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Abstract 
 
Contentious and politically fraught, the policing of disorder is directly linked to 
national culture and identity. France and Britain are European neighbours with 
distinct policing styles and traditions reflected in their differing approaches to 
public order policing.  
This thesis examines and compares this policing discipline in these 
countries. Focusing on the institutional and operational dimensions within their 
historical, social and political contexts, it identifies convergence and divergence 
of approaches.  
 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????n 
analytic framework, the thesis adopts a mainly qualitative approach, drawing data 
from a review of relevant literature, semi-‐??????????? ???????? ????????????
participant observations and case studies. A number of key findings are produced, 
based on the assumption that a state must possess an effective policing function 
for it to honour its sovereign and civic responsibilities.  
Both countries recognise that use of force upon citizens is legitimate only 
when necessary, proportionate and delivered by a civil institution. To achieve this 
both states maintain a public order policing capability. In France this is provided 
by full time specialist national forces; in Britain by an ad hoc part time response 
from as many as sixty geographical or functional forces.  
The main conclusions drawn from this research lie in the differences of 
histories, structures and traditions manifest in the central national institutions of 
France, and the devolved community based approach of the British. The tensions 
apparent in both states lie between the relevance of Republican Ideals or Peelian 
Principles respectively and their social realities. The prospects for safety and 
order in marginal communities are enhanced when the police and those policed 
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have a respectful relationship which improves communication, understanding and 
trust.  
The thesis argues that further review and adaptat??????? ???? ??????????????
model could operationalise it as good practice for police community threat 
assessment. It identifies some policy implications for both countries that should 
be accepted as good practice guidance. There is a strong case for modification of 
approach and sharing of identified good practice in both countries. Neither has 
achieved the necessary balance between state responsibilities and civic rights. 
Police-‐community relations in France should be addressed at a fundamental level 
and public order policing in Britain requires a review of its operational capability. 
It is on the ground that disorder situations are prevented and it is here that public 
confidence is won and lost. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction, Overview and Methodology 
Introduction and Overview  
 During the summer of 2011 a man was shot dead in the street in 
Tottenham, London. As a consequence serious public disorder broke out. Riots, 
looting and violence shocked the British public, as lurid headlines and pictures of 
burning buildings flashed around the globe. Not for the first time it was perceived 
that Britain had wobbled on the brink of anarchy (Guardian 2011; HoCHAC 2011; 
JRF 2011; Ministry of Justice 2011). Once again parts of Britain were seen to be 
enduring scenes of extreme lawlessness. 
At approximately 6.15pm on Thursday 4th August 2011 Mark Duggan was 
shot dead in Tottenham, London during an armed police operation (HoCHAC 
2011). During the evening of Saturday the 6th August, following a protest about 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????a five day period saw riots 
and looting in cities across England. Images of people smashing shop windows, 
stealing, and setting fire to buildings were broadcast across the world? (JRF 2011 
p1).  
Significant outbreaks of disorder occurred in diverse areas of London, 
spreading to a number of other British cities (JRF 2011; HoCHAC 2011; Ministry 
of Justice 2011; Singh et al 2011). Rightly or wrongly the police were criticised 
because of their perceived weakness of response to the disorder and were 
burdened with much of the blame. The spontaneity and rapidity of the spread of 
criminality and disorder to other areas shared many similarities with the events 
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that shook France in 2005 after two boys died trying to escape from the police at 
Clichy sous Bois (Lagrange 2009; Roché 2007; Waddington D 2007).  
Indifferent elites, police brutality, poverty and social exclusion have been 
cited1 as contributing to the explosions of violence in both countries. Neither the 
fact that the August disturbances of 2011 in Britain occurred, nor the possible 
causes of them, are the focus of this thesis but their resemblance to the French 
experiences of 2005 (and 2007) is significant. The presence of these similarities is 
important as it underscores the coherence of the comparative case study 
approach to the policing of public order in France and Britain that is adopted 
herein. The specific case studies selected for this research are justified later in 
this chapter, but it is clear that the disorders of August 2011, once ongoing 
inquiries have been completed, will provide another opportunity to assess the 
British style of public order policing. It is also hoped that the conclusions of this 
thesis may be useful to such future research. 
Public order policing is both gritty and newsworthy (Greer & McLaughlin 
2010). It has been subject to a great deal of academic scrutiny and comment, 
reflecting its status as an important and controversial area of policing 
(Waddington PAJ 2001). This study compares the policing of public order in France 
and Britain, and in order to do so, it considers the societal role of the police and 
aspects of police culture peculiar to the French and British traditions. It is helpful 
to accept that policing modern liberal democracies means facing ?similar basic 
pressures that shape a distinctive and characteristic culture?(Reiner 2000 p86) and 
it is timely to lay the foundation that this thesis works from an acceptance that ?a 
state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory? (Weber 1918).   
                                            
1 See Jobard 2009; Jobard et al 2009; Mouhanna 2009; Roché 2005/7; Davies 2011; JRF 
2011; Lewis et al 2011; Ministry of Justice 2011; Singh et al 2011; Younge 2011 
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???? ????????????????? ??????????? ???????????????? ????????? ?????????????????
?????? ????? ?? ???????? ??? ?????????? ??? ???? ??????? ??????????? ????? ????? Skolnick 
(1975 p3) clarifies that a police force that is nationally structured does not 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
with whether or not the police are ?answerable to a democratically elected 
Parliament?. It can be claimed that the civil police of any modern democratic  
society is the only body that uses force legitimately on behalf of the state upon its 
citizens, as ?the authority that police officers exercise is granted by the state; 
?????????????????????????????????????????????ly of legitimate force? (Waddington 
PAJ 1999 p20). Egon Bittner puts it another way: ?the policeman alone [sic], is 
equipped, entitled, and required to deal with every exigency in which force may 
????????????????????????????? 
The body of knowledge relating to the policing of public disorder is 
considerable. However, whilst research has been conducted into disorder and 
rioting in both France and Britain, little comparison has been made of how these 
incidents were policed. The intention in this thesis is to broaden and deepen this 
area of research by taking a comparative view of public order policing in these 
two European member states. The remainder of this chapter will describe the 
background and origins of this research project and will contextualise and outline 
the thesis aims, structure and methodology.  
Background 
 British policing has always had a clear identity, separate from the rest of 
the world, no more so than its approach to public order. That approach, of 
putting the police amongst the people to maintain security and facilitate 
protest, is quite distinct from other countries in Western Europe where 
police often use equipment including water cannon, CS gas and other 
physical measures to control crowds and separate the police from the 
protest crowd (HMIC 2009a p15) 
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???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of Constabulary (HMIC) sums up the view of many British police officers that their 
brand of policing, including the policing of public order, is distinct, different and 
generally better than that of their European counterparts. This is a natural and 
understandable self-‐belief and probably one common to most nations. The 
possibility that the British public order policing practice may not be so different 
from, nor yet as good ???? ???????? ????????? ????????? ??????? ?? ?????? ???? ?????
research during observation of a multi-‐national public order policing exercise 
hosted by the French Gendarmerie Mobile at their national public order training 
centre at Saint Astier in the Dordogne in June 2004. This exercise (one of a series) 
was funded by the European Union and could be emblematic of a wider 
Europeanisation of policing. Here it was possible to see for the first time how 
different European police and gendarmerie units could operate together, side by 
side, dealing with the same public disorder situations without resort to a truly 
common doctrine. The results were interesting; policing operations of various 
types and intensity were successfully executed and seemingly appropriate 
solutions to diverse and sensitive problems were implemented. If such good 
practice could be found in these circumstances then it must surely be possible to 
posit a combined European policing concept, or at least to accept that European 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 In order to assess the potential for any such sharing of good practice it was 
decided that a comparison of the French and British approaches to policing public 
order problems would highlight the similarities and differences in two major 
European neighbours who start from different ontological positions. This 
comparative approach allowed identification of good practice, affording an 
understanding of where there was convergence or divergence of ideas and 
consideration of how relevant knowledge might be shared. In turn, the insights 
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gained from this comparative approach served to frame a better understanding of 
the wider remit of public order policing. 
 France and Britain are countries that, on the face of it, police their 
citizens differently. In France, police officers are explicitly servants of 
government. They embody, symbolise and stand for the power and authority of 
the French state in a way wholly unfamiliar to the British citizen (Gregory 1985; 
Stead 1983). This begs the question as to how the police interact with the general 
public in nations where the police are considered to be an institution of the 
nation-‐state (Hartung 2008).  
Contrastingly British police constables are individually responsible as crown 
officers and servants of the law (Gregory 1985) where ?police power has not been 
regarded as lying at the heart of state authority? (Alderson 1985 p16). Knowing 
the social, economic, and political conditions, as well as any specific forms of 
protest pertaining to any locality is vital in understanding what is required to 
successfully police public disorder. Both countries have distinct but similar 
colonial and social histories, which frame their contemporary political and social 
characteristics. Consequently, some discussion of their socio-‐political landscapes 
and postcolonial characters is necessary. 
France: policing in the One and Indivisible Republic  
France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It 
shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction 
of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs. It shall be organised 
on a decentralised basis (French Constitution 2008). 
This extract from the French Constitution explicitly states that all citizens of 
France are equal. A foundation of the republican ideal it has also become a 
cornerstone of ????????????? ??????? ???? ?????????? ????????????????? ??ostcolonial 
????????????is the racial and ethnic difference of descendants of immigrants whose 
presence is a consequence of a colonial history (Michel and Honegger 2007). It is a 
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useful term that encapsulates a meaning that is present in both France and 
Britain. If one accepts that protest is usually a result of inequality and a lack of 
political voice, then it can be reasoned that minority groups, notably those with a 
???????????????????????????????????who have been housed in the banlieues of Paris, 
and other conurbations (in both countries), may have a reason to protest (Jobard 
2009; Lagrange 2009; Roché 2007).  
Inclusion, or rather exclusion, is seen by Michel and Honegger as an 
important factor in the attitudes of minority group members when they assess 
whether or not they have any stake in society. These researchers use the example 
of the French government?s adoption in 2005 of an article of law intended to 
better integrate the Harki minority (Algerians who fought with France in Algeria), 
and their families. ??????????????????????argument identifies two key groups: the 
first are the ?????????????? ?????????? who are aware of ethnic and racial 
differences that need recognition in order to be heard. The second group are the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
state that sees no differences in the public sphere. For this second group, there is 
no recognition of race or ethnicity ? there is simply one nationality -‐ the French. 
In their view, France manages diversity by denying it. Michel and Honegger go 
further in asserting that there is an implicit articulation by the Ministry of 
Integration that postcolonial difference is a danger to the state. Consequently the 
conscious group feels that negative interpretations of minorities are drawn 
because race and ethnicity are devoid of meaning and that the rejection of the 
past denies its impact on the present (Michel and Honegger 2007).  
 Violence is a continuing theme in colonial history and is, according to 
Aldrich (2007), linked to the use of violence in metropolitan France today through 
legacy. Violence is used by colonial descendants as a way of gaining self respect 
at an individual level. The violence of the coloniser is balanced by the violence of 
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the colonised and this is replicated today in the relationship between the 
marginalized inhabitants of the banlieues and the police. According to this 
analysis, all countries involved in colonialism used violence and are subject to 
violence in return (Aldrich 2007). This idea is useful in the comparison of the 
British and French policing strategies employed to deal with urban unrest in the 
late 20th and early 21st centuries.  
However, in spite of its secular philosophy, France has recognised minority 
groups in specific circumstances. This is evidenced by the recent trend towards 
????????? ??????????? ????? ??? ???? ????? ???? ?????????? unveiled in 2007 to 
???????????? ???? ??????? ??????? ???????? ?lgerians) who disappeared during the 
war of independence, or the Monument to Slaves (Aldrich 2007). ??????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
as a criterion to guide public policy, this is suggestive of some relaxation of the 
rigid republican view, or perhaps a sense of confusion in French state control. 
Aldrich states that the ?culture and ideology of violence that continues to echo 
from distant outposts of the empire to the banlieues of the post-‐colonial Hexagon? 
(Aldrich 2007p24) links colonial violence to modern issues. Such violence may 
indicate more than a limited crisis, indeed a decline or even a collapse of the 
French model of integration (Wieviorka 2005). 
 According to Zauberman & Levy (2003), both the visible appearance of the 
police and the legitimacy of their actions have a significant effect upon the 
perceptions of minority groups. The prospect of an ethnically representative 
police force (as recommended in Britain by Scarman 1981) is a strange one in 
France for two reasons: the conception that the police are accountable to the 
government and not to the people it polices; and, as also suggested by Aldrich 
(2007), that the republican ideal, an ?abstract conception of citizenship? gives no 
significance to the ethnic or cultural identities of its citizens (Zauberman & Levy 
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2003 p1065). As a result of the 2005 riots the French republican model has 
suffered further loss of public confidence and its abstract republican principles 
need to be brought in line with modern reality (Suleiman 2005). The public debate 
on crime and safety in France concentrates on the readily distinguished minority 
groups of Maghrebian and Black African youths, who are seen as violent 
delinquents. Little or no positive perceptions of these groups are articulated and 
statistical information regarding race and ethnicity drawn from police stop checks 
(procedural in Britain) would be inconceivable in France because of the idealised 
inclusive conception of being French (Zauberman & Levy 2003). Recognising 
diversity could be the first step in changing these entrenched perceptions. The 
republican ideal stands in the way of measuring this: it is simply not acceptable to 
that ideal for the state to record ethnicity, even if it is for the greater good. 
Some fear ???????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
??????????????wartime Vichy France, used to identify 76000 Jews who were sent to 
Nazi extermination camps, is held as an example of how terrible such a thing can 
be. (Zauberman & Levy 2003).   
 However, that the Police and Gendarmerie forces should visibly represent 
the public they serve is a reasonable argument. It serves no good purpose for the 
police to view more recent immigrants as nothing more than criminals, or for the 
police to be viewed by them as their enemies.  Whilst visible minority group 
representation in the police does not guarantee better community relations, it 
might serve to show that assimilation into society is possible for such groups, in 
???? ????? ???? ??? ???? ???? ???????? ???? ???????? ?????????? ???????? ??? ?????????
development.  
Ethnicity, culture, police attitudes, tactics and behaviour were significant factors 
(Roché 2007) and prior to the disturbances of 2005 that originated in Clichy sous 
Bois, there was a lack of police engagement with the populations of the 
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banlieues. Police attended incidents much as firemen [sic] go to fires, very 
quickly but too late (Roché 2007), and this is what allegedly occurred on a fateful 
evening in 2005. The police were tasked to answer a call and arrived to find 
themselves ?nose to nose? with a group of adolescents and a conflict situation 
arose. The youths that ran away from the police that evening did so, in all 
probability, to avoid contact with them, rather than because they themselves had 
done anything wrong. This sort of incident is nothing new to police officers who 
??????? ???? ???????????? ?????? ??? ???? ?????? ????? ??? ?????? Individuals do not make 
decisions without due regard for their surroundings, nor are they at the mercy of 
??????? ??????? ??????? ?????? ????????? ???? ??????? ??? ???????? ??? ???? situational, 
neighbourhood effect is significant in these choices and cannot be ignored 
(Sampson 2010). For Roché though, the police were poorly prepared for the 
escalation of the conflict that ensued and badly informed at the start of the riots 
that then followed. In France the police lack a truly community orientated 
policing ethos (Roché 2007) and consequently, one can surmise, they have no 
relationship with local youths other than that of enemies. As discussed in due 
course, this was confirmed by Police National (PN) and Compagnies Républicaines 
de Sécurité (CRS) sources during the empirical research.   
The disturbances that spread rapidly across France in 2005 will be the 
subject of a detailed case study later in this thesis, but for the purposes of the 
current discussion there were, according to Roché, six key moments in their 
escalation:  
1. The deaths of the two youths.  
2. The inability of the authorities (and the community) to calm the 
situation as the incidents increased.  
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3. Poor communication by the authorities, indeed dishonesty in their 
public statements. There was no openness or sympathy expressed 
for the families of the deceased, or the communities affected. 
4. A lack of appropriate police resources deployed to deal with the 
disorder.  
5. A poorly aimed smoke grenade fired into a Mosque that increased 
community tensions.  
6. The failure to anticipate that the riots would spread from their 
origin (Roché 2007 p14-‐25).  
The policing system was not effective (Roché 2007). The police were 
overly centralised and thereby incapable of attending to local needs. A large body 
with a small head is the metaphor used to describe the police organisation and a 
number of other national administrations (Roché 2007), reinforcing what was said 
by Zauberman and Levy (2003) regarding the French republican ideal and its 
centralist reality. 
Minister of the Interior ?????????? ???????????? ??? ????????? ??????? ???
?racailles? (rabble/scum) or ?savages? ???????????????????????????????????????????
lack of sympathy towards the minorities involved, which points again to an official 
indifference ??? ????????? ???? ?????????? ???? ?????????? (Zauberman & Levy p212). 
The predominantly reactive policy of the police and insensitive use of stop and 
search evidences a ?myopic? vision and shows that the rectors at Place Beauvau 
(home of the French Ministry of the Interior) have for years been ?feeling their 
way? in terms of strategic view and public relations (Roché 2007). This is very 
reminiscent of Scarman?s findings after the Brixton riots in Britain, over twenty-‐
five years ago, when he stated that the disorders of 1981 showed us how fragile 
public order is in a plural society (Scarman 1985).  
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????????? ?????????? ????????????? ??????? ??? ???? ?? ????????? ??????? ???
????????????????????????????????????????????????????of an issue than the structural 
conditions ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
that focused on the racially different, marginalised populations (Silverstein & 
Tetreault 2006) who are routinely policed (Jefferson 1990). 
Police resources in France are fully detailed in Chapter Three, but for now 
it is sufficient to accept that they are national forces that are assigned 
territorially using a numbers of officers per head of population formula that takes 
little or no account of crime rates in a locality (Roché 2005). There is an 
??????????? civil force of 146,000 police under the direction of the Ministry of the 
Interior and a gendarmerie force of 105,389 under the joint direction of the 
Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence to ensure internal security (US 
BDHR+L 2008). However according to Roché (2005 p35) the 17000 Gendarmes of the 
Gendarmerie Mobile (GM) and the 15000 agents of the CRS, which are the French 
public order policing specialists, are ?organised in an obsolete territorial basis? 
and little or nothing to do with the policing of daily delinquency. The police are 
criticised for not being directed by demand (Roché 2005), but this fails to give 
credit for their preparedness for dealing with disorder effectively and 
professionally when it occurs (Roach 1985; Stead 1983). Other arms of the 
judiciary are also nationally organised. Magistrates are structured in a similar 
manner and are consequently distant from the communities they serve, which has 
led to an incremental loss of public confidence in the penal system (Roché 2005).  
That said the concept of community policing is not unknown in France and 
a number of initiatives have been attempted. However its slow development has 
been a victim of electoral deadlines; as such reform requires time, political will 
and resources (Mouhanna 2008; Ober 2002). ?Il??????????????????????????????????????
local police officers in communities was one such initiative and one that could 
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have been successful but for the lack of political will both within policing and 
without. During the 1980s and 1990s the French police formally converted to 
ilotage but in practice very few officers gave the concept any credence, 
preferring the status quo of ?tough? policing (Mouhanna 2008).  
 The ??????? ????????????? later attempt at police reform ? ?Police de 
Proximité? (initiated, rolled out and disestablished between May 1997 and June 
2005) was another failed experiment in community policing. This style of policing 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ded from it. Jean-‐
Pierre Chevènement, then Minister of the Interior, claimed that the Police de 
Proximité project had been subject to more preparation than any other previous 
reform and the pilot in Paris was supposed to have been a model for further 
reform of the state. The reality fell short of this aim due to the hierarchical, 
complex and inflexible nature of the Ministry of the Interior and the layers of 
authority that managed the police (Roché 2007). 
Most recruits to this new form of policing were young in service and their 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ??? ????????? ???????? ??? ???? ?????? ??????? ?????????? ?????????? ????? ?????? ????
reform emphasised the judicial relationship between state and citizens and 
resulted in less problem solving and more process (Mouhanna 2008), leading to a 
lack of confidence all round and the ultimate failure of this socialist policy. 
According to Roché (2007), that failure was in part responsible for the 2005 
disturbances. Delinquency in France had risen since 1950 and the rate of 
detection of offences had fallen over the same period (up to 2002); indeed, 
offenders are half as likely to be identified today as they were half a century ago 
(Roché 2005). Manifestly this reform was destined to fail, in part due to those 
crime rates and the fact that it was both under resourced at an operational level 
and looked upon by police officers as a low prestige role. ?At the moment of its 
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????????????????????????? the necessary changes and means of its application had 
been rejected or diminished? (Roché 2005 p58; 83).  
In the build up to the elections of 2001 and 2002 Nicolas Sarkozy had 
ridden the political momentum of French preoccupation with security and the 
political right used the fear of crime to its benefit (Roché 2005; Mouhanna 2008). 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
installed Sarkozy as Minister of the Interior came with a strong results culture. 
They fixed such objectives as a 20% reduction in crime by 2006 and Sarkozy grew 
in popularity with his well-‐publicised determination to reduce delinquency (Roché 
2005 p259). This included the continuing use of the Brigades Anti-‐Crimes or BACs 
whose activities have been seen as abrasive by those targeted in the banlieues 
(Roché 2005; Mouhanna 2010b).  
Monsieur Sarkozy, whilst officially maintaining support for Police de 
Proximité, gradually withdrew resources allocated to it and ultimately disbanded 
them (Mouhanna 2008), which may have had unfortunate consequences. Jean-‐
Piere Chevènement stated in a recent interview (Le Post 2008) that the events of 
Seine Saint-‐Denis 2005 were a result of abandoning the Police de Proximité, since 
when the only contact between the youths on the estates and the police had been 
with units such as the BAC D. Whilst such interventions are often necessary, they 
are sometimes brutal. 
In this regard, these developments in France have followed a similar 
trajectory to the British ????????????? ???? ??? ?results? or ?performance led? 
policies that are imposed upon the public sector, which notably for this study 
includes the police (Savage 2007)?? ?????????? ?????? ??? ???????????????????????? ???
Britain are real drivers of police agency and have been the main performance 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? (Munro 2010; Neyroud 2008).   
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Roché suggests that the structure of geographical deployment of police 
and gendarmerie resources should be reorganised, a very sensitive issue that does 
seem to have merit, certainly at the more local level. He also suggests that the 
CRS and the GM are a wasted resource (2007 p281) being too costly, due to their 
regional structure and being too many in number. He recommends that the Police 
and Gendarmerie should be amalgamated, which really does amount to a culture 
shock for both agencies as it means the joining of a civil power with an historically 
military force and would require significant administrational and operational 
changes in order to achieve it. This amalgamation is already under way, as since 
2007 GN and PN agency within the French mainland has been managed by the 
Ministry of the Interior. The development of policing in France is more fully 
described in a later chapter, but until 2007 the Defence and Interior Ministries 
had effectively been in competition, as were (and still are) the different corps of 
police and gendarmes. This was/is more a professional rivalry than the territorial 
or geographical one apparent in Britain. 
Amalgamation of the French police and gendarmerie still seems a long way 
off but the streamlining of ministry control is aimed at acheiving savings and 
efficiencies. It is also worth noting that similar amalgamations have already been 
successfully managed in Belgium and Austria. The activities of the police are not 
an end in themselves but rather a means of service to the public (Roché 2007 
p284) and policing is a necessary function in order to guarantee human and 
??????????rights. This can be claimed to be so of any liberal democracy. The results 
culture is in reality a handicap by virtue of its centralised character and as such is 
counterproductive; in effect police efforts being hampered by central government 
policy (Roché 2007). 
Roché asserts that the idea of the Police de Proximité ?constitutes a 
unique model that will evolve (develop) policing in France and it was highly likely 
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that ex-‐president Sarkozy would relaunch it under a new name (Roché 2007). 
Although not directly attributable to Sarkozy himself, a new initiative was 
launched in 2008 by the then Minister of the Interior, Michelle Alliot-‐Marie, who 
launched UTeQ -‐ Unités Territoriales de Quartiers (NouvelObs 2008). These units 
were an experimental initiative with the stated intention of being ?police who are 
close to the people? (NouvelObs 2008). Alliot-‐Marie also said that it was not a case 
of reproducing the Police de Proximité. It was intended that there would be three 
teams of ten police officers, each with at least two years police experience. She 
also insisted that ?what counts is not the name [title] but the content? (Le Figaro 
2008) and that this initiative was part of a security plan to be piloted in Seine 
Saint-‐Denis (Paris) before being deployed across all of France. The inference here 
was that there was some official acceptance that the police needed to be closer 
to the people and acceptable to them if any trust was to be built. ?A police close 
??? ???? ?????????? ???????? ???? ????????? ???????? ?????quents, fight against 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
(Le Post 2008). The teams patrolled in the areas of Saint-‐Denis, La Corneuve and 
Clichy-‐Montfermeil all of which were and remain ?sensitive areas?. On the face of 
it this did seem to be a genuine attempt to re-‐introduce a locally based policing 
system, whilst avoiding the perception that the police de proximité amounted to 
police who only play football with the local kids as stated by Sarkozy in 2003 (Le 
Post 2008). This point was not missed by Alliot-‐Marie when she said that her new 
units would be on the ground to generate respect for the authority of the state 
and the law (NouvelObs 2008). UteQ though proved to be a relatively short lived 
initiative and was changed again in 2011 by the latest Minister of the Interior 
??????? ??????? ???? ????????? ????? ????? ????????? ???????????? ?????????? ??????
intended to establish community links through presence and example, whilst 
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ultimately cracking down on crime in line with presidential policy (Mouhanna 
2010).  
The activity of police officers alone though cannot assure improved 
community relations??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
The courts and their sentencing must also reflect the strategy. Fundamentally, 
whilst police efforts can contribute to a reduction in criminality, a lasting success 
will depend upon the efforts of other agencies linked to the judiciary dealing with 
such aspects as prevention and education (Roché 2005 p293). This partnership 
ethos has long been recognised in British policing as being vital to success in this 
regard (interview sources). Local policing strategies of the forty-‐three forces of 
England and Wales reflect the acceptance that the police cannot achieve success 
alone and the police role is often one of co-‐ordination rather than control (Home 
Office 2008; interview respondents). Stakeholders, which the residents of any 
area undoubtedly constitute, should be part of a consultation process and in order 
to do this the police need to be receptive to discussion. That does not signify any 
loss of statutory police powers but may necessitate a more negotiated approach. 
So it can be seen that France supports a centrally structured state 
???????????, ideologically underpinned by strong republican ideals. Again, for 
now, it is sufficient to describe it as nationally structured and administered. It is 
state controlled and does not have close links with the population it serves (Roché 
2005; Roach & Thomaneck 1985; Stead 1983). This contrasts with the British 
approach which we will consider next. 
Britain: Peelian principles and empirical realities  
British society ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????state not 
only recognises the legal existence of a social group, but also decentralises policy 
decision-‐making or implementation to those groups rather than to a geographical 
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territory (Lijphart 1980 in Wisler & Onwudiwe 2009 p8). Nevertheless, traditional 
attitudes to the role of policing in Britain had begun to change by the 1980s. By 
when, there were already concerns that the traditional view of the police as 
civilians in uniform was out of date ???????? ??? ??? ??????? ????? ????????? ???
?????????????????????????????????????????????? viewed as acceptable. Policing is a 
learning discipline and, as a result of such incidents as the Brixton riots of 1981 
and the Miners Strike 1984, public order management has moved on considerably. 
This is evidenced by the increasing militarisation of public order policing 
philosophy (Brewer et al 1988; Waddington PAJ 1991). A taboo had been broken in 
that the view that policing in Britain was non-‐political had been challenged: 
Nowhere are the police political innocents... focusing on public order 
policing is revealed as a political activity. Recognition of this fact may be 
more palatable to the passive observer of events in South Africa or 
Northern Ireland, but it is no less true of Britain (Brewer et al 1988 p4). 
?Policing is morally ambiguous and profoundly so? (Waddington PAJ 1996 p114), 
and police officers have a unique position in society being authorised by it to 
?exercise coercion? in a manner that would be totally illegal if attempted by 
anyone else. This infers that the civic responsibility for citizens to police 
themselves has been superseded by police enforcement. Public order policing 
involves a moral ambiguity that everyday crime fighting does not, as evidenced by 
the policing of the 1995 protest regarding animal exportation (Waddington PAJ 
1996 p115) when the police enforced the law, upon a group of citizens who were 
engaged in what amounted to civil disobedience, in order to stop the exportation 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
The moral ambiguity of police action in facilitating what was viewed 
ultimately as animal cruelty by many and therefore illegitimate is apparent. 
Public order policing has always been complicated by political considerations and 
few police commanders would disagree with this view: 
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Public order policing is irreducibly political; it is a highly visible 
representation of the relationship between the state and citizen. Its future 
is inextricably intertwined with how the British state develops (Waddington 
PAJ 1996 p129). 
There is an important difference between common criminality and protest: ?what 
distinguishes them is that protest is a conspicuous act of citizenship? and breaking 
the law in order to ?participate in that moral community? (Waddington PAJ 1996 
p115) is seen as legitimate.  
The year-‐lon???????????????? of 1984 had stimulated a rapid development 
in police tactics and deployments and officers had increasingly been seen wearing 
riot helmets and protective pads and carrying shields. The police had developed 
the National Reporting Centre (NRC) in 1972 because of previous miners? strikes 
that had shown the police response to be ineffective. From then on the co-‐
ordination of nationwide deployments could be centrally managed. New 
legislation had been passed that gave greater police powers (The Public Order Act 
1986), evidencing greater state involvement (Brewer et al 1988). CS agents and 
baton round options were by now available for police commanders (Brewer et al 
1988), though deployment of such options is extremely rare even now. Such 
tactical options are very rarely deployed and have never been recorded as having 
been used as a public order option on the mainland of Britain (interview sources). 
The limited and directed use of CS agents within firearms operations will not be 
considered here.   
In 1981 The Scarman Report was published as a result of his inquiry into 
the Brixton riots of 10th ?12th April that year. Lord Scarman was appointed by the 
then Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, to ?inquire urgently into the serious 
????????? ???????????? (Scarman 1981). His report was wide ranging and detailed, 
paying attention not only to police involvement but also to social and political 
conditions, as ?the disorders cannot be fully understood unless they are seen in 
19 
 
the context of complex political, social and economic factors which together 
create a predisposition towards violent protest? (Scarman 1981 p195). The 
disorder occurred not as a sudden unpredictable event, but after a long period of 
social exclusion and perceived racial discrimination by a number of official bodies, 
notably the police. Many officers from other boroughs and departments  of the 
????????????? ??????? ???? ????? ????????? ??? ?????????? ??????? ????? ???????????
n???????? ????? ???? ??????? ?????????????? ?????? ???? ???????????? ????? ?????? ??????
sections of the now revoked Vagrancy Act of 1824 (Hall 1999; Jones, C. 2011). 
Little evidence or even suspicion appeared to be needed in order to justify 
searching young local men, many of whom were of African Caribbean descent. 
Scarman advised that it is better to be policed consistently by local officers than 
heavily in short lived saturation policing operations. His recommendations were a 
watershed in policing practice, forming the basis for significant and ongoing 
changes to the policing of minorities and community race relations. A number of 
advances were made as a direct result of them. 
Scarman argued that all officers, from Constable to Commander/Assistant 
Chief Constable (ACC), should receive training in public order tactics to a common 
minimum standard. He saw a need for specialist public order units and the Special 
Patrol Groups (SPG) were maintained, albeit their title has changed, accepting 
that there would be circumstances where their deployment was necessary. He 
also mentioned the options of CS agents and baton rounds as being available for 
use if necessary.  
In the larger towns and cities with significant ethnic minority groups the 
police were seen by some as a predominantly white and racist organisation. The 
inner city riots of 1980-‐?????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????
and Tottenham amongst others, had occurred after some form of police 
????????????? ????? ?????? ??? ?? ???????? ?????????? ????? ?????????? ??port had 
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recommended improvements in police training in public order policing and dealing 
with diversity (then community race relations or CRR). By then the police had 
?????? ????? ?????????? ??????? ???? ??????? ?????? ????????? ????????? ???? ??????????
significantly but CRR had not. CRR in 1988 was generally not a priority and police 
attitudes had yet to be seen to change and this may still be the case: 
The essential problem remains a policing culture that, since the inception of 
the modern police in 1829, has always measured success in terms of the 
prevention and detection of crime, the maintenance of public order and the 
prosecution of offenders, and which has historically seen little value in 
developing community relations (Whitfield 2006). 
Lord Sca??????? ??????? ???????????? ?? ????????? ???? ????????? ???????? ???
racially discriminatory behaviour, which has been added to the police discipline 
code. He also recommended that an independent body should investigate 
complaints against the police, whilst allowing that there was no suggestion that 
police investigations were flawed. There was, however, a widespread lack of 
public confidence in the then existing system (Scarman 1981). Indeed, a number 
of changes have been made in the intervening period and the present Independent 
Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) does not directly employ police officers.  
Scarman (1981) was of the view that patterns of patrol should include 
mobile and foot patrol and that operational officers should have the opportunity 
to get to know the community they serve. This is an approach that many would 
think essential, one that was idealised in such television programmes as Dixon of 
Dock Green. However, similar to the French case, community policing was seen by 
many officers as a low prestige role and many of the most able officers were 
????????????????? ??????????????????????? ??????????????????????? ?????????????????
1982 p103). 
Scarman also believed that the police force should be more representative 
of the public it serves. Officers from minority groups were not present in the 
police in anything like the percentages they were present in the general 
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population. He did not support the use of quotas in recruitment or the lowering of 
standards, but made it clear that vigorous efforts should be made to recruit more 
black people (Holdaway 1991 p365; Scarman 1981). This was echoed by Robert 
Reiner; ?...the personnel of the police must reflect the more diverse and plural 
demographics of postmodern societies? (1992 p780). 
The police did take heed of almost all his recommendations, some of which 
were more readily achievable than others. Even thirty years later some have yet 
to be accomplished, notably the representation of ethnic minority groups in the 
police, which is still only 3.5% (British Council 2011) compared to the non-‐white 
proportion of the national population of 7.9% (Office for National Statistics 2011). 
Whilst the Scarman Report was the beginning of a long and ongoing period of 
change and much has happened since then, his findings remain a landmark in 
police community relations against which comparison can still be made. 
Since the Scarman Report, other inner city disturbances across Britain have 
prompted further inquiries and reports.  
During the spring and early summer of 2001, there were a number of 
disturbances in towns and cities in England involving large numbers of 
people from different cultural backgrounds and which resulted in the 
destruction of property and attacks on the police. Whilst these 
disturbances were rightly condemned by all sides of the communities 
affected, the Government made clear its determination to establish why 
these disturbances took place (John Denham in Cantle 2001).   
 
??????????????????????? ?????????? ???? ???????????? ??????? ????? (Cantle 2001) 
was initiated after what have become known as the Northern Milltown Riots that 
occurred in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford. A wide-‐ranging and detailed report 
that covered all the ingredients of British multicultural citizenship, it made sixty-‐
seven recommendations of which seven were directed at policing: 
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? local and police authorities should establish protocols of support, with 
clear agreements put in place to tackle serious problems such as 
criminality and inter community tensions;  
? the police should develop ?good practice guides? on communication with 
all sections of the community including young people;  
? the police should facilitate formal and informal contacts with the 
community and, where necessary,  re-‐organise duties and ?patch 
responsibilities?;  
? the police should address the lack of financial reward and career 
progression opportunities in the discipline of community policing, 
especially in the inner city areas;  
? should quality assure diversity training;  
? should review ethnic minority recruitment and take new and radical 
measures in that regard;  
? should look at more pro-‐active approaches to the banning of potentially 
inflammatory marches and demonstrations (Cantle 2001 p60-‐61).  
There were obvious similarities to the recommendations made by Scarman, 
particularly regarding the status of community police officers. A partnership or 
multi-‐agency approach was recommended and Cantle also makes clear the 
importance of the police in dealing with ?quality of life? issues. No agency alone 
???????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????? ???? ????? ?? ?????? ????? ??? ???????? ???? ???? ??????? ???? ?? ?????nition that 
?????? ????????? ???? ????????? ?????????????? (Cantle 2001 p40 5.11.1). The 
problems highlighted were more to do with a lack of police presence and the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????s that 
???? ???? ????? had developed. Cantle also emphasised the depth of social 
polarisation. Communities were not only separated geographically in housing 
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estates and schools, they operated ????? ???? ?????? ??? ?? ??????? ??? ????????? ?????? 
(Cantle 2001p9 2.1). This echoes comments made by Herman Ouseley, identifying 
a concerning drift towards self-‐segregation (Ouseley 2001). It was found 
communities may be geographically contiguous but are not neighbourly, which in 
turn results in ignorance, distrust, prejudice and ultimately conflict. The 
similarities between this and events in the banlieues of France are unmistakeable.  
????????????????segregated existence of some communities has been blamed 
by some on the failure of multiculturalism as a policy (Cantle 2001; Mirza 2007). 
This failure has been apparent for some time, with minority communities vying 
against each other in the political arena for resources. The Cantle report 
?????????? ??? ???? ???? ??? ?????? ?????? ????????????? ????????? ???? ?????????
segregation in parts of Britain? (Mirza 2007). A full critique of British 
multiculturalism would require its own thesis and is outside the scope of this 
work. That said, it should be recognised that the findings of both Scarman and 
Cantle are significant in that not much had changed during the twenty years 
between them. This provided some of the context that helps focus this research.  
Research focus 
In order to make a viable comparison of public order policing in France and Britain 
it is necessary to consider the respective historical, social and political 
foundations in both countries, as a frame for understanding how policing is 
imagined and practised. A contextual understanding of the institutional and 
operational levels of policing public order is also necessary.  
Informed and framed by the concepts and findings identified in the extant 
research literature, a qualitative research design was constructed based upon a 
multi-‐method comparative strategy integrating elite interviews and direct and 
participant observations in both countries. The development of this approach was 
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selected in order to access the perspectives, ideas and practices that inform and 
shape how professional police officers approach the issues involved in managing 
mass public disorder. 
Case studies are used ?to contribute to our knowledge of individual, group, 
organisational, social, political and related phenomena? (Yin 2009 p4).  In order to 
further extend and elaborate the insights derived from the chosen approach, it 
was decided to include a comparative case study of public order incidents in both 
countries as ?an empirical inquiry that investigates contemporary phenomenon in 
depth and within its real-‐life context? (Yin 2009 p18). ???????????????????????????
the case studies chosen meant that no single data collection method could be 
relied upon (Yin 2003). There are six sources for the collection of evidence 
?documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant 
observation and physical artefacts? (Yin 2003 p98). The requirements of this thesis 
were met from four of these: documents, interviews, and direct and participant 
observations. Multiple sources of evidence allowed consideration of a broader 
range of issues and a ?convergence of sources? (Yin 2003p117) which, guided by 
?????????????????????????????ensured a focused study.  
Overall research aim/objectives 
The research design outlined above was devised to answer three main research 
questions: 
1. What is the role of the police in policing disorder in the two countries? 
2. How and why do French and British police forces approach disorder in the 
styles that they do?   
3. In what ways are convergence and/or divergence of approach apparent in 
the policing of public disorder in France and Britain? 
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????????? ??????????????? ??????????????????????????????????? ????????????? model 
(Waddington D et al 1989) was utilised to provide an analytic framework for 
organising, assessing and interpreting the empirical data. It is an approach that 
has already been successfully utilised in the analysis of a number of public 
disorder incidents. An enhanced version of this framework was adapted in line 
?????????????????? ???? ????????? ??????? ????? ?????? ???????? ??? ????????? ???????????
and policies, as well as the existing six levels of structuration. This framework was 
applied to the research findings from all sources. 
This chapter concludes with a summary of the research aims for this thesis 
and its methodology. The methodological considerations are explained, as is the 
choice of a qualitative research strategy employing observational and interviewing 
techniques for the fieldwork. It also justifies the choice of the adapted version of 
???? ?????????????? ?????? ??? ???? ????????? ?????????? ???? ?????????? ???? ???????
structure. 
Methodology 
 
All social research sets out with specific purposes from a particular 
position, and aims to persuade readers of the significance of its claims; 
these claims are always broadly political (Clough and Nutbrown 2007 p4) 
 
This section explains the research strategy and how it was conducted. It will set 
out the rationale for the qualitative approach using both inductive and deductive 
??????????? ?????? ????? ????? ???? ???????? ????? ????? ???????????? ????????? ?refrains 
????????????????? ???????????? ??? ?????? ??? ????? ????? Rather concepts are 
developed and refined in the process of research? (Flick 2007 pX).  
Flick recommends creativity of methods or approaches, adapting these in 
order to achieve the research aims. This, in the context of this comparative study, 
required research to be carried out in two countries, consequently demanding 
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logistical and methodological flexibility that was simultaneously ?sensitive and 
adaptive to conditions in the field? (Flick 2007 p50).  
Such cross-‐national comparison secures a number of benefits including 
making contact with individuals who have great experience and knowledge of 
their national traditions. Through comparison of a variety of concepts, new 
insights and deeper understanding of the issues are possible. Researchers are able 
to identify similarities and differences in the characteristics of institutions, 
structures and practices. Different cultural perspectives are possible from 
understand?????????????????viewpoint and seeing ????? own approaches through 
the eyes of a knowledgeable external observer (Hantrais 1995). Comparative 
research is also helpful in the refinement of theory (Howard, Newman & Pridmor 
2000). 
Origins and Context 
Each year between 2003 and 2008 the Gendarmerie Nationale hosted a 
?European Union Multi National Pu?????????????????????????????????????????????????
exercises and intelligence management at their sizeable Centre National 
??????????????? ???? ??????? ??? ???????????? ???????? ??? ??? ???????? ??????????
Several countries from around Europe, as well as Turkey and Morocco, sent units 
to participate in these EU funded exercises, which afforded an opportunity to 
observe and experience the various national approaches to public order policing, 
and to assess the differing operational dimensions and doctrines. This is from 
where the idea for this research originated and developed, in the belief that it 
would give a deeper and broader understanding of this specialist area of policing.  
Further contemplation of the subject caused the author to consider questions such 
as:  
? When is it necessary to disperse a crowd?  
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? Why is the use of tear gas such a sensitive issue in Britain, when it is used 
readily and seemingly without public disapproval in France, where 
associated injury potential is comparatively low compared to the use of 
bodily force and batons often preferred in Britain? 
? Why is the policing of public order in France perceived, in Britain, to be a 
brutal affair compared to British methods?  
These were apparently straightforward questions that, when given careful 
consideration, proved to be not so easy to answer. Happily all the questions were 
researchable in that they were: interesting, relevant, feasible, ethical, concise 
and answerable (Green 2008 p47).  
It is timely here to acknowledge the centrality of human rights dilemmas 
to the policing of public order and human rights considerations are at the core of 
police doctrine and planning (KtP 2010). France and Britain (U.K.) are signatories 
to the European Convention on Human Rights (Ovey & White 2010) and whilst 
human rights are referred to in this thesis, and the public order policing doctrines 
of both countries are discussed, it is felt that deeper discussion of human rights 
issues would deserve a thesis of its own, so it needs to be clarified that analysis of 
the human rights dimension is not pursued in depth in this thesis. 
Prior to  commencing data collection, the above questions were further 
defined and refined through a lengthy process of ??????-‐???????????????????????????
the nature and scope of the questions and issues, followed by prioritisation, 
refinement and review (Green 2008 p56). A ?????????? ??? ?????????? ?????????????
was made to the European Governance, Identity and Public Policy (EGIPP) 
research group of the Cardiff University School of European Studies, and the 
feedback obtained used to inform the development of the project. This eventually 
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came to focus upon a research question that asked ?how can we and should we 
contextualise and compare the policing of public order in France and Britain?? 
Of direct relevance to the research in terms of access to the field and the 
data obtained was the fact that throughout the field research stages, the author 
was a serving  police officer professionally engaged in the policing of public order 
at all levels. ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
typo????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????? ???????? ??????? ????????????????????????? ???????? ??????????? ?????????
?????????????????? ??? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????nal commentators).  
The descriptors given for each group were useful not only in appreciating 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
police service, but also that even though leaving the organisation before 
completing the analysis might restrict future access, it could be beneficial as 
regards avoiding potential conflicts as well as giving an extra dimension in that:   
useful creative tensions between researcher types... can push the 
boundaries of inquiry further than any one constituency...understanding 
can only be enhanced if there is a greater degree of crossover between the 
theoretical and applied domains and a suspension of hostility between 
???????????????????????? 
As Jennifer Brown describes it, for the British research, access was 
provided to an ?inside insider??? ??? ??????? ????? ??????? ???? ????? ???? ??? ?????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????, and it is 
fair to say that, in order to gain access to the French Police and Gendarmes 
involved in public order, having this status was a necessity.  
It was anticipated that the author would complete the analysis and writing 
??? ??? ????? ?????? ?????? ???? ??????????? ????? ???? ??????? ???? ??? ????? ??? ?????????
????????? ??????? ?????????????? ????????? ????? ???? ???????? ???????? ???? ?????????????
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?????????? ??? ??????? ?????????? ????????? ????? ??? ?????? ????? ?? ????. It was hoped 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????? ??????? ??? ?????????? ?????n 1996 p182) or as David Canter puts it in his 
???????? ????????????????????????: ?????????????????????????????????????????????
leads to respect from colleagues and sometimes even to promotion. For the police 
officer such openness to those outside the police is fraught with danger and does 
???? ???????????? ?????? ???? ??????? ?????????? ???????? ??? ????????? ???? ?????? ?????
p119). Brown also notes that there are a number of former police officers such as 
PAJ Waddington that have become professional academics and as s?????????????????
????????????? 
Initial access to the French police was arranged through official police 
channels with the French Embassy Police Liaison Officer in London, who did a 
superb job, over a period in excess of a year, making the necessary arrangements 
that made a two week research mission possible. The structure of the visit and 
the timetable was set by the French authorities based upon several 
communications outlining the research aims and logistical requirements. It 
included a week in Paris as a guest of the Gendarmerie Nationale at their barracks 
situated at Maisons Alfort in South West Paris and visits to the Police Nationale Val 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Compagnies de Securit??????????????s Paris Headquarters at Vélizy Villacoublay in 
West Paris. Similarly the Gendarmerie Nationale provided access at all levels and 
at a number of venues in and around Paris. A number of presentations and/or 
tactical demonstrations were provided by all those visited and each of these was 
supplemented by question and answer sessions that were informal and helpful. 
Week two of the visit was spent as a participant observer at the CNEFG where the 
author was involved in a number of public order tactical training exercises 
involving several Gendarmerie Mobile squadrons. This form of research ?maximises 
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opportunities to learn from practice and promotes the transferability of new 
ideas? (Silver 2008 p103).  
Throughout the visit no request was refused or question avoided. 
Numerous informal conversations took place and everyone involved appeared keen 
to help and were open in their attitude. Photographs were taken of scenario 
training that, being information rich, supported description and arguments 
(Alexander 2008 p473) giving readers a better understanding of the issues.  
During this visit the author spent a total of nine full days observing and 
participating in public order policing briefings and exercises. It was recognized 
that, due to the slight difference of researcher typology during the French 
research and the evident logistical limitations, there could be an asymmetry of 
approach and potential for an imbalance in data collection and the inferences 
drawn.  
Several discussions were engaged in with officers from the rank of 
Lieutenant to Colonel/Commissaire. ??????????? ????????????????????????????? ???
that they were guided by the research experience and data gathered in Britain. In 
total approximately fifty hours of exercises and presentations were observed. 
Field notes were made in a research log and copies of the always freely available 
presentation notes were retained????????????????????????????????????????????????
the evenings and conclusions/personal observations noted. The data gathered 
during this period is detailed or discussed later in this thesis. It should be added 
here that, during 2004 and 2005, an additional fifteen days of immersion with 
gendarmerie units had been achieved, adding to the understanding of the French 
approach and providing a good base of knowledge to build on as a practitioner-‐
researcher during the formal research phase. 
?Someone who undertakes research within and often on behalf of their 
organisation? is known as a practitioner-‐researcher according to Gray ((2009 p401) 
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and whenever such a study is conducted there are inevitable questions regarding 
objectivity and subjectivity. Gray pays due regard to the ?fairly open access to 
key decision makers?, but also balances this against the difficulty of adopting 
fresh perspectives and approaches. Silver (2008 p104) makes the point that 
?traditionally... separation has been seen as important in establishing and 
maintaining objectivity? going on to justify participatory research as being 
?valuable in ensuring that the research remains grounded in the understanding and 
experiences of those being studied? (Silver 2008 p105).  
The need for objectivity throughout this research project was well 
understood. Subjectivity and ???? ????????? familiarity with the subject were 
identified as potential issues and guarded against. The project was self-‐funded 
which meant that there were no vested interests requiring consideration. Another 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the researcher as a subject, and it was viewed as a potential agent for change. 
The data was generated from the direct experiences of research sources (Gray 
2009 p313). 
Developing the Research Strategy ? Using a Qualitative Methodology 
This thesis is reliant on mixed methods that provide both a comparative 
and qualitative approach (Ragin 1994). It is in many respects ethnographic in 
character, in that it necessitates a ?multi-‐method qualitative approach? in order 
to achieve its aims and in large part seeks to ?????????????????????????????????????
their own world? (Flick 2007 p149). It broadly follows the approach described by 
Angrosino as ?the collection of information about the material products, social 
relationships, beliefs and values of a community? (2007 pXV) using ethnographic 
methods that ?have been adapted by scholars from many academic disciplines and 
professional fields? (Angrosino 2007 p19). The nature of this study is such that it 
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???? ???????????? ????? ???? ?????????????????????????????? ?? ????????? ???????? ?????
needed to ?discover a ?methodology? for itself? (Clough + Nutbrown 2007 p xi) and 
so consequently some refinement of the research plan was expected and indeed 
welcomed when changes were necessary. In order to further explain the research 
methodology it is necessary to justify the choice o?????????????????????????? 
????????????????? 
 As detailed in the literature review in the next chapter, there are a 
number of theories that could be applied to any given public order or disorder 
scenario. It has also been ?????? ????? ???? ?????????????? ????? has been 
successfully used to analyse a number of different types of disorder events 
including urban disorders, football violence and single issue protest (Waddington D 
2007). The six interdependent levels specified by the Flashpoints model, assessing 
the structural, political/ideological, cultural, contextual, situational and 
interactional factors behind such incidents, provide an effective mechanism for 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in explaining how and why a particular public order incident occurred.  
In its original form, the Flashpoints model gives little consideration to 
police traditions, culture or doctrines. As such, it was necessary to add another 
level of structuration to take account of this area. David Waddington has 
suggested that an additional seventh level would enhance the model: 
focusing on such recognised influences on police behaviour as national 
traditions of policing, formal systems of accountability and the particular 
philosophies, ??????????? ??? ????????? ?????????? ??????????? ??????????
aspects of strategy and tactics in relation to public order situations 
(Waddington D 2010 p346). 
The areas he lists here as integral to this additional level of analysis amount to 
doctrine. For British public order policing, this is set out in the ACPO manual of 
Guidance on Keeping the Peace (KtP 2007) the first edition of which was published 
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in 2001. As will be discussed in more detail in due course, inclusion of this seventh 
level provides better contextual understanding of police agency at the 
???????????????????????????????????? 
Hence there are seven levels of analysis available for consideration which, 
when addressed with due regard to the advantages of understanding the issue of 
identities in crowd management (Reicher 1987; Adang 2002; Stott 2005), add 
meaning to this study.   
  The broad theoretical framework sketched out above, has ?influenced the 
design, orientation and character? of this study (Cooper 2008 p9). Having selected 
a predominantly qualitative approach, the specific field methods of participant 
observation linked with informal interviews and conversations, elite interviewing 
and case studies chosen for the data collection need to be explained and 
justified.   
??????????????????????????d for deciding which sources would be the most 
productive and effective was straightforward. The respondents interviewed 
depended on the nature of the organisations and people being studied, as well as 
on the (very) ?legitimate limitations on [researcher] time, mobility, access and so 
forth? and of course, the research aim (Ambrosino 2007 p48). As far as public 
order policing in Britain was concerned, choices were driven by what was 
??????????? ?????? ????? ???? ????????? ????????? ??? ??? ???????? ????????? ???? ????
numerous possible sources available to him due to his length of police service and 
existing network of contacts.  
The strategy employed for selecting respondents and settings for 
??????????? ????????????? ???? ???? ??? ???????????? ?????????? ???????? ??????? ?????
????????? ??? ???????? ??? ??????????? information-‐rich cases for study in-‐???????
(Patton 2002p230), and was also used to select the case studies described later. 
Patton outlines fifteen purposeful sampling strategies and this thesis was guided, 
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in particular, by two of these, ?????????? ??? ?????? ?????????, ???? ???????????
???????????Patton 2002 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????well 
situated people? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????? ?cases... meet some predetermined criterion?? ?Patton 2002). A 
total of sixteen semi-‐structured interviews were conducted with police officers 
who had several years of experience in a command role, encompassing the 
complete range of strategic, tactical and operational functions (see chart below). 
The data gathering phase had in effect commenced many years before this 
study and the knowledge already acquired was supplemented in a directed 
manner using a variety of methods and sources. It was felt that this would ensure 
an appropriate amount of relevant data allowing the construction of the kind of 
??????? ?????????????? ??????????? ???????????? ????????? ???????? ?????? ????? ???????
Identifying the subjects for interview was again based on knowledge of the 
subject area, and knowing who the policy decision makers were in the British 
police service.  
Rank Experience Formal/Informal 
Chief Constable Strategic, tactical and operational 
command 
F 
Deputy Ch. Constable x 2 Strategic, tactical and operational 
command 
F 
ACC/Commander x 2 Strategic, tactical and operational 
command 
F 
Ch/Supt. x 3 Strategic, tactical and operational 
command 
F 
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Superintendent x 3 Strategic, tactical and operational 
command 
F 
Ch/Inspector x 2 Tactical and operational command F 
Inspector Tactical and operational command F 
Sergeant Operational Command Strategic, 
tactical and operational advisor 
F 
Commissaire and command 
team 
Strategic, tactical and operational 
command 
I 
Colonel x 2 Strategic, tactical and operational 
command 
I 
Lt Colonel x 3 Strategic, tactical and operational 
command 
I 
Major/Commandant x 2 Tactical and operational command I 
Capitaine x 3 Tactical and operational command I 
Lieutenant x 2 Operational Command I 
Fig. 1 Interviews: subjects rank, role, experience and whether interview formal or 
informal. 
The strategy in this area was, where possible, to take advantage of 
existing relationships. Two senior and influential ACPO officers already knew the 
researcher, ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the rest would follow, a tried and tested route to success that is suggested by 
Arksey and Knight (1999 p122/3). This approach did work and in every case the 
respondent was happy to help and gave up significant time from their busy 
schedules. More importantly, their enthusiasm for their work was evident and 
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their candour appreciated. All the British interviews were conducted according to 
a semi-‐standardised interview schedule (Fielding and Thomas 2008 p246) so that 
the same questions were asked of each respondent but with allowance for 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
was felt that this would benefit the research and enable the examination of the 
context of thought, feeling and action? (Arksey and Knight 1999 p32); additionally 
and importantly qualitative interviews especially ?allow for understanding and 
meanings to be explored in depth? (Arksey and Knight 1999 ). 
The questions were designed to address the key issues of the research and 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
order to ensure consistency and relevance to the research question. 
Supplementary questions were also included to be asked where appropriate. All 
interviewees consented to their interviews being recorded on a digital voice 
recorder for later transcription thus ensuring a ?permanent record that captures 
the whole of the conversation? (Arksey and Knight 1999 p 105).  This was helpful 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
that analysis of the texts could be carried out. This assisted greatly, providing a 
complete record of what was said. Contemporaneous field notes of key points 
were also made during the interviews in order to have a summary of the main 
issues that when considered alongside the transcripts would allow for a thorough 
analysis. 
Due consideration was given to whether the use of Computer Assisted 
Qualitative Data Analysis (CAQDAS) would be of benefit and it was decided not to 
use it on the grounds that the amount of data gathered from the interviews would 
be such that a paper based analysis would be achievable. Using the CAQDAS 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????that were available, was viewed 
as unlikely to add any value. Furthermore, access to the hardware containing 
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these programmes would be problematic and to become comfortable with the 
software would be vitally important (Lewins 2008 p417) but time constraints 
meant that this necessary level of comfort would not be achievable. Added to this 
was ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?the 
personal nature of the relationship between data and the researcher? (Lewins 
2008 p417). This was considered to be a rational decision based on an informed 
position (Delamont 2010). 
The review of existing literature has provided some essential theories for 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
2007 p49). It has also revealed a number of sources of contextual data and the 
fact that there have been numerous studies into public order policing, including a 
comparative study of rioting in France and Britain (Waddington et al 2010). 
Notwithstanding, it is still the case that there has not been a comparative study of 
the policing of public order in France and Britain, nor one that was designed to 
show how the respective police forces manage public order and disorder nor, 
importantly, why they do what they do. In order to achieve the necessary broad 
understanding of the issues it was decided that as well as the contextual 
knowledge provided by a historical approach, it was necessary to compare case 
studies from both countries.   
A case study is an in-‐depth study of a particular instance or of a few 
carefully selected cases (Gilbert 2008). Care needs to be taken with 
generalisation of findings but it is possible to be far more detailed than when 
using a large sample (Gilbert 2008). Case studies ?add depth of understanding to 
individual, group, organisational, social, political and related phenomena? (Yin 
2009 p4) and can ?explain the presumed causal links in real-‐life interventions that 
are too complex for the survey or experimental strategies? (Yin 2009 p19). For this 
thesis the aim was to be able to draw some conclusions through a comparative 
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analysis (Gomm et al 2002). ???????????????????????????????????????is framework to 
the data provided the necessary rigour. It also ensured that a systematic 
procedure was followed (Yin 2009 p14). Embedding the case studies in this 
appropriate theoretical framework meant that they could be used analytically 
with the rich detail that emerged providing illuminating insights, ?making formerly 
opaque connections suddenly pellucid? (Mitchell 2002 p183). 
Deciding which case studies were most suitable was based on their being 
both interesting for their own sake and that they were exceptional in some way 
(Gilbert 2008 p36). The relevance and currency of the events in question was also 
a consideration. It was necessary to select cases ?in which the experiences or 
processes to be studied [would] become especially clear? (Flick 2007 p28). 
Selection of the public disorder events for study was based upon the following 
main considerations:  
? How recent were the events and the availability of evidence 
? The seriousness of the disorder and that sustained police agency 
was necessary to deal with it  
? The involvement of a wide range of police assets drawn from a 
large geographical area 
Andrew Bennett???????????comparative methodology shows us how 
comparison of case studies helps with identification of additional variables and 
hypotheses, making inferences regarding causal mechanisms and developing 
historical explanations. Such comparison should achieve effective 
operationalisation of variables, or ?construct validity????????????????. The ability 
to identify new hypotheses is important and case studies do so by deduction and 
induction. There were some considerations necessary regarding the potential for 
bias in case selection, however it was thought that for the method of this thesis 
the choices of which events to study were well justified and the ?tension between 
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parsimony and richness?????????????????????achieved through application of the 
???????????????????, as adapted, to the data proved to be beneficial. The 
limitations of case study methods including any lack of representativeness or 
?weak capability???????? ?causal weight???????????????????? of variables were also 
catered for by ?????????????. This thesis illuminates a number of policy 
implications; case studies contribute to theory building (Bennett 2002) and such 
theory development can be useful in policy making (George & Bennett 2005). 
Decisions as to where best to go for participant observation in France were 
taken by the French Embassy, as already explained, and their choices proved to 
be appropriate, relevant, and informative. The conclusions, set out at the end of 
the thesis, are enriched by the empirical data derived from the fieldwork. The 
structure of the thesis is detailed in the next section.  
Thesis structure  
Following this introduction and discussion of methodology, the thesis is divided 
into seven further chapters. Chapter Two contains a review of the literature 
which offers a discussion of public order policing and linked social research. The 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
policing, and lays down the foundations of the thesis, addressing the ambiguity 
associated with repressive police agency on behalf of the state. This includes a 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 An overview of the different genres of disorder and protest is given, 
together with some discussion on the policing of crowds. Also the merits and 
demerits of the militarisation of public order policing are considered. The issues 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
The next four chapters rely on the fieldwork carried out in both France and 
Britain over a period of five years, and specifically upon testimony and observed 
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data from visits to key sources during 2009, presenting the empirical findings 
derived from that fieldwork period. Chapters Three and Four provide a contextual 
understanding of contemporary policing in France and Britain respectively, with 
their historical, social and political dimensions being addressed, focusing on the 
policing of public order within their particular republican and monarchic 
constitutions. These chapters also furnish description and explanation of the 
structures, traditions and doctrines of the policing institutions, and how public 
order policing is approached in the two countries. Chapters Five and Six are 
devoted to case studies into the causes and the policing of significant disorder 
events in both countries. The incidents were chosen because they were of a 
magnitude that required the mobilisation of large numbers of police officers 
across large geographical areas, which tested not only the operational efficiency 
of police tactics but also their sustainability over a period of time.  
The French case study focuses on two incidents -‐ Clichy sous Bois/Seine 
Saint Denis in 2005 and Villiers le Bel in 2007, both large and violent disorder 
incidents. The British study relies upon the serious disorder at Bradford in 2001, 
which until the very recent events of 2011, was the most recent public order 
policing operation involving significant mutual aid reinforcements. Both studies 
??????? ???? ???????? ?????????????? ?????????? ???? ?????? ?????????? ????????? ??
symmetrical and systematic handling of data and evidence (Yin 2009).   
A flexibly structured comparison of the empirical findings is conducted in 
chapter seven whe?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
are compared and contrasted, identifying the areas of convergence and 
divergence. This gives the basis for the conclusions that follow in the eighth and 
final chapter where a number of policy implications rooted in the empirical 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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thesis, is discussed and the potential for its operational application as a vehicle 
for threat and risk assessment based on contextual intelligence is raised. 
The similarity of the tensions between the respective realities of policing 
and French republican ideals or British Peelian principles is also considered and 
linked to the changing political context of policing. Finally the possibility for 
sharing any identified good practice and how this might be achieved is discussed 
in line with the research aims, as are potential avenues of future research.  
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
Introduction 
Policing is not and never has been an easy task, especially when it concerns  
high profile incidents of public disorder (Bessel and Emsley 2000 p7). The 
?????? ??? ???????? ??????? ??????? ???? ??????? ???????? ??? ?????? by many as a 
specialism. It is one strand of the wider policing discipline, albeit ?singularly 
????????? ???????????? ??? ???? ????? ??? ???? ?????? ?????????? ???????? ??????? ??? ???
?????????? ???? ??????? ?? ????? ??? ?????-‐clad officers engaged in forceful 
confrontation with political dissidents, pickets and those engaged in 
??????????????????????? ??????????????????????????. The term public order 
??????? ?? ???????????? ?????????? ??? ?? ???????????? ????? ?????? ?????? ???
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ommentators have 
made the point that policing is conceptually ambiguous or contradictory. 
There is a duality of roles in that the police have a duty to uphold the political 
and social order on behalf of the state, whilst at the same time protecting the 
citizens on behalf of whom the state claims legitimacy (Bessel 2000; Lofthouse 
1996; Waddington PAJ 1994).  
The subject matter of this thesis bridges academic disciplines touching 
on issues and themes relevant to criminology, politics, population 
demography, sociology, public policy, anthropology and psychology. It is not 
possible to cover them all, even with a broad brush, in one thesis, but their 
influence must be acknowledged, as the nature of policing is such that all 
these areas are potentially relevant to this area of study. This review of the 
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literature aims to provide an understanding of public order policing. It 
examines relevant theories of civil disorder and the increasing militarisation of 
the process of control. The policing of crowds is briefly considered and an 
overview of the different genres of disorder and protest is presented, This 
discussion helps to inform the choice of a framework for the subsequent 
analyses.   
Public Order Policing 
Any form of public event or protest should be policed on its own 
merits. Each and every occasion has the potential to result in disorder or 
violence necessitating the use of high impact police tactics; and this happens 
frequently enough to concentrate the minds of police and government policy 
makers. Some consideration of policing styles, strategies and tactics is 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
Police public order strategy in western countries has generally moved 
away from a policy of escalated force to a more negotiated style of managing 
public space (della Porta et al 2006; King & Brearley 1996; Pike 2005; 
Waddington D 2007 p10; Waddington PAJ 2000). This change has been caused 
by various factors. A number of inquiries or commissions have criticised 
unnecessary use of force by the police. In response, the police have developed 
their capability; they plan more carefully and are more inclined to a 
negotiated form of management approach rather than one of overwhelming 
force (KtP 2010; Waddington PAJ 2000; Pike 2005). This is achieved by 
balancing the use of accommodation of protest organisers, through 
concessions and assistance, against a readily available coercive capability 
(Waddington PAJ 1994a). 
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The escalation of disorder resulting from uncompromising police tactics 
can endanger human lives, is resource intensive and damaging to legitimacy 
(KtP 2010; della Porta et al 2006; King & Brearley 1996; Waddington PAJ 
1991/2000). Improved strategies, tactics and training have increased 
preventative capability (KtP 2010; della Porta et al 2006; King & Brearley 
1996; Pike 2005; Waddington PAJ 1991/2000). These factors will be covered 
more fully when we look at the institutional and operational dimensions of 
public order policing in both countries and associated policing doctrines.  
It has already been identified that policing is inherently political and 
that this imperative is bound to be reflected in police strategy, usually driving 
??? ??????????????????????????????he police are duty bound to uphold inevitably 
???????? ?????? ????????? ?????????? ???? ??? ???? ????? ??? ?????????? ??? ?????????
(Waddington PAJ 2003 p415). Policing public order has real political 
significance because it has ??????????? ???????????????? that are noticeably 
different to those of normal policing (Waddington PAJ 1996b p130; Pike 2005). 
According to PAJ Waddington (1996b) the following four characteristics 
constitute that difference:  
Visibility ? public order policing is ??????????????? highly visible? and readily 
scrutinised.  
Corporate Action ? where generally police officers engaged in public order 
??????? ???? ????????? ??? ??????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????????? ???????? ?????? ??? ??
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????.  
Non-‐Criminal ? police public order agency is such that arrests are unusual as 
the crowd/gathering/protesters are not viewed as criminals.  
Contestable ? in that the police version of events is more likely to be 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????sion 
??? ???????????? ???? ?????????????? ??????????? ??? ????????????. (Waddington PAJ 
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1996b p130-‐131). However public order is highly political and post event 
analyses are used to gain political advantage 
Public order policing can be all of these and is usually in the full view of 
the public eye. The nature of this policing discipline is evolving and since the 
late nineteen sixties has been subject to a creeping militarisation of its 
strategies, tactics and equipment (Jefferson 1987/1990/1993; Waddington PAJ 
1987/1991/1993). There is a general view amongst academic commentators 
that militarisation ??????????? ?????? ??? ???? ?????? ??? ???? ????? ??? ???? ?????
???????? ?????????? ???????? ????? ?????? ???? ???? ????? ????? ??? ?? ?????????
development (Waddington D. 1992 p185), or as an unnecessary violation of 
civil rights (Jefferson 1990).  
Given the interests and themes of this thesis it is important that the 
???????? ??? ????????????????? ??? ????????? ???? ??????????? ????????? ???? ????
contributions to this subject have been provided by Tony Jefferson and PAJ 
Waddington (Pike 2005), who have developed opposing views (Jefferson 
1987/1990/1993; Waddington PAJ 1987/1991/1993). They show how this 
phenomenon has created a tension between police legitimacy and use of 
force. Waddington argues that militarisation is necessary for improved 
command and control and by consequence the minimum use of force, whilst 
Jefferson contends that it increases the likelihood of disorder (Pike 2005).  
Legitimacy of police action is essential if we are to understand the 
policing of civil disorder (Waddington PAJ 1987; Pike 2005). Losing the moral 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
philosophy of civil disobedience. When the police or those being policed see 
each other?????????????? ??????????????????????? ???more likely (Waddington PAJ 
1987). Impartiality is also an important aspect of legitimacy (Pike 2005), 
certainly in a protest situation, ??? ????? ??? ????? ????? ?????? ??? ????????? ???????
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action, it also inhibits the crowd who have something to lose from resorting to 
?????????? ?Waddington PAJ 1987 p38). Effective communication between the 
parties involved is necessary to minimise any potential for disorder because 
??????????????????????????????presenting themselves as impartial guardians of 
the peace?? (Waddington PAJ 1987 p38) the lower the likelihood of a crowd 
becoming disorderly (Pike 2005; Waddington PAJ 1987). Waddington makes 
another important point, that a high quality command function is vital if 
police interventions, constituted as forms of corporate action, are to be 
successful: 
In sum, one of the defining characteristics of militarism ? the co-‐
ordination of squads under superior command ? offers the prospect 
of policing disorder with restrained discipline (Waddington PAJ 
1993 p357).     
 
He goes on to say that whilst such organisation is not in itself sufficient to 
ensure restraint, it is a necessary condition if discipline and co-‐ordination are 
to be achieved, elements that are simply not attainable through the more 
conventional British policing approach (Pike 2005).  
Whilst such advances in police tactics and legislation may be seen as 
menacing it is more likely that militarisation of public order policing has come 
about through a necessarily pragmatic approach by police commanders. An 
example of practitioners doing what they have to do in order to fulfil their 
??????? ??? ???????? ?? ???????? ????? ?????? ??? ??????? ?????????? ??? ??????????????
???????? ??????  ????????????? ???????????? ????-‐?????????? ??????? ??? ?tate 
traditions and societal change are responsible for developments in policing 
(Emsley 1983 p7). 
 It should be noted here that the British police, in spite of this 
??????????????????routinely and massively under-‐?????????????????(Waddington 
PAJ 2005 p363). Full enforcement of the law by the police would swamp the 
judicial system, which would not be able to cope with huge numbers of 
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arrests. The police would also ultimately risk losing their legitimacy by 
employing such a strategy. The British public are used to a consensual policing 
?????? ???? ????????? ???? ?????? ??????? ??????? ????????? ??? ???????? ??? ??????
public order operations felt bound by democratic values, even to the point of 
resisting pressures from government ministers, MPs, and local government to 
t???? ?? ????? ??????????? ??????? ??? ????? ?????????????? ?????????? ?Waddington 
PAJ 2005 p366).  
The French style of policing is arguably less consensual than the British, 
with both its main police institutions being very much arms of the state, 
directly responsible to and directed by the prefects (Chapman 1951; Roché 
2007; Stead 1983). This is as much a consequence of the way French 
institutions function as their intentions (Body-‐Gendrot 2004; Zauberman & 
Levy 2003).  
The police of both countries espouse a doctrine of restrained or 
minimum use of force, which might be compromised by the fact that they do 
sometimes have to police disorderly crowds in a coercive manner (Waddington 
PAJ 2005). In Britain this is done by an unarmed and vulnerable force, which 
gives increased legitimacy (Waddington PAJ 2005). French and British police 
have been forced to develop their capability to deal with disorder. However, 
historically in Britain, there is a general trajectory of evolution detectable in 
that they encounter a problem, and then at the next incident introduce some 
changes in tactics, strategy or equipment. Waddington PAJ calls this a ?process 
of adaptation???1987 p44). For example, events at the Notting Hill Carnival in 
1976 saw police resorting to the use of dustbin lids as shields. Then, in 
Lewisham in 1977 police used riot shields for the first time (during a National 
Front march). Other stimuli to adaptation occurred such as ??????????????????????
Bristol 1980, where police were forced to withdraw due to their disorganised 
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approach. Further serious riots occurred in 1981, and in 1986 there was the 
first murder of a police officer in a public order situation (Constable Keith 
Blakelock at Broadwater Farm, Tottenham), since that of Constable Culley 
during the Coldbath Fields disorder, London in 1833 (Emsley 1996 p29, 40, 61).  
Overall, in Britain, 1981 to 1991 was a turbulent ten year period 
(Waddington D 1992; Waddington PAJ & Wright 2009). It saw public order 
policing continuing to develop considerably in response to disorders such as 
???? ?????? ???? ?????????????? ??????????????????and others occurring in Oxford, 
Cardiff and Tyneside in 1991. The development of police public order training 
and tactics (as advised by Lord Scarman) and the visible changes in equipment 
such as flame retardant overalls, riot helmets and protective pads, which were 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????may be seen as a 
manifestation of the militarisation of the police. This is claimed by some to be 
part of a process associated with authoritarian states using the police to 
subjugate belligerent citizens (Waddington PAJ 1987). Whilst paramilitary 
policing has traditionally been considered incompatible with liberty (Emsley 
1983, in Waddington PAJ 1987) it is not incompatible with legitimacy and in 
reality encourages a disciplined and concerted police approach, which is more 
likely to reduce the use of force (Waddington PAJ 1987).   
Policing large disorderly crowds is a fearsome task for front line police 
officers who may well be anxious, frustrated and angry. They will probably be 
unable to view the whole scene and lack an objective appreciation of the 
situation. The confrontational tension of such a situation, according to Randall 
Collins (2008) ??? ????????? ???????????????, where hot explosive uncontrollable 
emotion flows in self-‐reinforcing waves so that individuals (in this context 
police officers) repeat their aggressive actions. Such a panic was evident 
during an incident in Los Angeles in 1991, where the suspect, Rodney King, 
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was badly beaten with batons by a number of overreacting police officers 
after a high speed car chase. According to Collins, ?????? ????????????? ???????
violence that ??????? ??????? ????????? ????? ???? ?????????? ??? ?? ???????????????
(2008 p88). It is in such situations that strong command can make all the 
difference. Any disorganised approach is unlikely to be effective or restrained 
(Waddington PAJ 1987). If people are part of an organised, well led and 
disciplined body they are in fact less likely to have to resort to high levels of 
violence in order to contain violent crowds.  
Interestingly for this study, the militarisation of British policing could 
also be argued to be a part of a wider blurring of role boundaries between the 
police and the military, due to developments in the international arena such 
as terrorism, which have necessitated shared agency and convergence of 
functions (Body-‐Gendrot 2010; Easton & Moelker 2010).  
A third separate national force to deal with public order (full time 
public order specialists as seen on the continent and notably in France), is 
seen as unlikely in Britain due to financial, logistical and political reasons and 
because national riot police tend to be synonymous with the use of high levels 
of force (Waddington PAJ 1987)???????????????????????????????????????????????
is how to contain violent disorder whilst using only minimum force. The 
concerted discipline afforded by paramilitarism allows the police to quell civil 
disorder with less force than would otherwise be l????????????????????????????
p44).  
Waddington defines paramilitarism thus: 
?????????????? ???????? ????????? ???????? ???? ????????? ???????? ???
leaving individual officers to take uncoordinated action at their own 
discretion, a paramilitaristic approach deploys squads of officers under 
the direction and control of their superiors ... a more disciplined 
response to disorderly and violent situations than is possible by 
traditional methods (Waddington PAJ 1993 p353). 
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 If we accept this thinking it can be said that paramilitarism, regardless 
of its appearance or political impact, in reality fits well with contemporary 
British police doctrine and human rights theory as regards necessity, 
proportionality and legality (KtP 2010). These issues will be explored later and 
in more detail when the thesis considers the operational dimensions of police 
doctrine and strategy. The police, on behalf of the state, are monopolists of 
force in a civil society (Bittner in Waddington PAJ 1993; Waddington PAJ 1999; 
Collins 2008??? ???? ???? ????????????? ??? ?????????????? ?????????? ???????? ????
control is the proverbial loose ?????????????????????????????????). If the end 
result is the minimum use of force then paramilitary methods could be 
suggested as being better practice for achieving that end than conventional 
alternatives (Waddington PAJ 1993). Police use of force on disorderly citizens 
can sometimes be necessary but is not always required, as where the police 
???? ?????? ???????????? ???????? ?? ???????????? ??? ???? ??????? ??e rioters almost 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
force does have to be applied a disciplined, coordinated response is better 
practice than ???????????????????????????????-‐equipped (and untrained) officers, 
and more likely to result in lower levels of force being used. The French 
concentration on state security has always relied on a military style and 
national structure for their police and there is ?little possibility today of a 
successful insurrectionary movem???? ???????????????????????? p75) because 
of their order maintenance capability and efficiency (Chapman 1951; 
Mucchielli 2009). 
Jefferson takes what he calls a view from below, holding that a 
militarised style of public order policing exacerbates the potential for disorder 
??????????????????-‐???????????????????? (Jefferson 1987; Pike 2005). He describes 
four stages of an escalatory process: 1. preparation: where trouble is expected 
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and a ?????? ????? ????????? ??? ????????????? ?????? ???????? ???? ?????????? ???
controlling space: where a crowd is allowed to gather in or is excluded from a 
defined geographical area, which promotes confrontation; 3. controlling the 
crowd: a further escalation where the space is controlled and people 
contained -‐ tensions are raised and disorder becomes more likely; 4. 
clearance: once the protest/gathering is over paramilitary tactics utilised to 
disperse a crowd can be confrontational. He argues that post event debriefing 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????? ??? ??????????????????????????????????? ????????????????
p53). 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????the 
use of trained officers in a coordinated manner is more effective in achieving 
successful outcomes with minimum use of force. Also that the police have a 
right to protect themselves, so that the use of protective clothing and 
equipment, even if there is a potential for this to be seen as provocative, is 
acceptable. He also allows that using certain tactical options, such as CS 
agents or water cannon, can have lower injury potential than police batons or 
horses (Pike 2005; Waddington 1993). He further rebuts ?????????????????????
the grounds that it relies on certain conditions always being present and 
always leading to some kind of disorder. He contends that when police plan 
for the worst case scenario the likelihood of disorder diminishes and when 
significant numbers of public order trained police are deployed there is 
?progressively less violence??(Waddington PAJ 1993 p362), Also, when disorder 
does occur it has more to do with a breakdown in command and control than 
the employment of military methods. He contests that Jefferson simply does 
not like the police employing such methods, rather than identifying an 
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?empirical connection? (Waddington PAJ 1993 p366) between those methods 
and incidents of disorder (Pike 2005; Waddington PAJ 1993).  
That said, in spite of this process of increasing militarisation, the 
response to the disturbances of August 2011 in London showed that the British 
model of policing seemed to have resulted in the police being less prepared 
for handling public disorder than their French counterparts. In French problem 
areas, where police and minority youths are in a permanent state of conflict, 
a well drilled paramilitary approach is used (Body-‐Gendrot 2011). 
The main objective for police officers commanding an event or incident 
is the maintenance of control (Pike 2005; Waddington PAJ 1994). A defined 
command structure and effective briefings are necessary for successful 
operations (KtP 2001, 2007, 2010). British under enforcement of law and 
preference for facilitation of protest relies on negotiation (Waddington PAJ 
1994). Maintaining control of public space and crowds requires skilled policing 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
action, challenge, confrontation and control inherent in police occupational 
????????? ???????????? ?? ????? ??????? ??????? ????????? ??????? ??????? ????? ????
public helpfully and co-‐???????????? ???? ???????????? ???? ???????? ????? ??????
??????????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????????? ?? ?????? ?????????? ????? ???? ????????
(Waddington D 2007 p212). Police conduct can destroy the order it seeks to 
uphold and a less abrasive manner can legitimise police action. Consequently, 
police officers should strive for the highest levels of professionalism 
(Waddington D 2007). It is difficult to dispute this point, but one should be  
mindful of the undeniably dangerous and stressful situations that police 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(Best G 1991 3-‐27).  
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 Negotiation and facilitation with event organisers or leaders as part of 
?????????????(King 2006; Pike 2005; Waddington D 2007) policing approach is a 
tactical consideration (KtP 2001, 2007, 2010) and the preferred start point for 
control maintenance. However, it is quite usual for reserve units to be kept 
nearby as a backup in case of emergency, a contingency that is sometimes 
described as the iron fist in a velvet glove (King and Waddington D 2005; Pike 
2005; Waddington PAJ 1994). PAJ Waddington suggests that social movement 
analysis is useful (Waddington PAJ 2003)????????????????????????????????????????
organisations are linked to each other in broader processes of collective 
act????? ??????? ?????? ?? ?????? ????? ????? ??? ??????? that the existence of 
contention, and ultimately violence, can be explained by consideration of the 
political opportunities, mobilising structures and framing processes, which in 
his view is preferable as an analysis model to other frameworks such as the 
??????????????model (Pike 2005; Waddington PAJ 2003).  
The militarisation of British policing is an ongoing process and seems, in 
many ways, to be increasingly convergent with the French model. Lessons 
learned and the need for better practice has developed British public order 
policing tactics and operational police officers continually perfect and 
advance these techniques. It is clear that public order policing strategies, 
tactics and equipment can both facilitate order and instigate disorder. 
However, for this comparative study it is also important to understand the 
context in which public disorder occurs. To do this it is necessary to consider 
???????????????????????. 
The Flashpoints Model  
Whenever there is an occurrence of violent disorder contextual factors 
such as poverty, unemployment, lack of life chances and marginalisation are 
often cited as causal (Waddington D et al 1989; Waddington D 2007). But these 
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factors are also often apparent when disorder does not occur. To understand a 
disorder event one needs to analyse all factors, including predisposing issues 
and trigger incidents, and not merely cite the causal factors. Understanding 
why disorder does or does not occur requires the use of an interpretive 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
is a framework that employs six levels of analysis relating ??? ??????????? ????
action, [which] may be illustrated as a series of ever-‐widening concentric 
circles, ranging from the macro, or wider contextual factors, to the micro, or 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
deserves a fuller explanation, as it is the most comprehensive model available 
at this time providing ???? ???????? ??? ?heorise the factors... crucial 
????????????? ??? ?????? ???? ?????????? ???????????? ??? ??? ????? ??????? ????
following paragraphs describe each of the six interdependent levels: 
structural; political/ideological; cultural; contextual; situational; and 
interactional.  
Structural 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
differences between social groups and the extent to which they are resolvable 
within the exist??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
concerns social factors such as exclusion, political and material deprivation, a 
mixture of grievances that had been noticed before by such notables as 
Scarman (1981) and Cantle (2002). These grieva??????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????The importance of place 
should not be underestimated. Neighbourhoods in which people live have a 
great influence upon a broad variety of social conditions such as crime, 
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health, community relations, housing, unwanted pregnancies, leadership 
networks, immigration, violence and disorder. This is part of a phenomenon 
that Robert Sampson calls enduring neighbourhood effect (Sampson 2010). 
This ????????????? ??????may relate to a group or groups, with no real 
stake in society, without a voice, whose resentment cannot be communicated 
??? ????????? ?????????? ????? ?????? ???????? ?????????????????? ????????? ????????
The following passage from Egon Bittner?? ????? ?????????? ??? ???? ??????? ???
????????????????summarises this neatly: 
One reason why the more serious aspects of police work suffer from 
low visibility is that they centre around the lives of people whose voice 
is either not heard or does not count on the forum of public opinion. It 
is exceedingly rare that the policemen make decisions that have a 
direct and lasting effect on the circumstances of existence of members 
of the middle and upper classes. This segment of society experiences 
police presence mainly in the form of traffic control and similar low 
level service. (Bittner 1980 p74) 
 
Political/Ideological 
This level covers what could be called strategic non-‐engagement. It concerns 
??????????????????????????????????????????????-‐?????????????????????????????
such bodies as the police, the judiciary, and the media. These are influential 
bodies whose action or inaction directly affects the groups in question, and 
importantly how these groups are perceived by the greater public. The media 
have a particular responsibility in this regard and their role will be discussed 
later. 
Cultural 
????????????????????????????????????????or subculture develops as a result of 
shared experiences, their attitudes to violence and how group members 
identify themselves is involved in this part of an analysis. If the groups 
involved have differing or incompatible views or behaviour, the potential for 
conflict is increased. Waddington defines the cultural variable as having 
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relevance when applied to dissenting sections of society and uses the example 
of interactions between police and those that are policed.  
The policing of groups by officers from outside the area is a possible 
cause of conflict due to those officers being unaware of local sensitivities. This 
is true but again nothing new to the police of today (in Britain), whose 
preparation and duties include diversity training, ongoing community impact 
assessments, dedicated minority support units and neighbourhood police 
officers. The deployment of officers from out of area would be ordered due to 
???????????? ????? ??? ?? ??????? ?????????, defined as the officer in overall 
command and who sets strategy, who should have considered the negative 
aspects of such deployment (KtP 2001;2007;2010).Police command structures 
will be explained later in the operational dimension.   
Contextual 
Communication processes are considered at this level of the ??????????????
model. The quality and efficacy of communication in any conflict situation is 
pivotal. This needs to include consideration of the recent history of 
interactions between police and citizens, where negative impressions are 
formed, rumours are passed and statements made by those involved that may 
be inflammatory. Again this includes media comment. It is important that 
liaison between police and other parties involved is maintained by good 
communication, or all those involved in the situation may become part of a 
self-‐fulfilling prophesy (Newburn 2007 p218). 
 Situational 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
are considered here. Communities live in neighbourhoods, which are diverse 
areas that can be defined as common places that vary in size and boundaries, 
where people and institutions interact. They amount to the spatial context of 
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social practices and meanings (Sampson 2010). Recognition of the significance 
of any dates and places that may be symbolic, such as the location of an 
earlier event involving police officers, is necessary. Such events and places 
may represent cultural turf to locals or no go areas to police officers 
(Waddington D 2007), which may well be perceived as requiring some kind of 
defensive or offensive action by either side. This might also include where the 
police see a location or position as being non-‐negotiable and under no 
circumstances to be breached. Perceptions such as these can become a driver 
of a particular course of action or choice of tactical option. David Waddington 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
disorder.  
Interactional 
This deals with the face-‐to-‐face interactions between police and public. These 
exchanges can produce widely divergent results depending upon the amount of 
?????????? ??-‐??????????? ?????????? ??? ????????????? ???????????? ?? ????? ?????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in the build up to disorder, are pivot??? ??? ???? ???????????? ???? ?????????????
(Waddington D 2007 p187).  
In an already tense environment, even a minor and normally justifiable 
arrest may trigger disorder. Waddington D mentions the importance of what 
????????????????????????????????????????????? the individual involved -‐ are they 
high ranking, vulnerable, old or young. Such characteristics might amount to a 
????????? ?????????? ????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????? ??????
important factor in this regard. Police commanders must set a sensible and 
justifiable/defendable intervention policy in such situations (KtP 2007 3.1.1 
p64) and should also be mindful that to: 
... the rest of the community ? the poor, the powerless, the ghetto, 
the slum dwellers, the devious, the deviant and the criminals -‐ the 
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policeman is a figure of awesome power and importance. What he does 
or fails to do literally shapes their destiny on a day to day basis (Bittner 
1980 p74) 
 
It appears that the 'Flashpoints' model has been used primarily as 
a debriefing tool in that it has been used after the event and that when 
so used provides an analysis of the factors surrounding that event. 
Debriefing is important but only effective if the lessons learned are 
applied. In this way the 'Flashpoints' model has the potential to become 
a predictive tool and it will be suggested that as well as learning from 
????????? ??? ????? ???????? ????? ???????????? ??? ??? ???????? ??????????????
framework by practitioners as part of an ongoing community threat 
assessment could identify possible future disorder. In any event, using it 
provides a very thorough appreciation of the social conditions and 
precipitating factors leading up to a disorder incident. 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
disorder case studies (Waddington D et al 1989; Waddington D 1992) including 
the Poll Tax riot 1990, Brixton 1981, and the Orgreave incident during the 
1984 miners? strike. Non-‐violent events are also considered, which show that 
the model may also identify how a peaceful outcome might be achieved. 
However, ??? ?????? ??? ??? ?????? ????? ???? ?????????????? ?????? ??? ???? ???????
universally as the best framework for analysis of disorder incidents. Bagguley 
and Hussain base their objections to it on imponderables such as: not knowing 
exact??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the power imbalance between the authorities and the crowd; and also because 
??????????? ??? ??? ?????? ??? ??????? ????? ?????? ??? ?? ????????? ???????????? ??????
p31). 
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Waddington PAJ, is the m?????????????? ????????????????????????????????
any one of a number of incidents or issues during the build up to disorder 
could be identified as being a single flashpoint. The model is described as 
conceptually flawed, post-‐hoc and non-‐predictive and as less than objective 
because it relies upon partial and subjective analyses and a complex 
???????????? ????? ??? ??????????? ??? ???? ?????????? ????????? ??? ?????????? ???? ???
(Waddington PAJ 2000b). Its levels of structuration are described as a mere 
?????????????????ctors for consideration (Waddington PAJ 2000b p106).  
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to analyse police behaviour or other perspectives. PA????????????? ??? ?????????
solely by observation of police agency and is therefore selective and partial. 
Consequently, it is unreasonable of him to suggest that civilian accounts need 
??? ??? ???????? ????? ??? ?????????? ???????????? whilst preferring a more 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????; Pike 2005).  
PAJ Waddington ?????????? ??? ?????????? ???? ????????? ?????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? (Waddington D 1998 
p375), which has implications for how public disorder is understood and how it 
is policed. For PAJ Waddington the study of disorder seems to be an attempt 
to excuse political violence (Waddington D 1998 p380) and he eschews any 
consideration of the potential for poverty, deprivation, exclusion and severely 
diminished life chances as causal of disorder (Waddington D 1998 p382). 
This considered body of opinion appears to have been somewhat 
????????????? ????????? ???? ??????????????????????????? ??????????????? ??dical and 
???????? ?????????? ???????????? ???? ????? ??????? ????????? ?????? ??? ???? ?????
article PAJ ??????????? ??????? ????? ??????????????? ???? ????????? ????????? ???
the population increasingly find themselves excluded from institutions rooted 
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in class relations that are ill-‐suited to their needs and unresponsive to their 
???????????Waddington PAJ 2000 p169). Thus they constitute exactly some of 
???? ?????????????? ????????? ????????? ???? ?????????????????? ???????. A central 
???????????????????????????????????????????? of the critical consensus is that 
the accounts used by analysts are those of protesters and rioters (Waddington 
D 1998 p390). His position regarding this consensus is problematic because he 
opposes so many credible commentators (Cantle 2001; Hussain & Bagguley 
2009; Jobard et al 2009; Lagrange 2009; Scarman 1981; Waddington D 1998) 
whose opinions, for this study, are impossible to ignore.  
It is true that any one-‐sided analysis fails due to lack of impartiality. It 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
consideration to police traditions, culture or doctrines. As such, it will be 
necessary to add another level of structuration to take account of this area in 
order to ensure that t??? ??????????? ??? ???? ???????????????????? ??? ???? ??? ????
material way lessen its depth and scope as an analytic framework.  
When compared to other analytic ??????? ?????????????? ???????? ???
provide a greater contextual understanding of why disorder does or does not 
occur. Additionally, notwithstanding the above arguments, it is probable that 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
could well be applicable in a predictive manner and this is addressed later. 
This thesis compares the policing of disorder in France and Britain using 
???? ?????????????? ??????? ???????? ???? ????????? ??? ????? ????? ??????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
consideration of police function and agency, which should add depth to the 
analysis. This research is focused on the public order policing role, which will 
allow a different angle of approach and provide fresh insights.  
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Historically, the British government has only responded to the 
challenges of public disorder by giving the police greater powers and better 
training and equipment (Waddington D 1992). This can also be said of the 
French authorities, as evidenced by their relegation of proximity policing in 
favour of a more results orientated style (Mouhanna 2010), as well as providing 
better equipment and weaponry for use in policing disorder and intelligence 
gathering (Bronner & Mandraud 2008; PN+GN sources 2009). At the same time, 
in both countries, the underlying social deprivation and inequality has not 
been addressed (Body-‐Gendrot 2011; Waddington D 1992) and further 
problems of political, industrial and civil nature have been made more likely 
than not (Waddington D 1992). Recommendations made by David Waddington 
echoed those of Scarman, made ten years earlier (Waddington D 1992 p215), 
when he questioned whether anything had been learned. The intervening 
??????? ???? ???????? ??????? ?????????? ????????? ????? ?????? ???? ?????????? ??? ???
accurate.  
??????????? ??????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????
and more with empirical academic research, which is in turn informing police 
activity. But tensions of the type described in publications by Waddington and 
others still exist. Recent events in the UK and France (Bagguley & Hussain 
2008; Bujra & Pearce 2009; Jobard 2009; Lagrange 2009; Mouhana 2009; 
Mucchielli 2011; Waddington et al 2009) have highlighted what now appear to 
be age-‐old problems of social exclusion and deprivation, which can be 
exacerbated, or indeed mitigated, by the attitudes and behaviour of police 
officers when dealing with sensitive situations or conflict (Body-‐Gendrot 2004; 
KtP 2007 p32; Fassin 2006). Often this means managing large groups of people 
??? ?????????? ????? ??????????? ??? ??????? is appropriate at this juncture, it 
assists in consideration of the difficulties that police face in this regard. 
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Crowds 
Policing a crowd is often necessary and sometimes contentious. A single 
??????????? ??? ?? ?????? ???? ??? ???????????? ??? ?definitions share common 
characteristics, conceptualising a crowd as a sizeable number of people 
gathered at a specific location for a measurable time period, with common 
?????? ???? ??????????? ??????? ???????????? ????????? ??????? ??????? ???????? ? 
large number of people or a crowd can be described using any of the 
following: spectators, flock, followers, protestors, revellers or fans. They may 
be orderly or disorderly, whether planned or spontaneous. Crowds that are 
inclined towards disorder have also been described as mobs, and those more 
disposed towards order as audiences (King & Brearley 1996; Pike 2005).  
There are a few notable theories of crowd disorder that need to be 
???????????????? ???????????????????? ????????????????????????????? ????????????
economic and political upheaval of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
(McPhail 1991) and mainly comes from the work of Gustave Le Bon (1895). 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
mindless mob or contagion theory (Le Bon 1895; McPhail 1991; Waddington 
PAJ 1991) in that people in crowd situations lose their individuality and 
??????? ???????????? ??? ??????????? ????? ??????????? ???? ??? ?? ???????? ???
???????????? ??????? ???????????? ?????? ????????? ????? ??????? ???? ???? ?????? ???
police training in many countries.  
However, no matter their type or context, crowds should not be viewed in 
this way (Waddington D et al 1989; Waddington PAJ 1994a). The history of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ????????? ????????? ????? ??????? People are individuals, and as such the 
heterogeneity of a crowd needs to be recognised (Pike 2005; Reicher 1987; 
Stott, C. & Adang, O. 2003/2003a). If a crowd is treated as though all its 
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members are of the same mind, a homogeneous group, there is an increased 
risk of disorder. It is vital that the police interact with crowd members, 
allowing a level of trust to develop and for crowd dynamics to be recognised. 
This approach is better than using more repressive tactics that are likely to 
increase hostility towards the police (Reicher et al 2007; Stott and 
Reicher1998; Stott and Drury, 2000; Stott et al 2001).  
Waddington D (1992) uses the theories of Gordon Allport (1924 -‐ social 
facilitation), Robert Zimbardo (1969 ? de-‐individuation approach) and 
?????????? Theory of Collective Behaviour (1962) as possible explanations of 
crowd behaviour. These theories were of their time and have been 
consequential on police agency.  
De-‐?????????????? ????????????? ????? ????????????? ?? ???????????????????????
from Le Bon, reduces self-‐awareness within crowds, increasing individual 
tendencies to express violent and aggressive behaviour. However more recent 
analysis undermines the scientific validity of de-‐?????????????? ??? ??????????
theory as it lacks empirical support (Stott 2009). Such classic theory is flawed 
because it ignores the role of the police and the broader social context in 
which crowd events occur (Stott 2009; Reicher et al 2004; Waddington D et al 
1989). That said, it has been responsible for the widely adopted view that 
crowd behaviour is pathological and undermines individual identity and that 
individuals within crowds are dangerous and unpredictable and can 
spontaneously become irrational, generating ?????????????????????????????????
understands crowds as unpredictable, volatile and dangerous and needing to 
be controlled, primarily by force (LeBon 1895; Stott 2009). These theories of 
crowd behaviour are less than compelling and have been superseded by social 
identity modelling of crowd behaviour that has been widely theorised and 
tested, especially in relation to football violence (Reicher 1987/1996; Reicher 
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et al 2007; Stott & Adang 2003a /2004; Stott & Drury 2001; Stott & Reicher 
1998; Stott 2005; Stott 2009).   
In terms of public order policing, certainly in the UK (and nowadays all 
over Europe) football related violence has provided an excellent vehicle for 
research and development of police leadership, strategy and tactics, much of 
which is reflected in the comprehensive doctrine available to police officers 
nowadays in the A.C.P.O. Manual of Guidance on Keeping the Peace or KTP 
(2011).  A brief consideration of the policing of sporting events will help to 
illustrate the social identity modelling of crowds. 
Sporting Events 
 ?????????? ??? ???? ???????? ??? ???? ???????????? ?????????? ??????? ??????
events has highlighted the ways in which attempts to control disorder can 
actually create the conditions for widespread conflict as a kind of self-‐
??????????? ?????????? ??????????????? ???? p3). Disorder at sporting events has 
been experienced primarily around association football, as a result of intended 
violence to opposition supporters. However, incidents of violent disorder have 
increasingly occurred at other events, including celebratory gatherings. The 
?????????????? ????????????????????? ??? ???????? ????????? ?????????????? ???????
culture, being linked to cultural and material deprivation and a lack of social 
control. Gang membership provides hierarchy and an opportunity to gain 
notoriety and respect through violence (Waddington D. 1992 p138).  
???? ?????????? ??? ??? ??? ???????? ???? ?????? numbers of people act 
together, to act in ways that are socially meaningful but do so without any 
planning or formal co-‐???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(Reicher 1987 p171) The social identity aspect of a crowd is important in 
understanding crowd ??????????? ????? ?relates behaviour to its social context 
???????????????????????????????Reicher 1987 p202).  
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The effects of social identities in crowds can be explained by use of the 
??????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
?????? ???? ????? ????????? ????? ???? ???????? ???? ????? ???????????? ??? ???? ????-‐
??????? ??? ?????????? ???? ????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ???? ????
stereotype them. It can be drawn from this that any side in a dispute may see 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
reaching consequences for police commanders or planners of events as regards 
placement or containment of groups. If confrontation between two groups 
does occur, those who a??????????????????????????????and who were not looking 
for trouble may perceive that they are themselves under attack also and react 
accordingly. Put another way, it may be a case of ordinary crowd members 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????p34). 
During the Euro 2000 football tournament the police strategy eschewed 
the mass mobilisation of riot police and instead promoted non-‐confrontational 
attitudes and behaviour with the intention of respecting other cultures and 
nationalities. This required them to be unbiased and to judge people on their 
behaviour, whilst adopting a flexible, approachable manner and actively 
making contacts with crowd members. Policing decisions and agency were 
based upon real information (Adang 2002). The strategy worked and generally 
the Euro 2000 tournament passed without the predicted crowd disorder (Adang 
2002). 
 A scientific understanding of the psychology and behaviour of crowds is 
necessary for effective management (Stott and Adang 2003a). Stott and Adang 
state that football matches are crowd events, as are protest marches, rallies 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
make contingency for this, but should be more generally aware that the 
intention of the majority is peaceful and they will see their activity as 
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legitimate. The view that the dynamics of a crowd are internal and people 
lose their inhibitions and act irrationally is outdated and dangerous. They 
further state that in order to minimise disorder in crowd situations the 
management or control of it needs to rely upon the principles that the ??????? 
legitimate (this may not mean lawful per se) intentions should be promoted. 
There should be a differentiation between groups seeking disorder and those 
that are not, and that the crowd should be managed proactively (Stott and 
Adang 2003a).  
The social identity of the crowd which determines their collective 
behaviour is linked to their history. Scottish (and Welsh) football fans tend to 
chant anti-‐English songs because of their historical relationship with England 
(Adang and Stott 2003). Local derby events also may engender intense rivalry, 
the trouble seemingly being always with the neighbours.  
Crowd dynamics involve interactions between groups, including the 
police, and the police role is vital in (positive) manipulation of crowd 
dynamics. The public order management approach must be knowledge driven 
and cognisant that risk is dynamic and levels of risk can be managed through 
appropriate interactions. Police in Britain us??????????????????????????? 
Balance is seen as vital to the success of any crowd management 
operation, which is balancing the tactics used relative to the risk involved. 
Low-‐key events should be managed in a low-‐key manner. Where robust police 
interventions are necessary at high-‐risk events and dynamic police tactics are 
required, they must be accurately targeted for police action to be judged as 
appropriate or legitimate to minimise the likelihood of aggressive crowd 
reactions, which may otherwise spiral out of control (Stott and Adang 2003a). 
Police interventions or deployments must be flexible in order to adapt to 
fluctuations in risk or threat levels. They need to be proportionate. 
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 Successful crowd management depends on four principles: education ? 
identifying groups and their cultures/sensitivities; facilitation ? of legitimate 
intentions and lawful aims; communication ? keeping crowd members 
informed; differentiation -‐ between those who are the problem and those that 
are not (Adang & Stott 2004). Recognition of these principles is certainly a 
sensible aim in the planning phase or outset of an operation. Policing crowds is 
still a developing skill area and British police commanders are generally keen 
to learn from their mistakes (Interview sources 1, 7, 8). 
 Police strategies and tactics more recently employed in crowd control 
support this and policing operations increasingly involve debriefing and 
refinement, leading to successful outcomes. As an example the briefings 
delivered by South Wales Police prior to events and operations now highlight 
the need for professionalism and explain what the strategy is designed to 
achieve (Interviews 1, 5, 9). The emphasis is on setting standards, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????(i.e. not 
inflammatory), and dealing with transgressors appropriately and readily: 
the important issue to arise from research is that public order police 
tactics, fan/police interactions and crowd dynamics appear to play a 
very important role in determining ???????????????????????????????????????
the context of international football tournaments. The available data 
suggest that this is because the police can affect the inter-‐group 
????????????? ????? ????????? ???? ?????????? ??? ???? ???????? ??????????
processes in ??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????
likely ??????????? ??? ???? ????????? ??? ???????? ??? ??????????? ???? (Stott 
and Pearson 2006). 
   
In their criticism of social identity modelling, Bagguley and Hussein see its 
methodology as being problema???????????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ???????? ??? ???? ??????? ???? ???? ??????? ?????????? ?????? ????? ???? ?????
reification of the crowd oversimplifies rationalisation of crowd action. There 
may be some truth in this as the ESIM does provide for ????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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use of force. From a pragmatic viewpoint, these theories of crowd behaviour 
do serve to assist managers of events or incidents in their decision making and 
would apply equally to other forms of protest or celebration. 
Single Issue Protest   
Police view single-‐issue protest as being different from, for example, football 
or urban violence. That is not to say that it never develops into violence. 
Single-‐issue protest can take many forms and is usually linked to an issue of 
importance to individuals or groups, such as animal welfare, genetically 
modified crops and anti-‐war expression (inter alia). Protest has to be visible 
and usually takes place on the streets ????????????????????????? ?become the 
locus for protest and protest has come from an ever growing diversity of 
quarters and with a mounting readiness to resort to violence on the part of 
protesters and the police? (Roach & Thomaneck 1985 p1). Nevertheless, 
protest can be just as conspicuous when it is taken onto private property such 
as occurred during the 2005 G8 conference at Gleneagles in Scotland or where 
incursions are made into power stations or animal farms. 
Peaceful demonstrations may be policed on safety grounds or because 
there is a risk of civil disobedience. A distinction should be made between 
???????? ????????????? ???? ?????? ?????????????? ???????? ?? ??????? ????? ??? ????
philosophy of John Rawls (Hoffman & Graham 2006 p210) when describing 
lawbreaking for self or group interest as having no justification and therefore 
criminal. However, breaking laws can be justifiable if an individual or group of 
people do so to protest against an unjust law or policy, as an appeal to the 
moral majority that is being asked to respect principles that it already 
implicitly accepts. Democracies do sometimes make unjust laws and civil 
disobedience could therefore be justified if:  
? The injustice is clear; 
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? The disobedience involves breaking laws (not necessarily the law at 
issue); 
? It is a public act ? in order to be communicative; 
? It is non-‐violent; 
? Those doing it accept the consequences of their action; 
? It does not threaten the stability of the state; 
? It happens within a wider fidelity to the law (Hoffman & Graham 2006 
p210). 
So, according to this philosophy, the disobedience must be to make a point in 
a non-‐violent way that only breaks the law in order to further a moral and 
justifiable protest against an unjust policy or law.  
The Media 
 It would be naïve to believe that the media, notably the tabloid 
newspapers in the UK, but including other forms of it, are neutral or unbiased 
in their reporting of events or issues. It is safe to assert that the various media 
have considerable influence throughout the world; particularly television, the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
Public protests, disorder or riots provide dramatic images of violence involving 
protestors, counter-‐protestors, police officers or all of these and more (Bessel 
and Emsley 2000; della Porta et al. 2006; Greer & McLaughlin 2010; 
Waddington D 1992/1997/2007; Waddington et al. 2009). As was the case 
during the G20 protest and the violence of 2009, media coverage, notably and 
??????????????????????????????????facilitated a drip feed of fresh video footage, 
witness testimonies and commentary that provided non-‐police perspectives 
that were emotive and highly critical of the police (Greer & McLaughlin 2010). 
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The media have (rightly) reported protest and public order issues and 
have championed causes, such as the section 28 debate (Local Government Act 
1988 forbidding the promotion of homosexuality by local authorities) that was 
widely publicised at the time, or indeed the EU constitution question where 
????? ????? newspaper claimed pressure from its readership caused Prime 
Minister Blair to give an assurance that there would be a referendum before 
Britain signed up to an EU constitution.  
??? ?when does the press cross the line between covering protest and 
sponsoring i?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
issue or ??? ??????? ??? ????????? ??????? ???? ??????????-‐ what Stanley Cohen has 
??????????moral p?????????????????????? to the extent that disorder is actually 
????????????????????? ???? ??????????????????????? ??????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????BBC News 2001c), whose editor saw 
fit to release the name of a convicted paedophile living on the Paulsgrove 
estate in Portsmouth so triggering ??? ?? ??????? ????????? ??????? ?o police and 
damage to property.  
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
issues and, of course, their own circulation or viewing figures is well 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
grievances (Milne 2005) is also obvious, and it is plain that whilst the media 
may not wholly initiate and direct protest, it can readily and easily fan the 
flames of discontent. Twenty four hour TV in particular needs to fill its 
timeslots. It is difficult to quantify how much effect media coverage may 
have, for instance, upon the severity of sentences imposed on those convicted 
of public order offences following a well publicised riot or protest. It is 
probable though that the attitudes and behaviour of those involved in such 
events has been affected in some way by media coverage.  
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Media attention does impact upon public order policing and the police 
need to have well-‐developed media strategies to deal with this factor (KtP 
2010 p11). Any police action in a public order situation is likely to be subject 
????????? ?????????? ????? ???????? ???? ??????????? ??????? ??? ??????? ?????????? ????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Tackenberg 2000 p122). The police need to use the media more 
constructively; media and public reaction to a more negotiated approach 
instead of superior force is usually positive and consequently more likely to 
build trust between the public and the police (Hartung 2008). 
Review Synopsis 
As with all reviews, this remains a work in progress inasmuch as it can be 
modified to take account of any significant new developments or discoveries. 
However, currently it is sufficient in identifying and framing the issues that 
will constitute the principal empirical focus for this thesis. Moreover, as 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
happy with the research question and you have systematically searched the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????chapter now 
forms the foundation for this research thesis.  
This chapter has characterised public order policing as a morally 
ambiguous area that is politically and operationally fraught with issues of 
legitimacy, ethics and accountability. There is a considerable body of 
knowledge resulting from academic research and operational experience. 
Some of these areas have been considered here and this has highlighted the 
variety and polarity of opinion. Tony ???????????? ???? ??????????? ??????
?????????? ?????????? ???????????????? ??????????? ???? ???? ??????????? ????
polemics reg??????? ???? ???????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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of collective identity (LeBon 1895), all evidence the ongoing conflictual 
theoretical dimension of public order policing (Pike 2005).  
This thesis addresses whether or not the management of contemporary 
public order and disorder produces any convergence between French and 
British approaches. In so doing, it pays due regard to their existing very 
different structures and whether national histories and trajectories are key to 
understanding this area. It also considers debates around representation of 
social diversity in police forces and the importance of citizenship and identity 
as factors in the policing of public order. 
 From the foregoing it is apparent that there are many parallels 
between the French and British political, social and historical situations. The 
historical similarities of empire and colonialism discussed in the previous 
chapter are evident, with both states having the same issues of post-‐colonial 
difference as outlined by Michel and Honneger (2007), albeit involving 
different national and cultural origins. The violence and cruelty of colonialism 
is a significant historical factor in the ongoing resentment amongst those in 
society who still find themselves subject to racism and exclusion, whether as a 
result of centralist republican ideals or of well intentioned but misguided 
multi-‐cultural policies.  
There would appear to be a cyclical theme, in both countries, of 
disenfranchisement and exclusion of sections of society that causes discontent 
and ultimately disorder or riot. In Britain such matters have been followed by 
inquiries, findings and recommendations that initiate change that never quite 
seems to provide lasting solutions. Lessons appear to have to be learned time 
and time again (Scarman 1981; Cantle 2001; HoCHAC 2011; JRF 2011). 
 It is within this context that British police policy makers and 
practitioners must strive to keep all sides happy. This is not a simple task. 
 73 
 
There is a need for police commanders to maintain the capability to deal with 
disorder whilst at the same time providing a service that is visible and gives 
the public what it needs and importantly, what it wants on a day-‐to-‐day basis. 
T???? ??? ???? ????? ??? ???????? ??????? ????? ??????? ??? ??????? ???? ????????????? ???
????????????????????????? 
 There is much debate about how best the police can provide such a 
service and it is certain that in spite of their many similarities, the French and 
British systems are very different in approach and delivery. What seems 
equally certain is that, in terms of the policing of public order, the similarities 
and differences of these approaches have not been objectively compared and 
that such a comparison could well assist in identifying any good practice that 
????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 Public Order Policing is a wide enough discipline in itself to necessitate 
a fairly tight adherence to the core comparison made in this thesis. Such a 
study is likely to ask some questions of the general foundational principles and 
traditions of both national institutions. A comparison of the political and 
operational dimensions of the discipline, within the contemporary social 
context, should deliver the necessary material on which to base reasoned 
conclusions. It was with this aim in mind that the research methodology was 
formulated. 
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Chapter Three 
Liberté, égalité, fraternité 
France 
Introduction 
This chapter contextualises policing as a discipline in the French tradition and in particular 
the policing of public order. It considers the development of policing within France and 
the society of which it is a part, reflecting how ?the evolution of the French police is an 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????This requires 
an historical overview and some mention of the period before the Revolution, as well as 
subsequent events. Setting the scene for following chapters in this manner will show a 
continuity of development over the long term and provide an understanding of how the 
present system and structure is linked to those times. History provides us with key 
junctures that have helped shape contemporary policing cultures in France. Therefore 
some consideration of the French colonial past is also required in order to understand the 
?????????????????? ????????????? ???? ????????????? ????????????????????a strong republican 
structure.  
The focus of this study is public order policing, which allows us largely to ignore 
municipal police forces and administrative units beyond acknowledging their existence. 
This study concentrates on the two national French policing institutions, the Gendarmerie 
Nationale (GN) and the Police Nationale (PN) and, in particular, their respective public 
order policing specialists, the Gendarmerie Mobile (GM) and the Compagnies Républicains 
de Securité (CRS). This chapter will first describe the historical and social context, 
including some influential historical events. It will then provide an understanding of the 
contemporary institutional context where structures, doctrine and methods will be 
considered.  
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Historical and Social Context 
The history of policing predates the French revolution. The development of policing in 
France follows the organisation of society and in particular the development of the State 
(Stead 1983; GN source 4). The origins of modern French policing go back to the ancien 
regime, the pre-‐revolutionary French monarchy, and the relatively decentralised 
organisation that was a corollary of this mode of organisation. The crown was absolutist in 
theory but, in practice, relied on the support of provincial nobles, who had their own 
control over the policing function (GN source 4). Hence, the origins of modern policing are 
to be found in the Middle Ages. During the Middle Ages the Connetable (Constable in 
English, from the Latin comes stabuli -‐ count of the stables) was one of the five high 
offices of the crown (Heraldica 2010).  
As first officer of the crown, he [the Connetable] ranked in precedence 
immediately after the peers...  The constable had under his command all military 
officers, including the marechaux...  He also administered military justice within 
the host (the name of the jurisdiction was the connétablie), which he exercised 
with the assistance of the maréchaux (marshals) of France. This is very much in 
parallel with the Court of the Lord Constable... which existed in England at the 
same time (Heraldica 2010).  
 
Until Cardinal Richelieu?? Edict of January 1627 the policing function in France was 
carried out by the Connetablie. Thereafter it became the responsibility of the 
Maréchaussee (Marshal -‐ from old German marah -‐ horse, and schalh -‐ servant or stable 
keeper, a body essentially much the same as its predecessor, both in role and etymology). 
It is worth noting here that Riche???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
that led to the Treaties of Westphalia and the basis of the modern conception of state 
sovereignty. The Gendarmerie is the heir to those Royal Constabularies and, until 1944, 
was the only national policing body in France (Emsley 1983; Gendarmerie 2009).  
Initially charged with protecting the population from the many unemployed ex-‐
soldiers that had formed groups or militias and who survived through plunder (Emsley 1983 
p29; GN source 4), gendarmerie duties grew to include a more general policing role. On 
March 9, 1720, a nationwide territorial structure was created, and in 1791 was officially 
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renamed the Gendarmerie Nationale (GN). Codification of its role and duties was 
confirmed in law in 1798, and nowadays the Gendarmerie is responsible for policing 95% of 
France territorially and 50% of its population (GN source 4). The gendarmerie is a pre-‐
revolutionary institution that has survived and developed over centuries. The Revolution 
caused the disintegration of the ancient regime, a consequence of which was the need for 
new political institutions such as the Préfecture and the transformation of existing ones, 
including the Gendarmerie. This helps to explain why, in France, the policing of disorder is 
conceptualised as being divorced from territory. It also imparts a sense of the importance 
of how the State reaches from behind and beyond the Republic. 
There is, in France, a historical and traditional distrust of the concept of local 
policing. In part, this might be ascribed to being a consequence of historical abuses of 
power by self-‐interested local regulators and militias who served their masters first, and 
not always the needs of the wider public (Emsley 1983 p29; GN source 4). As such, the 
only recourse of the people was to the Sovereign in Paris, who was able to take a less 
parochial view. This factor is viewed by the GN as conceptually important to the national 
police force approach with regard to the policing of protest and disorder because, even 
today, most major demonstrations of public dissatisfaction take place in Paris (GN source 
4). However, this is not to say that other regions and cities of France are free from unrest. 
Therefore the services of all the national police units are available for deployment 
throughout France and, in the case of the GN, this includes the Départements d'Outre Mer 
and the Territoires d'Outre Mer (DOM TOMs) situated around the globe, and still considered 
to be very much a part of the republic. 
The Dom-‐Toms are utterly different from our own post-‐empire Commonwealth of 
54 sovereign states. When you see pictures of the Queen in a far-‐flung office, her 
position there is purely ceremonial. Not so with the many formal portraits of 
Sarkozy across the Dom-‐Toms. The French president is boss, bankrolls the lot, and 
keeps them in check. When the Commonwealth gets restive, a conference is 
called. When the Dom-‐Toms get restive, the Elysée Palace sends in the gendarmes. 
(Millard 2010 no page No.) 
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The GN???????????????????????????regimes is significant, and some description of the post-‐
revolutionary (1789) phases is necessary to show how the GN serves the State over and 
above any particular regime. The wider philosophical evolution of French society is a 
significant factor, as is the impact of a number of specific events, which will be described 
later. Some description and discussion of the French Republic is vital to understanding this 
aspect. 
Republique  
The French Republic is one and indivisible, meaning that it is made up of equal 
citizens, not separate communities. The Republic thus enables unity to be 
combined with diversity, the me with the we. The two resulting principles are 
those of national sovereignty (i.e. top-‐down sovereignty, that of the nation-‐states) 
and popular sovereignty i.e. (bottom-‐up sovereignty, that of the people). National 
sovereignty corresponds to the idea that every Nation... an assembly of citizens 
united by a common history, language and culture, retains control of the decisions 
[made]... for the common good. Popular sovereignty is the essence of democracy: 
power proceeds from the people, who delegate it temporarily to their elected 
officials. Popular sovereignty is delegated but remains inalienable. The people are 
free to decide, to do and undo [???????? translation] (France-‐republicaine 2010). 
The culture of French republicanism has developed from pre-‐Revolutionary times through 
five republics, two empires and one restoration of the monarchy. The French Revolution of 
1789, essentially the origin of the rights of man, together with the French Constitution and 
French republican ideals, further consolidated a centralist and national approach to 
policing. These ideals, based upon the American bill of rights and natural rights doctrine, 
declared that no matter what the circumstances, wherever or whenever, the Rights of Man 
remain universal and valid (Chavis 2009). So a liberal democracy was born, founded upon 
the thinking of philosophers such as John Locke, Thomas Paine and, in particular, the 
French philosopher of the Revolution, Jean Jacques Rousseau (Baczko 1988; Morsink 1984; 
Shestack 1998). These democratic rights were underpinned by the rule of law, with the GN 
operating as the national police force, vested with the responsibility of ensuring such 
protection (GN source 4; Stead 1983). It is worthy of note that regular military forces 
remained available as an arm of government.  
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From 1795 and the declaration of the constitution of the First Republic, France was 
?...the first society in history which tried to live without a public religion? (Letailleur 
2008). It will become clear, later in this thesis, that the secularism versus particularism 
debate in France and the concept of being French before anything else is a significant 
factor in this study.  Even though the ideals of republicanism were laid down by the 
Revolution of 1789, the separation of Church and State in public life or Laïcité, was not 
formalised until 1905 by the Third Republic, when a law was finally passed to confirm it 
(Letailleur 2008).  
The removal of cultural and religious identity from public life has strong and noble 
aims in terms of protecting social and political rights. However, those protections have 
become contentious due to the increasing diversity and cultural requirements of the very 
citizens they are designed to protect. Additionally, this republican model does not seem to 
adapt readily to changing circumstances. It has not allowed meaningful devolution of 
policing methodologies to adapt to societal changes. To illustrate this it is necessary to 
outline and discuss French imperialism and the effects of Empire.  
Empire 
The policing of public disorder needs to take account of the imperial legacy and its lasting 
consequences in contemporary French society. This legacy has created a powerful cocktail 
of discontent (Aldrich 2007; Zauberman & Levy 2007), which makes the policing of 
consequent societal tension highly problematic. In abstract terms there are no distinctions 
between types of French citizen (Michel & Honneger 2007; Zauberman & Levy 2003), a 
noble aim inherited from the revolution. But the contraposition is that there is no 
recognition of the specific rights or needs of minority groups. The police tend to be 
isolated from local contexts, certainly in sensitive areas. Abstract citizenship appears to 
have become a means of deliberately ignoring the needs of local communities (Aldrich 
2007; Zauberman & Levy 2007; Michel & Honneger 2007; Roché 2005/6).  
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At its peak, during the 1920s and 30s, the French Empire covered some 4,767,000 
sq. miles and was second in size and influence only to the British Empire (Betts 2004 p1). 
Republican ideals, as well as self-‐interest, drove the French civilising mission in its 
colonies, particularly those in Africa. It is reasonable to say that France saw itself as a 
positive benefactor bringing enlightenment to the natives of the lands it occupied, 
?affording access to a culture and language... uniquely suited to conveying the universal 
values associated with the Revolution? (Cumming in Cole and Raymond 2006 p157).  
The colonisation of so many lands, together with ??????????????????????????????????
their populations, cultures, administrations and structures has more recently brought an 
influx of these colonial descendants to France in search of education, employment and 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
this demography is something of a mystery in official terms, and best explained thus:  
In the case of France... analysis of this problem is hindered by an abstract 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
community other than the Nation. In particular, it should be stressed that it is 
against the law to include any ethnic or religious categorization of the population 
within public statistics and, more generally, to allow for the processing of 
?????????? ????? ?????????? ??????? ???????? ?????? ??? ??????? ??????? (Zauberman and 
Levy 2003 p1066).  
 
The only lawful official distinction is between French citizens and aliens. In short, you are 
either French or you are not. This can be easily confirmed by visiting official French 
websites such as the INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques) 
or INED (Institut national d'études démographiques). The total population of Metropolitan 
France on 1st January 2010 was 62,793,432 or 65,447,374 including the Dom-‐Toms (Insee 
2010), and these sites give statistics of age, gender, birth rate or region, but do not give 
any indication of ethnicity or religion. There is no allowable official distinction between 
French citizens along the lines of their ethnicity or origins. 
This is often perceived as a form of official discrimination and exclusion. For 
balance, it also needs to be said that French authorities have some justifiable argument 
for this stance, because in 1990 the CNIL (Commission Nationale de ??????????????????????
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Libertés) authorised the creation of a police database containing sensitive personal 
information, including race and ethnicity, on the grounds that it was necessary in the 
prevention of terrorism. There was much protest, even from Charles Pasqua, a former 
Minister of the Interior, who referred to the wartime Vichy Government??? ????????? ????
??????. Similarly, another attempt to authorise use of skin colour for identification 
purposes was blocked by the then Minister of the Interior, Jean-‐Pierre Chevènement, as 
being against ?the values of the republic? (Zauberman and Levy 2003 p1067).  
So there is in France a real concern that such data could be used once again to 
persecute minorities, and there appears to be a genuine moral debate regarding this 
issue. Zauberman and Levy posit the argument that this dichotomy has more to do with 
the conception of France, and the place of minorities within it, than it has with the moral 
debate as previously outlined. Regardless of the philosophical issues, the policing of 
minority groups will always be a sensitive issue, and one not made easier by 
misconceptions, or policies perceived as having little relevance to the groups in question.  
This is closely linked to what Noemi Michel and Manuela Honegger define as 
?????????????? ???????????, ?????? ?????? ??????????? ??????????? ????????? ???????????? ????
???????? ??? ???? ????????? ??? ?????? ??????????? ????????????? ???????????? ???? ???? ????????????
conception of the state as being neutral (Michel and Honneger 2007 p2). Consideration of 
this issue is necessary because it forms an important part of the case studies. The 
importance of republican ideals and state protection was already apparent, because both 
are central to how the state polices its citizens. The effects of Republic and Empire are a 
broad set of cultural and service values closely linked to the role of the State. They form 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
The nature of contemporary policing has also been shaped by key events in history 
and two such incidents, as described by GN sources during the empirical research (GN 
sources 4 + 8) are summarised below. These events amount to concrete practitioner 
experiences, key historical junctures that have left their mark on the contemporary 
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policing of disorder and use of force. They are described to demonstrate how 
contemporary responses are rooted in particular experiences drawn from the past. They 
were the signal events of their time that changed police thinking. 
?????????????????????????? 1891 
 Fourmies is a town of some 15,000 inhabitants in Northern France some two 
hundred kilometres north of Paris and situated close to the Belgian border. In 1891 it was 
one of a number of textile producing towns most of whose inhabitants were textile 
workers. Paul Lafargue (son-‐in-‐law of Karl Marx) and a leader of a socialist political group 
??????? ???????????? ???? ????? ??????? ?? ???? ??? ??????????? ??????? ??? ???? ?st in protest at 
working conditions and pay. This was an entrenched dispute with both sides fighting hard 
for their perceived rights. On the morning of May 1st a crowd of some two hundred 
gathered in the town square for what was intended to be a peaceful protest. However, a 
scuffle with a mounted police officer resulted in four of the protesters being arrested. As 
a result of this incident, two companies of a locally based army regiment were deployed 
to the scene. This is likely to have done little to reduce tension. They were armed with 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
range (Congres 2009). The crowd was faced by three hundred soldiers led by Commander 
Chapus. Stones were thrown and the crowd pushed forward. Chapus ordered shots to be 
fired over the protesters heads but to no avail. He then ordered his soldiers to fix 
bayonets but this was ineffective due to their close proximity to the crowd. Whilst it is not 
possible to state whether or not he panicked, the situation caused him to give his troops 
the order to fire at the crowd. As a result thirty five protesters were injured and nine 
were killed. Amongst the nine dead were two boys and four young women (ac-‐lille 2009; 
GN sources 4 + 8). The lesson was stark; rightly or wrongly Chapus directed his men to 
open fire. Military forces tend to follow orders.  
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Languedoc 1907  
Possibly ??????????????????????????????????????????twentieth century was generated by the 
strong feelings of Languedoc wine growers whose livelihoods were threatened by the 
catastrophic effects of phylloxera (a disease of grape vines). This was further compounded 
by the perceived governmental discrimination towards the Languedoc wine producers 
after the vine rootstock had been replaced and wine production reinvigorated (GN source 
4). The then Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau (Le Tigre) deployed army units against 
the protesters and five people were killed, including Cécile Bourel, a twenty year old 
woman, who had been shopping in the local market. Serious rioting and damage occurred 
as a result (Lichfield 2007). When the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Regiment, who were 
largely recruited from the Languedoc region, heard of the deaths ?????????????????????????
?????? ????????? ??N source2009) and approximately five hundred of them mutinied and 
marched on Béziers.  
Outright civil war, even a southern secession, seemed briefly to threaten. The 
action of the 17th has since entered into France's rich folklore of resistance and 
rebellion. In truth, the soldiers appear to have been unsure what to do next. 
Within 24 hours, without firing a shot, they accepted an amnesty and a promise of 
no punishment. Most were rapidly thrown out of the army or sent to miserable 
postings abroad (Lichfield in The Guardian 2007). 
Army units from elsewhere in France had to be drafted in to replace them once they had 
been removed from their duties. For ????????????????????????????the lesson learned was 
the need for dedicated public order units to be available for deployment in such 
circumstances, and that they should not be native to the region in question. This was 
achieved after the First World War, in 1921, with the formation within the GN of the 
Gendarmerie Mobile. Today most Gendarmes are posted away from their home regions.  
 The evolution of the Gendarmerie has continued. In 1950, whilst still coming under 
the Ministry of Defence, the Gendarmerie was made distinct from the army, becoming a 
separate force, but still charged with policing duties throughout the Republic. In 2002 
their operational duties, regarding their national internal security mission, were brought 
under the Ministry of the Interior (Home Office), headed at that time by Nicolas Sarkozy. 
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In 2009, the administration of the Gendarmerie became fully the responsibility of this 
office, except for military missions:  
 August 3, 2009 -‐ Law 2009-‐971: The powers of the judicial authority ... 
notwithstanding, the Gendarmerie Nationale lies under the authority of the Home 
Minister ... With regards to its military missions ... the institution is placed under 
the Defence Minister's authority (Gendarmerie ppt 2009).  
So, in all non-‐military matters their budget is controlled by the Ministry of the Interior 
although, as it stands, the GN still retains its military status. This ?rapprochement? (vie-‐
publique 2009) will bring the two forces of law and order, the PN and GN, closer together 
in terms of interoperability, with the sharing of human and material resources, as well as 
training facilities. This process is intended to be incremental, and will make efficiency 
savings. It will also bring all policing services under the authority of the Préfets. The 
classic rivalry that existed between these two codes of policing seems to have become less 
important because of this convergence, but it is fair to say that this rivalry does still exist, 
and this was apparent during conversations with sources from both institutions.  
The Police Nationale is often cited as having originated as part ?????????????????????
wartime Vichy government in 1941, and there is some truth in this. An Act was passed on 
April 23rd that year, and the national police service was established, generally with 
policing responsibilities for towns with populations of over 10,000 people (Interieur 2010; 
Stead 1983). Paris retained its special status, which will be discussed in a following section 
about the Prefecture de Police. The national structure of the police force, forerunner of 
???????????may have been formed by the Vichy government, ??????????????????????????????
system began life much earlier. On further investigation it is apparent that its history 
parallels that of the GN.  
At the same time that the Connetablie was in place, an inchoate city police force 
was developing in Paris; it was the first of its kind. In 1254 the Chevalier of the Watch was 
installed and staffed by ?twenty mounted sergeants and twenty six sergeants on foot? 
(Interieur 2010), charged with keeping Paris safe by night. Following on from this, similar 
city forces were developed throughout France.  
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In 1667 the office of ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Gabriel-‐Nicolas de la Reynie was appointed Lieutenant General by the King, and given 
responsibility for the policing of Paris (Emsley 1983; Stead 1983). He is considered to have 
laid the foundations of the modern police force, and is quoted as having said ??olicing is to 
ensure the safety of the public and private individuals, by protecting the city from that 
which causes disorder? (Interieur 2010). One can see that the maintenance of public order 
was seen as the primary policing role and this system was extended to all the major cities 
of France. It remaining as such until the Revolution changed the regime, when the role of 
the Lieutenant of Police became the responsibility of the elected mayor, with police 
chiefs working under the direction of that office. Several developments took place over 
the ensuing period including the installation of police commissioners (Commissaire or 
Superintendent) in all cities of over 5000, but crime levels and ?rebellious activity? 
continued to rise (Interieur 2010). It is clear that, throughout these developments, the 
French police role was very political (Emsley 1983) and there seems to have been a focus 
upon maintenance of order, intelligence gathering and repression of anti state activity 
(Emsley 1983; Stead 1983).  
Under Napoleon Bonaparte, the State was reformed and the Prefecture de Police 
established (Emsley 1983; GN source 2009; Stead 1983). The Prefet de Police was now in 
charge of all aspects of policing in Paris, still with an emphasis on public order, and 
protecting the security of the state. Outside Paris, police forces in other cities acted 
under the authority of the Prefet or sub-‐Prefet, all direct representatives of the State. In 
rural areas and smaller towns policing remained the responsibility of the GN (GN source 
4). City police forces continued to change and develop through the four Republics until 
????????????????????????created a national body. Today they are organised regionally with 
each Departement having a chief of police in charge of a number of police districts, each 
commanded by a Commisaire Divisionaire (Chief Superintendent). Also a national officer 
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????????? ??????? ???? ???????????? ??? ?????? ???? ??? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????????? ??????????
Supérieure de la Police ENSP). 
Towards the end of World War Two, after the liberation of France, the Ministry of 
the Interior took over direction of the national police, now the Sûreté Nationale (1944 ? 
1966), still responsible for policing all towns having populations of over 10,000 people. 
This was a further key development in the centralisation of the French police system 
(Stead 1983). In 1947 after a series of industrial strikes, a sub-‐directorate of Republican 
Security Companies (CRS) was formed as a general reserve of the National Police. The 
Prefecture de Police de Paris again remained unchanged. In 1966 a law was passed that 
established the PN in its present form with its headquarters in Paris. Whilst remaining a 
national body, it is ????????????????????????????????, and the Préfet de Paris remains the 
chief of police for the Petite Couronne. 
 
Fig.2 The Prefecture de Paris Boundaries (La Petite Couronne) 
 The development of the PN has continued since then and, over more recent decades, a 
concerted modernisation process has taken place. This has resulted in a number of new 
structures or directorates being established, which will be detailed in the following 
section that describes the contemporary institutional dimension. 
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The Contemporary Institutional Context 
This section shows that there is a division between two rival corps, The GN and the PN. 
Both are under very firm State control, which appears to distrust the concept of local 
police forces, and community policing. Insofar as distinctions can be made, whilst both are 
very much national institutions, the GN is a generalist force, with the PN mainly being 
operational in large cities. Both have responsibilities for the policing of disorder, but the 
PN in particular appear to symbolise the alienation from the populations of the quartiers 
(sensitive suburbs). In order for this study to provide a real appreciation of the policing of 
public order in France, discussion of the institutional dimension needs to concentrate on 
these two national policing bodies (GN and PN), and the role of the Préfecture in Paris. 
The following descriptions are intended to outline the functions of the two national forces 
and how they are directly controlled by the state through the Préfets. The organisation 
chart that follows gives a summary view of the present structure that will be more fully 
explained in the following sections. 
 
Fig. 3 Organisation chart of French Policing Structure (PN ppt 2009) 
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Gendarmerie Nationale (GN) 
The operational activities of the GN are in reality governed by three authorities, each 
overseeing particular aspects of its role. Defence missions remain under the authority of 
the Ministry of Defence; investigation duties and powers are performed and effected 
under the authority of the Ministry of Justice; public safety and public order duties are 
implemented under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior (GN sources 4 + 5). As 
such, the GN is a very flexible service that can be deployed to a wide range of crises. 
Figure three below shows how gendarmerie duties may include the full spectrum, from 
general policing patrols to fighting full scale wars within French territory or abroad.   
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Fig.4 The Spectrum of Crisis (Gendarmerie ppt 2009) 
The GN is ?a police force with a military status? (GN sources 4 + 5) made up of 
105,021 personnel, mostly Gendarmes (6,744 officers; 76,275 NCOs; and 14,952 
volunteers), 246 support officers, and a civilian staff of 1,928. There are also around 
40,000 reservists that can be called upon in time of need.  
In 2007 the GN was awarded ?7.3 billion as its annual budget (48% of the national 
policing budget). As well as salaries, costs included maintenance of 4,120 barracks, 32,000 
vehicles and 83,296 computers. The GN strives to stay abreast of developments in IT and 
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communication technology, updating them at significant cost (Osor 2009). The GN is a 
distinct body with a own character and culture that is different from that of their 
colleagues, the Police Nationale (PN), and this does impact upon their service delivery: 
??????????????????????????????????? (GN source 7). This is not to say that their policing 
aims differ from the PN. In a general policing context it seems more a difference of 
policing style.  
The organisation of the GN confirms its military-‐style, with a hierarchical chain of 
operational command. It is divided into twenty two geographical areas and each area 
commander answers directly to the Directeur Général de la Gendarmerie Nationale 
(DGGN). It is a national organisation comprised of the territorial gendarmerie, the mobile 
gendarmerie and a number of specialist units (Gendarmerie 2009).                             
The Gendarmerie Départementale (Divisional or Territorial Gendarmerie) 
The departmental Gendarmes are generally based in the smaller towns and rural areas. 
They have a traditional policing function with the maintenance of public safety as their 
primary role. This is further defined as ?protecting people and property, keeping the 
public informed, together with gathering and sharing intelligence? (Gendarmerie ppt 
2009). Being approximately 66,000 gendarmes in strength, the departmental gendarmerie  
prides itself as being a community orientated local policing force that is close to, and 
indeed, a part of the population. It claims to have a community driven and partnership-‐
based policing approach that includes local security contracts and crime prevention 
duties. Such local contracts would evidence a genuine cooperation with local authorities, 
even though these are also very much a part of the State architecture. This could bear 
comparison with the British structure. There are also 3,200 gendarmerie school-‐safety 
liaison officers, which further evidences a commitment in this regard (Gendarmerie ppt 
2009). 
Gendarmes are ??????? ??? ?????????????? ??? ??????? ????? across France, with 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????. They also work out 
89 
 
of smaller joint or lone stations at the Canton level (roughly equivalent to an electoral 
Ward in the UK). Fig. 4 below juxtaposes the military and GN structures. 
Fig. 5 Organisation of the GM/GN 
 
(Gendarmerie ppt 2009) 
Additionally there are number of more specialist units that supplement the 
divisional Gendarmerie such as: criminal investigation, intelligence and judicial 
investigation units (CID); surveillance and intervention squads based in sensitive areas, 
who perform surveillance duties to assist divisional units; La Brigade de Prévention de la 
Délinquance Juvénile (BPDJ), units that intervene in sensitive suburban areas to reduce 
juvenile criminality; roads policing units tasked with road safety, including motorcycle 
patrols that police the road networks; mountain units that are trained in search and 
rescue and police the mountainous areas (twenty mountain and high mountain platoons 
that conduct approximately 4,000-‐4,500 search and rescue operations per year). There are 
also Gendarmes skilled in cave and tunnel rescue; air support units (twenty one in 
metropolitan France) and nautical units that watch the coast and inland waterways 
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(twenty seven sea-‐shore units, twelve river units and five land-‐water marine units). The 
Gendarmerie also trains and deploys police dogs (410 teams).  
Gendarmerie responsibilities cover a continuum of policing duties from a civil 
peacetime role to military war duties. The Police Nationale role is a purely civil policing 
one. The Gendarmerie sees itself as ?? state force handling the [whole] security 
continuum? (Gendarmerie ppt 2009). 
The Gendarmerie Mobile (Public Order Units) 
Today the Gendarmerie Mobile (GM) consists of 16,476 Gendarmes of all ranks. It is the 
?????????????? ????? ??????? ?????? ????????? asset and is generally responsible for 
maintaining and where necessary restoring law and order. When not engaged in public 
order duties GM units may be deployed on general public safety duties with departmental 
gendarmes. GN sources (2, 4, 5, 6 + 7) suggest that this does happen when possible, but 
GM squadrons are usually dedicated to public order duties. The GM is also nationally 
structured ??????? ???????????????????????????????????? ??????? ?????? ?g???????????? serving 
out of the metropolitan territory, each of which is made up of between four and seven 
squadrons (Escadron de Gendarmerie Mobile EGM the basic unit of the GM). An armoured 
group is also available, based at Versailles Sartory. At the time of writing the GM has 127 
such squadrons although it was predicted that this number would be reduced in the near 
future due to financial restraints (GN source 4). Each squadron of around 120 Gendarmes 
is sub divided into four platoons; three regular platoons and one intervention group. The 
gendarmes of the intervention groups (pelotons ??intervention) receive extra training to 
perform specialist roles, thus giving each squadron a great degree of logistical and tactical 
flexibility and autonomy. Each squadron spends on average 180 days away from their base 
each year and two or three squadrons are permanently deployed on crisis-‐management 
operations such as Kosovo/Ivory Coast. This is in addition to specific assignments on a 
squadron or individual basis deployed to such places as Haiti, DRC and Lebanon. 
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Fig. 6 An EGM in training at St Astier 2009 
The nature of GM duties can generally be described as having the following categories and 
proportions: public security 44%; protection and escort 21%; public order operations 13%; 
training 10% ; other missions 12% (GN source 4). Whilst only 13% of their duties are 
ascribed to public order operations, in this context this refers to the narrower description 
of policing protest, sporting events and crowd control rather than the wider meaning of 
maintaining order, which would include all the other duties mentioned above such as 
public security. When on operational public order duties in France GM members wear a 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
are likely to be carried out wearing a light blue shirt. All gendarmes wear the stylised 
grenade badge. GM badges including insignia of rank are yellow to distinguish them from 
the territorial gendarmerie, which are white.  
Regular and frequent operational deployments throughout France and around the 
world keep the squadrons very busy. As well as their ongoing personal career 
development, and local EGM training of twenty days a year, each squadron attends the 
National Public Order Training Centre (CNEFG) at St Astier for two weeks intensive public 
order refreshment training and scenarios every eighteen months (Gendarmerie 
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presentation 2009). Elements of the GM are regularly deployed on EU, NATO and UN 
peacemaking and peace building operations. On average there are 1,500 gendarmes 
deployed around the world at any given time. 
 
Fig. 7 Gendarmerie images (Gendarmerie ppt 2009) 
Force de Gendarmerie mobile et d'intervention (FGMI) 
Formed in 2005 the FGMI is based at Maisons Alfort in Paris and is an integral part of the 
GM organisation. The FGMI is responsible for the command and management of the GM 
within the Ile de France, and sensitive escort duties. It has at its disposal 3500 gendarmes 
organised in five to eight groupements, including the armoured group based at Versailles 
Sartory. It is also the home of the Etat Major Projetable de Gestion de Crise (EMPGC), 
which is a deployable headquarters for crisis management. This is a unit that can be 
deployed anywhere in the world as an emergency planning and major incident command 
team to assist in the management of crises ranging from natural disasters such as 
earthquakes etc. to mining accidents, shipwrecks, environmental pollution and riots or 
looting. In short it can attend to almost any type of major incident. It also has the linked 
responsibilities for operational debriefing with a view to any necessary improvements 
through review and rewrite of methodologies, operational advice and the maintenance of 
their capabilities through training. This unit has had operational involvement in the 
policing of notable events such as: the G8 Summit at Vichy 2007, a very large public order 
event????????????????????? in Guyana 2008, where gendarmes were deployed to deal with 
illegal gold mining; ???? ???????? ????????? ?? 2009, where bank robber Antonio Ferrara, 
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captured after being broken out of a Fresnes gaol in 2003 by an armed gang, faced a two 
month trial; and the NATO Summit in Strasbourg 2009, which saw significant protests 
(EMPGC presentation 2009). 
 Intervention Units  
The Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN) is essentially a counter-‐
terrorism & intervention unit, whose gendarmes are highly skilled intervention specialists. 
They are intensively trained to deal with serious events such as terrorism, serious crime, 
hostage situations and interventions in prisons. The GIGN are also available for deployment 
overseas at short notice. Also available for intervention duties is the Peloton 
??????????????? ??? ????????? ??????????? ??????, whose two GM squadrons (based at 
Toulouse and Orange) form part of a new initiative that is an intermediate force between 
the GM squadron intervention teams and the GIGN. PI2G is available at short notice and 
trained to similar level as the GIGN and can assist that group if necessary. Two further 
PI2G units are planned for the northern half of the country.   
It has been shown that the GN maintains a significant public order policing 
capability. In its GM it possesses the organisational capacity to deal with all levels of 
public order issues, across the globe if necessary. The GM is highly trained, well equipped 
and can respond quickly and effectively; its squadrons are regularly deployed on order 
maintenance duties in the sensitive areas of French cities or towns, often as support for 
the Police Nationale, which will be considered next.     
  
Police Nationale (PN) 
Security is part of the inalienable rights of man ... guaranteeing the rights of man 
and citizen necessitates a public force established for the benefit of all and not for 
the usefulness of those to whom it is entrusted (French Interior Ministry 2010) 
 As outlined earlier the PN has developed as a national organisation since the time of the 
Second World War. In its present form it is part of the Ministry of the Interior and headed 
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by the Directeur Général de la Police Nationale. The PN strength as at 1st January 2006 
was 145,820 staff including 119,182 police officers plus 26, 638 support staff (French 
Interior Ministry 2010). 
The philosophy of the PN is stated as being directly linked to the 1789 declaration 
of the rights of man and is written into statute (with laws of 1995 and 2002). It has the 
aims of maintaining public peace and security by enforcement of the law, protecting life 
and property and the prevention of disorder and delinquency. The police have a 
responsibility to investigate crime, bring offenders to justice, and to provide information 
to the state regarding any threats to public order or the ?fundamental interests? of the 
state (French Interior Ministry 2010). To carry out these functions the Director General has 
several  directorates that manage specific areas of policing. These include the following:  
L'Inspection Générale de la Police Nationale (IGPN) 
A national inspectorate for the PN, it performs a function equivalent to the British H.M. 
Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC). It researches aspects of policing, making 
recommendations with the aim of improving policing services. 
 Direction Centrale de la Police Judiciaire (DCPJ)  
The national directorate for the policing of criminal matters is focused mainly on 
organised crime. It approximates the British Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). 
This office co-‐ordinates all law enforcement agencies in this regard (PN, GN, Customs and 
Excise etc). 
Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur (DCRI) 
????? ??? ???? ???? central intelligence agency that reports directly to the Minister of the 
Interior. It has departments responsible for such areas as: economic protection, terrorism, 
technological, violent subversion, general administration, support, counter-‐espionage and 
international affairs. 
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Direction Centrale de la Sécurité Publique (DCSP) 
This is the central directorate of public security, which has responsibility for territorial 
policing across France. Its primary functions are concerned with public safety, urban 
violence, fighting crime and roads policing.  It directs general police duties across the 
spectrum, and is widely perceived as being the directing body for uniformed policing. This 
includes the policing of public order at the local level, and each Departmental Prefet has 
local public order units at their disposal. These units are known as Compagnies 
????????????????????, and members are trained in public order tactics. They carry an array 
of equipment necessary for this role. CDI agents wear operational uniforms that are very 
similar to that of the CRS but they can be distinguished by their departmental badges and 
their vehicles. 
 
Fig. 8. A ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
Direction Centrale des Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité (DCCRS) 
This is the central directorate of the CRS, whose duties and structure will be further 
explained as part of the following section on the CRS. 
The Director General of the Police also has a number of specialist units to deal 
with anti-‐terrorism, drugs, armed interventions, scientific analysis and information. The 
rank structure of the PN ??? ??????????? ??? ?????? ???????? The Gardiens de la Paix (peace 
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keepers), who are non-‐commissioned officers that perform civil policing duties; t??????????
??????????????, the equivalent to the UK inspecting ranks????????????????????????, which 
are equivalent to British superintendent ranks. This study will refer to them generally as 
police officers, unless specificity is necessary. However, i???????????????????????????????????
system is very strong in France, particularly in the civil service and other state 
?????????????? ???????? ??? ????? ???????? ??? ?????, although promotion to a higher corps is 
possible and does happen but requires the appropriate academic qualification.  
Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité (CRS) 
The CRS are remembered for their role in the iconic protests of May 1968 where they 
clashed with protesting students, earning a fearsome reputation and became subject of 
?????????????????????? ?????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????erised in 
the songs, comics and stories of popular culture.  
Formed in 1944 the CRS are the public order specialists of the PN. Perhaps better 
known, certainly more infamous, than the GM, they perform more or less the same roles 
and are interoperable with them (they are often deployed alongside one another for 
bigger events). The primary role of the CRS is public order policing and they are usually 
seen performing crowd control duties at protests, sporting or organised events. They are 
also the general reserve of the PN and are managed by the central directorate (DCCRS). 
Several units remain at the permanent disposal of the Préfets for deployments to deal 
with urban violence and public safety. As such they are frequently utilised in the most 
troubled inner city areas. 30% of CRS officers are based in Paris and 10% -‐ 15% in the 
banlieues (suburbs) of Paris (PN source 4). 
Prior to 1944, the maintenance of public order was carried out by the military, in a 
manner that was more repressive and less preventative than that performed by the CRS 
nowadays (PN source 4). That said they still have a very military structure and style (Stead 
1983)???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
formed by the Vichy government in 1941 as a mobile force and was modelled on the GM, 
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but with a civil not military statute. Dissolved after the Liberation on 8th December 1944, 
(Polices 2010) the GMR were replaced by the CRS whose members included many former 
French resistance men (PN source 4), which is ironic as the GMR were often tasked with 
repression of the wartime resistance movement.  
 The CRS numbers approximately 14,421 staff in total (CRS presentation December 
2009), ???????????????????? ????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? technical and 
administrative ??????????????????????????????????é??????????????????????????????????????????
and who have limited powers. CRS officers are recognisable by their blue uniforms that 
have a large red CRS patch badge on them?????????????????????????????????????????????????
helmet with two yellow horizontal bands, which nowadays is of similar design to the 
gendarmerie helmet, probably as a result of a recent move to a shared procurement of 
equipment.  
Fig.9 CRS Agents (www.google.com) 
The basic unit of the CRS is, as one might expect, the company. Each company 
normally has a complement of between 120 and 150 members with a Commandant in 
charge. There are normally four general service platoons and one headquarters platoon 
that includes the company secretariat and is responsible for such things as equipment, 
vehicles, weapons, ordnance and catering. As such each company is self sufficient. CRS 
companies normally operate away from their home base where they are accommodated in 
barracks. 
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Fig. 10 Typical CRS Company Structure 
There are sixty one companies spread across the whole of France in seven 
directorates, corresponding with the seven defence zones. Every CRS company maintains 
its operational efficiency with an annual training regime, without which they would lose 
?reflexes and capacities? (PN source 4). Using training grounds local to their geographic 
bases they have three five day blocks of collective training each year to hone the 
?fundamental and automatic responses???PN source 4) necessary for maintenance and re-‐
establishment of public order. In addition, an obligatory two-‐company night exercise and a 
further ten training days are interspersed through the year. 
 In addition to the companies there are also nine motorway units, six motorcycle 
units and one mountain unit (search and rescue). The main point to keep in mind is that 
the CRS is a mobile reserve that has a permanent responsibility to be available for 
deployment throughout the territory. They are also instrumental as a part of the 
????????????? ????-‐delinquency and urban violence strategies (French Interior Ministry 
2010). As such, CRS units are engaged full time in security patrols in all French cities and, 
like their GM counterparts, they regularly train together as units, work as a team and 
frequently deal with significant disorder situations.  
By way of summary the following page contains a chart showing the operational 
units of the two national police forces of France. It provides a quick reference and 
comparison of the two organisations. It can be seen that both institutions possess similar 
assets, albeit within slightly different structures. 
Commandant  
Capitain  
Adjoint  
     
Headquarters  
Platoon  
General  
Service  
Platoon  
General  
Service  
Platoon  
General  
Service  
Platoon  
General  
Service  
Platoon  
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Fig.11  Operational Units/Sub Units of the French National Police Forces  
Gendarmerie  Nationale   Police  Nationale  
Gendarmerie  Départementale  
? Uniformed Patrol 
? Criminal investigation, intelligence 
and judicial investigation units 
(CID) 
?  Surveillance and intervention 
squads  (sensitive areas) 
?  La Brigade de prévention de la 
délinquance juvénile (BPDJ) 
? Roads policing units 
? Mountain units ?search and rescue; 
?  Air support units  
? Gendarmerie police dogs 
? School-‐safety liaison officers 
? Gendarmerie Maritime  
? Gendarmerie de l'Air (Airforce 
Gendarmerie)  
? Gendarmerie des transports aériens 
(Air Transport)  
? Gendarmerie de l'Armement (DGA) 
? Gendarmerie Nationale's 
Prospective Centre (CPGN) 
 
The  Republican  Guard  
? Two infantry regiments 
? One cavalry regiment 
? Motorcycle squadron 
? Orchestra, bands and a choir 
The  Gendarmerie  Mobile  
? 23 ?????????????  
o 4  ?  7  Squadrons  each  
o Total  of  127  Squadrons  
? 1  Armoured  Groupement  
? Force   de   Gendarmerie   mobile   et  
d'intervention  (FGMI)  
? Groupe   d'intervention   de   la  
Gendarmerie  nationale  (GIGN) 
? ???????????????????????????????????
Génération  (PI2G)  
? International  and  European  security  
forces 
 
Direction   Générale   de   la   Police   Nationale  
DGPN    
? Anti  Drug  Unit  (MILAD)  
? Anti  Terrorist  Unit  (UCLAT)  
? Research,   Assistance,   Intervention,  
Dissuasion  (RAID)  
? Interior  Ministry  Security  Unit  (SSMI)  
?   Central  Vehicle  Database  (SCA)  
?   Intelligence  Service(SICOP)  
? Victims  unit  
? Scientific  unit  (forensics)  
? Police  band  
  
  
Direction  Centrale  de   la  Sécurité  Publique  
(DCSP)  
Uniform  Patrol  
  
  Direction  Centrale  de  la  Sécurité  Publique  
(DCSP)  
???????????????????????????????  
Direction   Centrale   de   la   Police   aux  
Frontières  (DCPAF)  
Border  Police  
Direction   Centrale   des   Compagnies  
Républicaines  de  Sécurité  (DCCRS)  
  
? Compagnies   Républicaines   de   Sécurité  
(CRS)  
o 7  Zones  
o 61  x  Companies  
o 9  x    motorway  units  
o   6  x  motorcycle  units  
o Search  &  rescue  units  (seasonal)  
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Prefecture of Police 
    The police headquarters in the heart of the life of the community, guarantees 
the safety of persons and property in Paris and the three departments of the inner 
suburbs. Founded in 1800, serving all audiences, it brings together diverse 
expertise within both the mayor and the prefect (Prefecture 2010) 
As outlined earlier, the Préfecture de Police is the competent authority for all policing 
?????????????????????????????????????, the city of Paris and the departments of Hauts de 
Seine, Seine Saint Denis and Val de Marne. Within this jurisdiction the Prefecture has 
responsibility for the security and safety of all citizens. The Prefet de Police of Paris has 
the same responsibilities that the DGPN does outside of Paris, and draws this authority 
directly from the Minister of the Interior. The DGPN has no authority over the Prefet de 
Police. ????? ???????? ??? ??????? ????????? ????? ??? ??? ??????? ?? ????? ????????????? ??? ????
?????????????????? ??????????3 p8). The Préfecture then is a unique organisation with no 
equivalent British institution. It is quite different from the current ?????? ??? ?????????
office.  
Paris has a population of approximately 12 million and each year plays host to 5200 
sporting, ceremonial, inauguration or festive events as well as many thousands of 
incidents requiring policing. As regards the control of the policing of public order and 
traffic the Préfecture houses the public order and information command room, which is 
staffed by representatives of the PN, GN and other public services such as the fire 
brigade. 
Fig. 12 Central control room Paris 
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The organisation chart below of the Public Order and Traffic command structure is just 
one part of the Préfecture???????e and complex structure. 
 
Fig.13 Prefecture organisation chart (Interieur 2010) 
It is clear then, that Paris has great importance as the heart of the Republic in the minds 
of the French people. It is the seat of government and where people come together for 
events and to protest. It is where the policing of such events is practised regularly and 
most often. Policing big events or disorders is more difficult elsewhere (PN source). 
?Politically Paris is more important than elsewhere so events are policed more thoroughly? 
(PN source 3). It is also the reason that Napoléon created the Préfecture to care for it. 
GM, CRS and CDI Public Order Policing -‐ Doctrines and Methods 
All three of these public order policing bodies are bound by the same laws, the same 
human rights culture and the same republican ideals. Yet they have significant differences 
of structure, history and policing culture as were detailed earlier. There is potential for 
issues regarding the inter-‐operability of these organisations. However, when asked if they 
can work readily with one another, the general response was that they can work alongside 
one another as units, but not as mixed teams. CRS officers and GM gendarmes have a 
mutual respect, but there is an evident element of competition. PN source 3 commented 
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that the GM is less mobile than CRS units. A GM officer (GN source 7) said that the CRS 
cost more, and take longer to deploy than the GM, because they are bound by the red 
tape of service constraints. This is no doubt largely due to the relative strength of the 
unions in the PN, who have access to the media. As a military body, union membership is 
denied to members of the GN. The points made by both PN and GN sources all seemed 
reasonable, valid and served to underline a fundamental difference of approach. 
 The following figure 14 shows a typical departmental police structure and provides 
a clear view of the importance given to public order policing.  
 
??? ?????????????? ?????????
Le DDSP
Departmental Director
SGO
Admin
Logistics
Finance
SDIG
Intelligence H Q Chief
Compagnie de
Sécurisation
3è District
Sarcelles
2è District
Argenteuil
SOP
Public Order
Service
1er District
CERGY
Sûreté 
Départementale
(CID)
Provision of 
Mobile Forces
(C RS ou E G M)
 
Fig.14 A Département level policing structure (PN presentation 2009) 
At the department level, public order policing is the responsibility of the Service Ordre 
Publique (SOP) which deals with day to day public order policing in the districts. The DDSP 
of the Département ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
districts (or sous-‐préfectures) as detailed in the above chart. Each district has three or 
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four Commissariats (Police Stations commanded by a Commissaire/Superintendent). The 
Service des Informations Géneral (SDIG) is the intelligence unit that gathers information 
from many sources, which would include elected officials, the unions, protest organisers 
and paid informants. In this way community tension indicators can be monitored and, as 
with all effective police services, it is fair to assert that information and intelligence is 
vital for strategic, tactical and operational decision making. It is notable though, that the 
?????????????????????????????(State) policing intelligence sources rather than community 
sources. 
Departmental SOPs are typically structured as shown below: 
Public O rder Service (SOP)
A service of the Départmentale units dedicated to 
policing the distr icts and public r ights of way
L R AH Q
Intervention 
Company
C DI
Roads
Policing
B A C D Dogs
(Immigration)
 
Fig.15 Service Ordre Publique structure (PN presentation 2009) 
The SOP of the Département ??? ???? ?????? has just under two hundred staff with the 
complements of the operational units as follows: CDI -‐ ninety agents; BAC D ? thirty; police 
dogs ? sixteen; roads policing ? thirty. Police numbers in other Départements are 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
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The BAC D is the Brigade Anti Criminalité Départementale, which is aimed at 
combating delinquency and low to medium level crime. They generally patrol during the 
hours of darkness and frequently use stop and check powers on potential offenders (PN 
source 3). They have been criticised because of the frequency and style of their 
interventions (HRW 2012; Goris et al 2009). Resentment over police attitudes and 
behaviour during identity checks was a significant factor in triggering the 2005 
disturbances, with stop and search having been the cause of ?countless lower-‐intensity 
conflicts between police and young people in urban areas? (HRW 2012 p2). This 
divisiveness has a negative effect on broader police and community relations, certainly as 
regards information and intelligence gathering (HRW 2012). Similar criticism has been 
levelled at the Metropolitan police in London, where the disturbances of August 2011 also 
lacked a single cause and where stop and search, particularly of black and Asian men, was 
a major source of discontent with the police. These tensions were cited by some as a 
motivating factor for the disturbances and some attacks on the police (Singh et al 
2011).The CDI, as previously detailed, is a large unit that performs public order duties, 
high visibility patrols and interventions within the Département. They are trained in and 
deploy similar tactics to CRS units.  
Community policing, as it is understood in the UK, does not seem to have the same 
tradition in France. Patrolling local police officers who interact with the communities and 
are part of the community are not evident. The community policing approach attempted 
??? ?????? ???????? ????? ???? ????? ???????? ??? ??????????, was deemed to have been 
unsuccessful and scrapped. Its failure has been attributed to ???????????????????????????????
hierarchical, complex and inflexible nature, together with the layers of authority that 
managed the police. Also it was under-‐resourced at an operational level, and viewed by 
police officers as a role that lacked prestige (Roché 2005 p58). A Commisaire also stated 
that in France prevention of crime and disorder is more difficult because the public do not 
like talking to the police (PN source 3; HRW 2012); implicitly there is little in the way of 
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police structure or agency to facilitate such communication. So it can be argued that 
community policing in France is simply not viewed as important enough for the state or its 
institutions to invest in. 
However, in the place of Police de Proximité another initiative was instituted in 
the form of Unités Territoriales de Quartiér (UTeQ), whose officers provided a constant 
presence in the difficult areas with the aim of reducing urban violence, a job that is 
considered ?tres dur? ? ?very tough? (PN source 3). Launched in 2008 by Michelle Alliot 
Marie, the then Minister of the Interior, they patrolled the sensitive areas of Saint-‐Denis, 
La Courneuve, Clichy-‐sous-‐Bois and Montfermeil.  These units were staffed by agents with 
at least four years service, and were present in many sensitive areas such as Cergy 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????rnment website post of April 2008 stated 
that they were aimed at the underground economy and the trade in illicit drugs as well as 
re-‐establishing public confidence in the police (French Governement 2010). It then adds 
????? ????? ???? ?????? ????? ???????? ???? ???????????, otherwise known as less than lethal 
weapons. This would be in addition to conventional side arms, which are carried by all 
national police agents and gendarmes. This could suggest that, whilst intending to build 
confidence in the police, it was through enforcement rather than engagement, and 
probably seen by recipients as repressive rather than progressive.  
French government support for this style of policing remains stronger than it was 
for Police de Proximité and this was evidenced by the then Minister of the Interior Brice 
??????????s announcement of June 2010, regarding the establishment of a further twenty-‐
six UTeQ units for Bobigny, Paris (lefigaro 2010). The UTeQs were supported by the 
Compagnies de Sécurisation, also part of the Departmental structure under the DDSP and 
who might be expected to have a good local knowledge. These companies were aimed at 
countering urban violence and delinquency and performed a support role similar to that of 
the CRS (PN source 3) but, being locally based and controlled, should have had a better 
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understanding of local cultures. So it is fair to say that there was a considerable and 
increased state investment in order maintenance. 
Where gatherings of people or crowds leads to tension with potential for disorder, 
the French authorities often use powers under Article 431-‐3 of the French Penal Code, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????a???????????????????????????????????? 
any gathering in a street or other public place likely to disturb public order. A 
crowd can be dispersed by the police after two orders (sommations) to disperse 
have been issued without effect by the Prefet, sub prefet, mayor or deputies, any 
police officer responsible for public safety or any other judicially qualified police 
officer bearing the insignia of their office... the police may use direct force if 
violence or assault are used against them or they cannot otherwise defend the 
ground they occupy (Lexinter 2010) 
Where a crowd has gathered, spontaneously or otherwise, and public order is likely to be 
disturbed, the Préfet has to analyse the situation, and decide if authorisation for use of 
force is necessary and proportionate. If such authorisation is given, the police will make 
??? ????????????? ?????? ??? ?? ????????????? ?????? ??? ??? ??????? ?? ???????? ???????? ?????
force may be used if the crowd does not disperse. A loud signal flare (fusée rouge) will 
????????? ??? ?????? ??????? ????? ????????????? ??? the crowd does not take heed of two 
????????????? ???? ??????? ???? ????????? ????????? ???? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ????? ????
????????????? ??????? ????? ???? ??? ??????? ?????? ????? ???????? ???? ??????? ?????? ????? ???
loudspeakers and signs, and then give sufficient time for those wishing to leave to do so. 
Levels of force used are at the discretion of the commanding officer, who must have due 
regard to their necessity and proportionality. Commanders will use the lowest level of 
force possible, in order to achieve the aim (GN sources 3, 4, 5 + 8; PN sources 3 + 4). 
However academic sources suggest that these good intentions fall short of the reality 
described by their sources (Hamidi 2009; Mouhanna 2009, 2010b; Roché 2006). Whatever 
the perceptions or findings of commentators, the decision regarding the level of force 
necessary is the responsibility of the commander. In contrast to the personal responsibility 
for use of force normally held by their British counterparts, there should be less likelihood 
of a French police officer using force without direction.  
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???? ?????????? ??????? ??? ?????? ???????? ?? ????????????? ???? ??? ???????? ??????????
bounds (this would be a charge forward by a line of police); tear gas grenades; water 
cannon and armoured vehicles. Any planned use of firearms would also have to be 
authorised by the Préfet and warning messages announced. The diagrams below illustrate 
the human rights standards to which they train and the operational goals they seek to 
achieve. These are translations of two Gendarmerie presentation slides and show the 
graduation of force, the first refers to the public order context: 
COERCION
DEPLOYED
STRONGLOW
Violence 
of adversary
According to the urgency, 
of the environment, of the means,
the Gendarme/Adversary factors, 
the aim is to overcome the adversary
by negotiating, disuasing and 
employing the exact level of force ;
by having a mental and tactical advantage
while keeping the capability of breaking the contact 
or reinforcing the riposte  
Tear-gaz diffuser
Blades ( If A to F unvailable)
Vehicle (striken) 
FIRE ARMS (A to F)
ATTACKING
INJUNCTIONS
Constraint by strong pressure
Baton stop
Accompaniment
Dazzling by a powerful lamp
Deformable kinetic projectile
Body stop
STRONG
GRADUATED INTERVENTION
Stun projectile 
Dog 
Keeping the distance
Negotiation
1
2
3
4
 
Fig.16 Public Order Graduated Force (Gendarmerie presentation 2009) 
The next one shows the graduation at a more general and individual level. Both slides 
demonstrate steps in a process designed to ?respect the sacred principle of graduated 
response? (GN sources 3 + 5). 
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Arrest
Dispersal
Disorientation
Keep a distance
Deterrence
Delaying
CS GAS
FIREARMS
DIALOGUE
CONTROL
PHYSICAL CONSTRAINT
BATONS
ESCORT
USE OF TORCH
FLASH BALL 
STRIKES
L                                                 GRADUATED RESPONSE
TAZER
DOGS
PUSH BACK
NEGOC IAT ION
1
2
3
4
high Use of coercion
by gendarmes
??????????? violence
HighWeak  
Fig.17 Graduated Response (Gendarmerie presentation 2009) 
The French method and manner of dealing with unlawful assemblies is reminiscent of the 
old British procedure of a magistrate reading of the Riot Act (enacted in 1715 and 
repealed in 1973) prior to forces of order dealing with riotous behaviour. Warning 
messages are still very much a part of British public order policing tactics, and will be 
discussed in the following chapter.  
Throughout the continuum of graduated force, it is evident that negotiation is a 
constant, and disengagement is always an option when necessity and proportionality 
considerations are made. It is also worth noting that the use of tear gas is lower on the 
French continuum than the use of police dogs, which is very different from the UK. A 
conversation with a gendarmerie officer regarding British perceptions of the frequent and 
liberal use of tear gas in France drew the following response ?but you [the British] use 
dogs... the Nazis used dogs? (GN source 6). This exchange showed distinctly how diverse 
policing cultures view use of certain options. Balancing the human rights of one group or 
individual against another can be a complex and challenging task with significant political 
and reputational issues. However, in a straightforward use of force context, whilst the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? in itself, when 
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one considers the injury potential of a dog bite compared to tear gas (dog bites tear flesh; 
tear gas makes eyes water), it is clear that he had a point.  
Summary 
So, whilst the French forces of law and order have a solid and foundational human 
rights ethos, they are explicitly an arm of government, and seem to have a compelling 
republican responsibility to deal with disorder, or potential disorder, through application 
of the law that is rather more ??????????????? than the British approach.   
The French policing system amounts to an overt arm of state control. British 
officers attest to serve the Queen. However, there is a fine but significant conceptual 
difference between the state and The Crown. British policing originates in the 
communities themselves, whereas French policing is applied by the State. The French 
police always had a distinctly political role (Emsley 1983). Gendarmes were ?required to 
report on strangers and events concerning public peace? (Emsley 1983 p45), a case of the 
state controlling its citizens. There is no comparable legal philosophy or set of codified 
rules in Britain. 
French policing is centrally managed, nationally structured and made up of two 
main institutions, the Gendarmerie Nationale and the Police Nationale, although many 
municipalities have their own local policing arrangements as well. Both the GN and the PN 
have their own full time public order policing specialists, the GM and the CRS, who 
perform a number of security and public safety functions, as well as maintenance of 
order. More often than not GN and PN staff are posted away from their region of origin. 
The British system of policing geographical areas using the same police officers 
consistently has been viewed by some in France as preferable to the French approach 
which resembles occupation by foreign forces; at the same time the centralisation of 
British policing has been called very much a French import (Emsley 1983). The PN and GN 
have their own distinct traditions, but ultimately perform similar and complementary roles 
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within the French mainland, because both institutions are now controlled by the Ministry 
of the Interior. 
While there have been a number of convergent changes, in areas such as 
equipment and tactics, the PN and GN remain distinctly separate bodies. There is some 
difference of approach, and indeed a high degree of rivalry between the codes and corps, 
but both institutions have very strong cultures of service to the state that are central to 
their professional identities, and this will be reflected in the analyses that follow. 
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Chapter Four 
Britain 
 
Introduction 
Any general description or perception of Britain usually includes the four 
nations of the Union; England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Apart from 
the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) the British police are generally 
unarmed and have similar structures, uniforms, cultures and doctrines. All are 
?????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????? ???Peelian Principles that 
will be discussed later. So whilst much of this research has been carried out in 
England and Wales, the data and comment relates and refers to Britain and the 
British model of policing.  
This chapter seeks to describe the development of policing in Britain, 
outlining the historical, social and institutional dimensions. Following the 
structure of the previous chapter, it provides a brief history of the origins of the 
police in Britain, sufficient to describe, explain and contextualise policing in the 
British tradition. The historical and social context section will discuss certain 
notable examples of public disorder that occurred in Britain, seeking to provide 
some context for these. This section will also include a brief description of 
imperialism and multiculturalism, however it is not an examination of these or 
any other political or social phenomena. They are mentioned here in order that a 
comparison with the French situation may be made, and to provide some context 
for public order policing. As with the previous chapter, the institutional dimension 
will further explain the development of public order policing in Britain and detail 
contemporary policing strategies, tactics and methods in this regard.  
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Historical and Social Context 
The Parekh Report of 2000 describes Britain ??? ?a community of citizens and a 
community of communities, both a liberal and a multicultural society, and needs 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????? (Intro. No page No.), and it 
is fair to broadly describe Britain, and just about every European state, as a 
liberal western democracy. However, unlike many of its closer European 
neighbours Britain does not have a written constitution. In the words of one 
politician, Norman Baker, the British Constitution ?has proved to be not worth the 
paper it's not written on? (BBC News 2009). This unwritten constitution is not that 
strong a basis for democracy in that it can essentially be whatever the 
government wants it to be (Haseler 2010) ???? ?is nothing less than the western 
world's only remaining ???????? ??????? (Haseler 1990 p415). This lack of 
codification means that British governance, which is based upon a variety of 
sources such as common law, statutes, treaties and conventions, is both complex 
and unwieldy. It is within this complexity that policing in Britain is carried out.  
 One may surmise that prior to Roman times any social regulation would 
have been truly communitarian, of the people by the people within communities 
and appropriate to local custom, since ????????????????????????????????????????????
often carried out by c???????????????????????????????????????????????????. In order to 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
go back to Anglo-‐Saxon England, between the end of the Roman occupation in the 
5th Century and the Norman Conquest of 1066 (Emsley 1983/1986; Rawlings 2002). 
This period saw legislative functions being carried out by the King and his councils 
(Regia 2010) with new or updated laws being issued at regular intervals. There 
wa?? ?? ???????????? ???????? ???????????? ??? ???? ???????????? ?????? ?????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????no occupational police 
service any action taken to investigate a crime would have been wholly dependent 
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upon the victim or vic?????? ??????? ???????? ??????? (Regia 2010). The idea of 
collective responsibility for keeping law and order was established ??????? ?the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1985 p20). 
In the tenth century the Shires of England, each headed by the Shire-‐reeve 
(precursor of sheriff, the pivot of central and local government), were divided 
into administrative ?????? ??????? ??????????? ??????? ??? ?? ????????????. Each 
Hundred was sub-‐divided ??????????????????????????????ontext are groupings of ten 
households rather than the feudal tax tithe of a tenth of a household?s produce. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
function was carried out by ten freemen of the Tythe led by the Tythingman, and 
then usually only for crimes against the Kings Peace (Regia 2010; Kent 1981; 
Roberg et al 2000)????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? (Rawlings 2002). This was a 
system of suretyship that relied upon the compulsory sharing of responsibility 
among persons connected through kinship, or by oath of fealty to a lord or knight. 
?????????????????????required to be a member of a tithing, a group of ?ten? with 
a mutual res????????????????????????????????????? a frankpledge (Olsen T no date).  
The office of Constable did not appear in England until after the Norman 
Conquest. Having a role similar to that of the Connetable of France and being 
responsible for the ?military affairs for the king...  an enforcing agent of the king's 
writs? (Musson 2003) the Constable was an important position but a lofty one. As 
such it was necessary to have a structure where local officers would carry out the 
peacekeeping function as ?a natural adjunct to the community responsibility 
entailed in the frankpledge system, which supplied an awareness and alertness at 
the truly local level, and in the watch, a nocturnal vigilance against unwanted or 
dangerous outsiders? (Musson 2003). The constable at this level was the lowest 
114 
 
officer in the hierarchy of authority and also responsible on one hand for 
representing the state (king) to the local population and on the other for 
representing local interests to the state (Kent 1981). 
According to English jurist Henry de Bracton, the judicial role of the 
constable was to find evidence and record facts on which judgements could be 
made. The Constable was the ?eyes and ears of the court? and the earliest strong 
arm of the law. ?It is the duty of the constable to enrol everything in order, for he 
has record as to the things he sees; but he cannot judge... He has record as to 
matters of fact, not matters of judgment and law? (Bracton 1968 Vol.4 p136). It is 
still the case that the police do not apportion blame. Their duty remains that of 
putting the facts before the court, as well as keeping the peace. 
Settlements came to be dependent upon the peace being kept by local 
constables drawing their authority from the 1285 Statute of Winchester that 
codified to some degree earlier customs regarding the possession of weapons and 
keeping the Kings Peace. As a precaution against assaults, robberies and other 
crime, this statute also provided guidance to keepers of the watch regarding the 
arrest of suspicious strangers. Constables whilst being responsible to the Sheriff 
and having responsibilities for arrest on indictment by the county court were not 
just central agents. They had local affinities and a duty to make summary arrests 
as necessary. Consequently they were ????? ???????????? ???? ???????????? ?????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
responsibilities in this regard (Police Federation 2007).  
Developments throughout the hundred years or so from the mid 
seventeenth century saw Tythingmen??? ??????? become the sole function of the 
parish constables, who in turn reported to Justices of the Peace instead of Shire-‐
reeves. In towns keeping the peace became the responsibility of the Guilds, and 
?????? ????? ??????, whose men guarded the gates and patrolled the streets at 
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night (Met police 2010). Evidently law enforcement was then very much a public 
duty carried out by the public, albeit as a stratum of a larger system. Attributed 
to Henry Fielding, the first formal police unit was established in London around 
1749 (Emsley 1983; Rawlings 2002). Its officers were directly attached to the Bow 
Street Magistrates Court; hence their more famous title ?Bow Street Runners?. 
Their salaries were paid from central funds.  
The eighteenth century was a time of great economic and social change in 
Britain. The advent of the industrial revolution drew people in search of fortune 
from all over the country, Europe and further afield and the populations of towns 
and cities burgeoned. The Watch systems and parish constables remained in place 
until the nineteenth century by when it was apparent that they were simply no 
longer able to cope with the numbers of people, the increase of poverty and the 
changes in crime and behaviour. A new police force was needed to ?respond to 
increased levels of social disorder? (Lenz & Chaires 2007 p76) in that rapidly 
growing industrialised urban society (Lenz & Chaires 2007; Emsley 2001; Rawlings 
2002). 
Home Secretary Sir Robert Peel was concerned that increasing levels of 
crime were a threat to the system of government and set up a Parliamentary 
inquiry that led to the Metropolitan Police Act of 1829 being passed and the 
?Jenny Darbies? (a corruption of the French Gens ???????? were born (Rawlings 
2002 p120). The main difference between the New Police and the old system was 
the removal of community control to the effect that policing became rather more 
imposed upon them than done by them (Rawlings 2002). Whilst this new, 
contested, force proved itself to be more effective than the moribund system it 
replaced (Bayley 1975), it was not as popular as history suggests. After reforming 
the police in Ireland, Peel had an overt distrust of local power structures and an 
overwhelming urge toward centralisation that influenced his London police reform 
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proposals (Paley 1989 p125). Also, ?so pervasive was the resistance to their arrival 
that we need to ask ourselves... how such a decisive enlargement of the powers 
of the state became possible at all? (Ignatieff 1979 in Newburn 2000 p25). The 
new standards of social control consequent to this new institution were mostly 
imposed on the working classes, minimising the political impact of this increased 
potential for repression (Lenz & Chaires 2007; Paley 1989; Rawlings 2002).  
The first (and only joint) Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police, 
Colonel Charles Rowan and Sir Richard Mayne, were charged with organising the 
???? ??????? ???? ?????? ????? ??????? ?????? ?????????? ?????? ????????? ??????????????
which detailed the structure, methods and objectives of policing (Lenz & Chaires 
2007; Rawlings 2002). These ultimately led to the below listed and erroneously 
titled Peelian Principles being constructed, albeit as an ?invention of twentieth 
century textbook authors? (Lenz & Chaires 2007 p69). These principles are 
significant because they ????? ??????? ???? ?????????????? ??? ???????? ???????????
?adopted as idealised ancestors? might be by an orphan (Lenz & Chaires 2007 
p78). These nine principles have become part of the argument that the 
development of the British model of policing is a success of democratic process 
(Neyroud ? forthcoming) and this is further evidenced by the fact that the HMIC 
have reproduced them in their 2009 report:   
1. The basic mission for which the police exist is to prevent crime and 
disorder.  
2. The ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon 
public approval of police actions.  
3. Police must secure the willing co-‐operation of the public in voluntary 
observance of the law to be able to secure and maintain the respect of 
the public.  
4. The degree of co-‐operation of the public that can be secured diminishes 
proportionately to the necessity of the use of physical force.  
5. Police seek and preserve public favour not by catering to public opinion 
but by constantly demonstrating absolute impartial service to the law.  
6. Police use physical force to the extent necessary to secure observance of 
the law or to restore order only when the exercise of persuasion, advice 
and warning is found to be insufficient.  
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7. Police, at all times, should maintain a relationship with the public that 
gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and 
the public are the police; the police being only members of the public 
who are paid to give full-‐time attention to duties which are incumbent 
on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.  
8. Police should always direct their action strictly towards their functions 
and never appear to usurp the powers of the judiciary.  
9. The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not 
the visible evidence of police action in dealing with it.  
(Adapting to Protest ? Nurturing the British Model of Policing 2009)  
It can be seen that although a twentieth century construct, these principles have 
???????????????the foundation upon which the tradition or idealised view of British 
policing has been built. That said, they are believed by many to be as relevant 
today as they were then, and are possibly in sharper focus now. This is due in part 
to recent reviews as a result of the death of Ian Tomlinson, who died after being 
pushed to the floor by a police officer at the 2009 G20 protest in London.  
Rowan and Mayne set up their Headquarters at 4 Whitehall Place, also 
known as Scotland Yard. By 1839, the Metropolitan Police Force was responsible 
for policing the whole of London, apart from the Square Mile of the City, which 
had ???? ???? ?????? ??? ??????? ???????? ?CoLP). In 1839 the County Police Act was 
passed, and numerous full time county forces were established throughout 
England and Wales structured along similar lines to the Metropolitan Police. This 
structure is still in place today (Rawlings 2002; Met police 2010). 
So the modern police force in Britain can trace its roots back to the 
middle-‐ages and, as has been shown, has developed since those times into the 
civil force recognisable today. Its structure and traditions are the result of this 
ongoing process, and have been affected by numerous factors, not least the 
incidence of conflict, disorder and riots, some of which are outlined next. 
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Rioting in Britain  
Some discussion of historical British disorders is helpful at this stage, and the 
following summarised events, whilst not requiring deep analysis for this thesis, do 
show how the use of military forces in civil disorder can alienate the citizens of 
the state. Rioting in Britain is not a new phenomenon and has been recorded as 
early as 1208, when violence erupted between students and townspeople in 
Oxford (Oxford 2010), and again in 1355 with the St. Scholastica day riot (Miller no 
date). ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
society, often provided the unorganised poor the ???????????????????????????????
absence of representative institutions or the ability to participate in them, they 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????The frequency 
of rioting in Britain in???????????????????????????????????????????????????????peak 
with the Gordon Riots of 1780 (Emsley 1983 p162; Rudé 1959). Significant 
outbreaks of disorder in Britain have occurred with a certain frequency ever 
since1. The relevance to this study of the following events is both descriptive and 
contextual. They help to show how the use of force on behalf of a liberal 
democracy becomes seen as legitimate, and therefore acceptable, only when it is 
necessary and proportionate and carried out by a civil authority. ?????????? ?????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
but where military force has been used on civilians it has involved high levels of 
violence and people have been killed or badly injured (Marrow 1994; Marlow 1989; 
Rawlings 2002; Rudé 1956). The use of troops, as seen during the Gordon Riots of 
1780 and the Peterloo Massacre of 1819, was catastrophic in terms of civil 
liberties and reputations. Another, different, example of how the possibility of 
military involvement can be politically resonant, ???? ????? ??????? ??? ???????????
                                            
1 See Bessel & Emsley 2000; Emsley 1983; Geary 1985; Rawlings 2002; Rudé 1959; Tilly 
1995; Waddington D 2001; Waddington, Jobard & King 2009; Weinberger 1991 
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?????????????? ?????????????????? Again these incidents amount to signal events of 
their time. They motivated changes in police thinking.    
The Gordon Riots 
The Gordon Riots of 1780 also ?took place at a time of acute political 
crisis? (Rudé 1956) when a number of factors were in issue including: 
The sharp divisions... brought out between the government and the City of 
London on the bearing of arms...the particular anxieties of the Roman 
Catholic community; and, perhaps most important of all, to the permanent 
strengthening of the executive by the powerful arguments which they 
provided in favour of a professional police force (Rudé 1956 p93). 
The link between the strengthening of the executive and the need to have a 
professional police force is explicit. The reason for these riots was the perceived 
strengthening of the Catholic agenda brought about by The Papists Act of 1778, 
which sought to redress some of the injustices of the previous Popery Act of 1698. 
The catalyst for disorder was a petition supported appeal to parliament to the 
effect that the Papists Act should be repealed. This appeal was brought by Lord 
George Gordon, chairman of the Protestant Association who had been successful 
in preventing a similar Act in Scotland.  
The petition was ultimately unsuccessful but it was brought to the House 
of Commons accompanied by a crowd of some 50,000 people. The disturbances 
were not directed at the rich but during the ensuing riots, that lasted for several 
days, the houses, businesses, offices and shops of visibly prominent Catholics were 
attacked (Rogers 1998). Public houses were similarly treated, as were several 
gaols, including Newgate and the Clink, where the inmates were released (Rudé 
1964). The riots were eventually quelled by troops, who, having been released 
from the need for civil direction (Babington 1990) opened fire on more than one 
occasion, resulting in 285 people killed and 173 treated for wounds. A further 450 
rioters were arrested with 160 being tried at the Old Bailey. Twenty five were 
sentenced to death and hanged; twelve were sentenced to prison for terms of 
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between one month and five years, and one was ?privately whipped? (Rudé 1956; 
Babington 1990). Lord Gordon was tried but acquitted after a remarkable legal 
defence (Rudé 1956).  
The Peterloo Massacre 
On 16th August 1819 a crowd of at least 60,000 (Marlow 1989) gathered at Saint 
Peters Field, Manchester, as part of a pro-‐democracy and anti-‐poverty 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????? ???????????
after cavalry were used to disperse what was an orderly political demonstration 
(Babington 1990; Marlow 1989). So large was the crowd that the 400 or so special 
constables on duty were engulfed by it.  Local magistrates panicked and asked for 
military assistance, sending notes to the Manchester and Salford Yeomanry 
Cavalry (MYC) and the 15th Hussars (Marlow 1989). The Hussars, commanded by Lt. 
???????? ???????????? ????? ?? ????-‐time army unit. The Yeomanry, led by Captain 
Hugh Birley and Major Thomas Trafford, were a part-‐time local volunteer force, 
many of them recruited from the families of wealthy middle class businessmen 
(Babington 1990). The MYC, members of which had old scores to settle with some 
amongst the crowd, took up the task of arresting the speakers. They charged the 
crowd with sabres drawn and there ???? ??? ??????? ??? ???? ?????????? ?????? ????
???????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????? ?????????????? ???? ???????????
(Walmsley 1969 p.xx). Twelve people died, including a woman and a child, and 
approximately 630 were injured (Marrow 1994). Most injuries were caused by 
crushing as the crowd panicked, but many were inflicted by sabres (Marlow 1989).  
The subsequent conviction and sentencing of leading protesters and the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to be a contested issue and whilst the authorities saw it as a victory it was a 
?????????? ???? ??? ??? ???? ??????? ?? ?legend of government oppression? (Babington 
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1990 p59). There is little doubt that this is because ???????????????????????-‐men 
cutting down unarmed women scorched ???????????????? (Rogers 1998 p244). 
The seriousness of these riots is difficult to comprehend today, but one 
might imagine the gravity of similar events taking place and ask why they do not. 
A later example of how disorder was dealt with in Britain, but where troops did 
not use violence was the 1910 disorder at Tonypandy. Many accounts of it have 
been written2 and it is significant for a number of socio-‐political reasons but 
mostly, for this thesis, because it was one of the last occasions that troops were 
mobilised for use in policing civil disorder on mainland Britain and it showed a 
growing political sensitivity to the use of military force against citizens (Geary 
1985).  
Tonypandy 1910 
 The Cambrian Combine mining network had trialled a new coal seam at the 
Ely Pit, Penygraig, in the Rhondda Valley. Seventy miners were tasked to work it 
for a set period in order to assess extraction rates. Extracting coal from this mine 
was problematic due to a band of rock running through the seam, and 
consequently less coal was being produced than expected. The miners, who were 
paid by the ton of produce, were effectively being paid less for working longer. 
This resulted in the employers claiming that the miners were deliberately working 
slowly and in August ????? ????? ???? ??????? ??????? ?????? ????? ???????? ?????
effectively barred these miners from their places of work, who then as a 
consequence went on strike. Workers from other areas were called in by the 
mining company causing the disaffected miners to picket the mines. This 
culminated with a balloted walk out by thousands of other miners, closing all the 
pits of the area except for one at Llwynypia. Disorder occurred and damage was 
                                            
2 Geary 1985; Weinberger 1991; webapps.rhondda-‐cynon-‐taff.gov.uk; www.tonypandy2010 
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caused to local shops and the house of a mining official. The resolve of the miners 
was such that they fought pitched battles with Glamorganshire Constabulary 
officers. The autocratic Glamorganshire Chief Constable, Captain Lionel Lindsay, a 
friend of the local mine owners, having engineered an acceptance that the local 
population was turbulent (Weinberger 1991), drafted 300 Metropolitan police 
officers to Tonypandy, as directed by Home Secretary Winston Churchill, in order 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????. 
Central government was reluctant to use troops in civil disorder (Geary 1985; 
Weinberger 1991) but infantry and cavalry troops, under the command of General 
Macready, were also sent ready for deployment by the civil authorities if 
necessary. Somewhat unusually, Macready also commanded the Metropolitan 
police contingent (Weinberger 1991). It is not documented whether troops were 
used against civilians on this occasion (RCT 2010). However one miner, Samuel 
Rhys, did die, probably as the result of a blow from a police truncheon (RCT 
2010). The emotional fallout from that date is still present (Weinberger 1991), 
even though the events are now just outside living memory, and a centenary 
remembrance event took place in Tonypandy on Sunday 7th November 2010 
(RCTBC 2010). The fact that ??????? ????? ????????? ??? ????????? ?????????? ???
significant and still spoken of.  
That Churchill was deeply concerned regarding the potential consequences 
of military action against civilians involved in an industrial dispute (Geary 1985) is 
evidenced by this excerpt from his letter to Prime Minister David Lloyd George: 
The time will come... when I shall have to leave the soldiers in much more 
naked contact with the population...the strikers...may come right up 
against the rifles with consequences of the utmost gravity (NLS 2010) 
????????????????????????????????????nless some real quality is put into this business 
we shall get into very deep water indeed? (NLS 2010), which in the language of 
those times was a fairly explicit request for help from someone with influence and 
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perhaps some affinity with the people of the area. Whilst troops were not used 
directly against civilians on this occasion, the example of ???????????????? ??????
repeatedly used to castigate Churchill for repressive use of force (Weinberger 
1991 p41). 
 These examples of rioting in Britain illustrate that where the forces of 
order have local connections, as at Peterloo and Tonypandy, local allegiances can 
result in excessive and one-‐sided repression (Geary 1985). They have also shown 
that such use of military forces has been no more successful here than in France. 
That said, the use of civil forces to deal with civil matters is no guarantee that 
public relations will be unaffected. This is borne out by the repercussions of just 
about every riot or violent protest that has taken place in Britain since the First 
World War (Geary 1985). Each such event seems to have been a catalyst for 
debate and change throughout the twentieth century and certainly the first 
decade of the twenty-‐first, a period of rapid change and technological 
development.  
The growth of television and electronic media over this period needs to be 
acknowledged. Disorder is extremely newsworthy and the increasingly detailed 
and sustained reporting of it gives exposure to the arguments and behaviour of all 
involved, which affects public opinion;  
press activism has helped foster a new kind of social movement: dramatic 
surges of single-‐issue sentiment that occur outside party politics and which 
can be activated by surprisingly small groups of people (Milne 2005 p10).   
The inner city riots of the early 1980s, and notably Brixton in 1981, have already 
been touched upon in this thesis and were instrumental in changing forever the 
policing of such incidents in Britain. The effects of serious disorder can be long 
term (Geary 1985) as can the repercussions for police public relations. It is 
sufficient to say that Britain like France ?????????????????????????????????????????????
of social reform. Social historians ?have come to regard the riot as part of the 
124 
 
development of our democracy and growth of social and political reform in this 
country...Britain has riots some say, whilst other countries have revolutions? 
(Metropolitan Police c1986). 
Empire 
The sun never sets on the British Empire is an oft quoted saying stemming from 
the fact that, at its zenith, the geographical reach of the Empire meant that the 
sun was always shining in one part of it. This is significant, in that the broad 
ethnic mix, or demography, of Britain today shows such diversity largely because 
of the ?unforeseen legacy of their imperial past -‐ the large inflow of migrants, 
mostly from South Asia? (Darwin J 2005). Many immigrants, people from the 
Dominions, Colonies, Protectorates, Mandates and Territories of that Empire, have 
since arrived in Britain. The ebbs and flows of prosperity and poverty across the 
globe that are usually linked to social, political and environmental crises have 
caused a constant stream of migrants. Britain has been the destination of choice 
because of its relative stability and prosperity and, in many cases, its imperial 
legacy of language and culture. This ?colonial expansion established the pre-‐
conditions for the global use of English? (Graddol 1997 p5) and English has become 
the lingua franca of the business world and indeed of globalisation itself. 
At its largest, in terms of land area, between the two World Wars, the British 
Empire covered between a quarter and a third of the globe and its land area was 
150 times the size of the British Isles (British Empire 2010). There are a number of 
factors viewed as causal to the growth of this Empire, amongst them Christianity, 
specifically Protestantism, whose work ethic was readily reconciled with Christian 
doctrine. British civilisation, being seen as innately superior to that of those that 
were being colonised, ??????? ???? ??? ????????? ??? ??????? ??? ???? ??????? ?????????
????????????, was similar in effect. Commerce or mercantilism was also significant, 
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with British chartered monopoly companies, such as the East India Company, 
generating vast profits that ensured the spread of British influence around the 
globe. The industrial revolution in Britain powered British expansionism 
throughout this period, and there was a powerful and effective Royal Navy to help 
secure strategic imperial aims (British Empire 2010). At the turn of the 20th 
century British colonies existed in every continent, and the pink colour indicating 
???? ???????? ?????????? ?????????? ???? ??????map. Britain today, has a diverse 
multicultural mix, which successive governments have managed through a policy 
of multiculturalism or, more precisely, liberal multiculturalism. This has been 
held up by politicians as both a success and failure as a policy, depending upon 
?????????????????????????? 
????????????????????????????, where being visibly different becomes a source 
of power, is not the foundation of true equality (Steele 1990). Identity politics has 
been beneficial for minority groups, but is also a source of conflict. It would seem 
that British multiculturalism has not amounted to meaningful integration. Some 
minority ethnic and cultural groups have been inclined to live within their own 
areas (Cantle 2001 p9). Such silo like existence is not a basis for understanding or 
respect, often breeding suspicion, envy and hatred. Recent history has shown that 
difference, in any form, remains a source of suspicion and conflict and that 
integration is a slow process. This has proven to be a challenge to British policing, 
the structure of which we shall look at next. 
Institutional Context 
Outside England and Wales there are a further nine territorial forces in 
Scotland and Northern Ireland. As well as the territorial police forces there are a 
number of non-‐territorial forces that have specific functions, as listed below:  
? British Transport Police 
? Central Motorway Policing Group 
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? Civil Nuclear Constabulary (formerly UKAEA Constabulary) 
? Ministry of Defence Police 
? Port of Dover Police 
? Port of Liverpool Police 
? The Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) 
? Scottish Drug Enforcement Agency 
 
Presently there are forty-‐three separate territorial police forces in England and 
Wales. Each force, or service as they prefer to be called nowadays, is headed by a 
Chief Constable or, in the case of the City of London and the Metropolitan Police, 
a Commissioner (Directgov 2010). Each police area has a Police Authority made up 
of local people, normally seventeen in number including nine local councillors and 
eight independents, of which at least one must be a magistrate. Police Authorities 
are part of a tripartite link between themselves, the Chief Constable and the 
Home Office, and are responsible to the public for ensuring the efficiency of the 
police, and to ensure that the public have a say in what the local police 
objectives should be. They set employment targets with the aim of having a 
police service that reflects the local community. They also have a legal duty to 
check that policing is carried out in a fair and respectful manner (APA 2010). 
Additionally there are a number of national policing priorities that are set by 
central government.  
This structure is shortly to change, with Police Authorities being replaced 
by a Policing and Crime Commissioner. This will be an elected official, in all 
probability along party political lines. Understandably there are concerns that this 
will effectively amount to a politicisation of the police, and this was reflected in 
the Association of Police Authorities (APA) website with a paragraph stating that 
local police authorities ensure that communities are served according to their 
needs, and ?not for party-‐political reasons or on behalf of one particular interest 
group? (APA 2010).  
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Previous reviews of policing saw the numbers of police forces in Britain 
drop from 239 to 43 (Geary 1985) in what was effectively a process of 
centralisation. This has increased Home Office influence over policing (Geary 
1985). The present number of forces has been criticised as being: (i) still too 
many to be coherent or consistent and are incapable of dealing with organised 
crime and terrorism; (ii) too costly because of unnecessary duplication of 
resources across the country (Independent 2010). The present chairman of the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Sir Hugh Orde and Sir Paul Stephenson 
(former Commissioner), have indicated that the present structure needs  
independent review to evaluate  if it remains fit for purpose (Independent 2010). 
A 2005 initiative to make changes to this structure by Home Secretary Charles 
Clarke ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
issues including merging smaller forces into larger regional organisations, thus 
reducing costs by doing away with a number of high ranking positions, gaining 
efficiencies of scale, and by more effective  sharing of specialist resources. This 
was ultimately shelved ??? ?????? ??? ???? ???????? ????? ?the 43 force structure is no 
longe?? ???? ???? ????????? ?????? ?76). Simply, the political will was not strong 
enough.  
However, a review of national police leadership and training has been 
carried out. The former chief executive of the NPIA and former Chief Constable, 
Peter Neyroud, makes several recommendations, including the phasing out of the 
NPIA. He is explicit that ?the more that policing is localised for delivery, the more 
important it is to be clear on the areas where interoperability and national 
standards are vital to protect the public? (Neyroud 2010 p10). So it is fair to argue 
that British policing is becoming more nationally structured, as well as being a 
national institution. 
128 
 
The 2009 ?????? ????? ????????? ???????A New Force also recommends that 
the police should be accountable to elected politicians but, to be more efficient 
at the local level, police forces should be smaller, with the Metropolitan Police 
taking the national lead on serious crime (which one supposes would include cross 
border, national and international crime). This could avoid wastage caused by 
unnecessary regional bureaucracies and duplicated spending on serious crime at 
the national level (Bassett et al 2009).  
It is probable that the forty-‐three police chiefs in England and Wales would 
robustly defend their ?Constabulary Independence? (Savage, Charman & Cope 
2000) and it seems eminently sensible that policing decisions be made by people 
who have the authority, qualification and competence to make them. Presently 
each force is divided into a number of Basic Command Units (BCU), or Boroughs, 
which are fairly autonomous, and this could be described as localism in action. 
They have their own command teams and control their own budgets. They are 
normally commanded by a Chief Superintendent, who should be ???????? ???? ???
local issues, sensitivities and priorities, effectively making each BCU a smaller 
local force. They are guided by force policing plans, which are developed in line 
with national policy. National policy comes from the Home Office and there are a 
number of national police bodies that have been established in order to achieve 
this: 
????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
HMIC is an independent body that inspects all aspects of policing across England 
and Wales with the aim of improvement. It is a statutory body that acts as a 
regulator, representing public interest, making regular inspections of the forty-‐
three territorial forces and PSNI; British Transport Police (BTP); the Serious and 
Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and HM Revenue and Customs. It produces reports 
that are available to the public and intended to be ?clear, jargon-‐free and 
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designed to be accessible, measured, objective, statistically reliable and 
authoritative? (HMIC 2010). It claims to identify areas of good practice and offer 
expert advice to forces. It is headed by a Chief Constable and generally uses 
seconded serving senior officers in the role of Rapporteurs. As such it is very much 
a part of the establishment and there is a danger that this structure might 
promote an overly conservative adherence to the traditional view of British 
policing. Consequently its reports may lack some objectivity.    
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 
The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) is an independent, 
professionally led strategic body. In the public interest and, in equal and 
active partnership with Government and the Association of Police 
Authorities, ACPO leads and coordinates the direction and development of 
the police service in England, Wales and Northern Ireland (ACPO 2010) 
The above ACPO Statement of Purpose, taken from their website, gives the 
??????????? ????? ????? ????? ?????? ??? ????? ??? ???? ????, inasmuch that it is an 
influential body which advises government on policing issues, and ultimately sets 
national police strategy. Interestingly, ????? ?????????? ?????????? ??????????????
(Savage, Charman & Cope 2000 p1) is a private company registered under the 
Companies Act 1985 with its memorandum and articles of association stating that 
the ?name of the Company (hereinafter called the Company) is ?The Association of 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ACPO 2010). There 
are questions as to the transparency of this company. Until November 2011 it did 
not have to comply with the Freedom of Information Act which raises concerns 
that its private nature means that it lacks accountability. This raises other 
questions regarding conflict of interest. Would ACPO be better situated 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????body? 
Whose interests does such a PLC serve best ? its own or those of the police 
service? Indeed the Reform report A New Force (Bassett et al 2009) describes 
ACPO as ?a self-‐perpetuating oligarchy?. This is probably due, at least in part, to 
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the fact that it is ultimately the relevant Police Authority that is responsible for 
the appointment of Chief Officers. These officers are chosen from those who have 
been selected for and successfully attended the Strategic Command Course, in 
line with Home Office guidelines (MPA 2010). These courses are designed and run 
by the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA ? see below) on behalf of 
ACPO.  
 ACPO was the true influence on national police strategy (Bassett et al 
2009). It cites its primary aim as being the provision of ?strong and visible 
leadership..., inspiring confidence in those we lead, our partners and the diverse 
communities we serve? (ACPO 2010). Their website provides information regarding 
its structure and policies. Its manuals of guidance on firearms, public order and 
conflict management are, however, no longer available.  
 Further objectives include: (i) overseeing the development of doctrine; (ii) 
being the principal voice of policing; (iii) co-‐ordination of strategic responses to 
national need; (iv) development of the highest professional knowledge and 
standards; (v) ensuring ?that the ACPO brand name is recognised globally as a 
mark of excellence in policing?. It espouses an ethical and inclusive methodology 
in achieving these objectives that is ?committed to equality and Human Rights? 
(ACPO 2010). The Neyroud report has recommended that ACPO be subject to some 
?repositioning? of its role regarding leadership and professional standards 
(Neyroud 2010 p8). 
Police National Information and Co-‐ordination Centre (PNICC) 
PNICC is a development of the National Reporting Centre that was instituted in 
1972. It is one of the national bodies that exist under the umbrella of ACPO. It is a 
small but important unit, designed to act as a national mobilisation coordination 
centre so that resources can be deployed where necessary. It employs a small 
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number of full-‐time staff and others seconded to it in time of need. So where a 
police force requires the assistance of extra resources in order to deal with pre-‐
planned or spontaneous events, they can be made available. PNICC has been 
pivotal in the policing of such events as G8, G20 and the Suffolk serial murder 
investigations. It was also involved in the planning of mutual aid assistance for the 
English Defence League protests and the national influenza pandemic. It co-‐
ordinates the mobilisation of police support to large operations and critical 
incidents and is the link to the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR). Drawing 
resources from forces throughout the UK, it has responsibility for providing mutual 
aid assistance to the Metropolitan Police for the 2012 Olympic Games (ACPO 
2010).  
PNICC should co-‐ordinate resources according to the requirements of the 
event or operation and relies upon the Police National Mobilisation Plan (PNMP) 
matrix of national resources that is subscribed to by all forces, each of which 
should have defined its commitment according to what it can actually provide in 
terms of specialist resources and numbers of them.  
PNICC does not, however, provide a perfect answer to urgent need. During 
the August 2011 disturbances in London the Metropolitan Police Force Mobilisation 
Plan was ineffective, due to the lack of public order trained officers available to 
deal with the situations (Police Federation 2011). PNICC offered little help during 
the first 48 hours of the disturbances and, whilst disorder was still confined to 
London, PNICC failed to co-‐ordinate strategy. It would seem that the spontaneous 
nature of those events badly affected the ability of the police to respond. PNICC 
was shown to be ineffectual in co-‐ordinating the initial interoperability and 
response of trained human resources, communications and equipment (Police 
Federation 2011). Simply put, PNICC takes time to mobilise both its own and 
others resources, which can result in a ponderous operational response. Once up 
132 
 
and running, after the violence spread outside London, PNICC did succeed in its 
aim (Police Federation 2011). 
National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
National Police Training before that. The NPIA is a national body: 
a non-‐departmental public body (NDPB) sponsored and funded by the Home 
Office. It is police-‐owned and police-‐led; with representation on the 
National Policing Board and an executive leadership drawn from the police 
service (NPIA 2010).    
It has developed a ten year st???????? ?????????? ??????? ?????????? ???????????, 
which sets out seven areas for continuing improvement: 
? Developing effective operational processes, practices and doctrine  
? Enhancing global security  
? Strengthening leadership in the police service at all levels  
? Developing the skills and professionalism of the workforce  
? Improving the use of information, knowledge and science  
? continuously improving the delivery of support services  
? increasing the efficiency of service delivery by forces 
NPIA has a number of specialist departments that can provide knowledge and 
training in their fields. Amongst these departments is the Specialist Operations 
Centre, which includes the Uniformed Operational Support team that deals with 
public order, operational planning and the policing of major incidents. It remains 
to be seen how the NPIA role will be affected by the proposed changes 
recommended in the Neyroud review, which questions how the ?national functions 
currently delivered by the NPIA could be transitioned into the future? (Neyroud 
2010 p9). This is as good as saying that NPIA has a short life expectancy. 
  From the above it is apparent that policing in Britain is carried out by 
several agencies that, on the face of it, work symbiotically to achieve the 
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overarching policing plan as dictated by the Home Office. This could be compared 
with the different departments of the rather more bureaucratic French Policing 
structure, as described in the previous chapter, the main difference being that in 
France policing is done by two national forces. Also, there are a number of 
national policing bodies in Britain, which suggests that the British local policing 
model requires a nationally co-‐ordinated and assisted structure. These include the 
National Crime Squad (NCS), National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), 
National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPIOU), National Ballistics Intelligence 
Service (NABIS), Police National Database (PND), Police National Computer (PNC), 
Police National Legal Database (PNLD) and the Police National DNA Database, 
which have been created over the last thirty-‐seven years. This indicates that a 
national policing approach does exist. The apparent cohesiveness of ACPO, APA 
and HMIC etc. also suggests a creeping centralisation of strategy. Additionally, 
and notwithstanding, a localism of policing under the BCU structure, there are 
???????? ??????? ??? ???????? ??? ?????????? ????? ????????? ?? ????????? ??? ?????????? ???
power to central government... the enhanced corporate status of ACPO both 
centralises policing policy... and protects the decentralised nature of British 
????????????????????, Charman & Cope 2000a p47).  
Public Order Policing in Britain 
The concept of mutual aid has already been mentioned and in simple terms 
amounts to an agreement between the forty-‐three forces of England and Wales to 
assist one another in time of need. The forces of Scotland and the PSNI are also 
??????? ??? ??? ????? ??????????? ???? ?????? ???? ????????? ??? ??????? ?????? ????????? ???
Britain stems from doctrine produced by NPIA, published as a three part concept 
comprising the ACPO Manual of Guidance on Keeping the Peace (KtP 2007), the 
ACPO Standards, Tactics and Training Manual (Centrex 2004) and the ACPO 
approved training packages (APOC; IPOC; CMS). The ACPO Manual of Guidance on 
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Keeping the Peace is the ?bible? of public order policing, often referred to simply 
???????? (Interview sources 2009) should be used by all forces and practitioners. 
KtP along with the ACPO standards, tactics and training manual and commander 
training packages formed the remainder of the public order policing doctrine. All 
these documents have now been brought together in a new style guidance manual 
which is called 'Public Order -‐ Authorised Professional Practice' (NPIA source 1). 
 
Fig.18 National Public Order Doctrine Model 
 
 Being duty bound to keep the peace, all British police officers are trained 
in general police duties. This training includes core subjects such as police law, 
human rights, criminal justice, diversity and fairness, and conflict management 
(personal safety). Generally officers patrol ???beat?, usually alone, and are aware 
of their sworn responsibility to protect life and property and to prevent and 
??????? ????????? ????????? ????? ??? ????????? ????? have a degree of discretion, 
requiring that they make decisions as to when offenders are reported or arrested, 
based upon the legal necessity standard. Consequently, they become used to 
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dealing with what can be very sensitive and important issues on their own, within 
a framework of local and national policies and procedures (Police source 2009). 
This is the traditional, idealised, policing role. There is a key shift of role from 
normal police duties to the corporate action (Waddington PAJ 1996b) required for 
public order policing. The structured teamwork required by public order policing 
is not the norm for most officers.  
??????????????????????recommendations was improved training for officers 
in public order policing (Scarman 1981). This resulted in the development of 
national tactics and training across Britain. More recently public order training in 
Britain has been subject to review, due to the HMIC enquiry into the policing of 
the G20 protests of April 2009 in London. During that event, Ian Tomlinson died 
after being pushed over by a police officer. A number of other incidents also 
occurred that were widely broadcast, debated, and in some cases sensationalised 
by the press and TV. The more recent disorders of August 2011 have further 
invigorated this process. In truth, police public order training was already 
changing by including further human rights awareness training (SWP 2009), and 
has now been codified by an updated manual of guidance ? KtP 2010 (HMIC 2011).  
During basic training all officers should be trained to Level Three in public 
order policing techniques, where they receive grounding in basic tactics such as 
foot cordons, command structures, and an overview of Common Minimum 
Standard (CMS) or Level Two tactics. In order that units from different forces can 
work together effectively each force maintains a number of officers who are 
trained to Level Two or Mutual Aid Standard (MAS). Presently this requires that 
each officer receives four days CMS training each year, and attains operational 
competence in seven basic public order tactics: Foot Cordons; Shield Cordons; 
Free Running Lines; Mixed Shield Dispersal; Building Entries; Petrol Reception 
(being petrol bombed) and dealing with Violent and Deranged Persons (VDP). This 
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is intended to ensure commonality of words of command etc. and hence 
interoperability, so that, theoretically at least, PSUs from different forces can 
work together effectively. In reality this training, whilst intended to be common 
across all forces, does not mean that all receive similar training.  
Regional priorities are allowed for in the doctrine, for example, forces 
with significant ????????? ??????????????????????????????? ???????????????!) do have 
greater numbers of operational deployments, and train accordingly. Others may 
have to manage regular environmental protest, such as the Thames Valley Police 
at and around the Oxford University biomedical research centre. Different forces 
will have different capabilities, depending on their requirements. All forces have 
a responsibility to ensure that their units are fit for purpose. However, not all give 
their level two trained officers the required full four days CMS training, which 
could mean that their PSU officers may be vulnerable if deployed to serious public 
disorder incidents as evidenced at Bradford in 2001 (interview sources 3, 6 +7).    
The basic unit of public order policing in Britain is the Police Support Unit 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????police officers, 
serving the communities of their areas, ????????????????????????????????????????
basis for operational public order deployments. PSUs may well be deployed 
frequently and regularly in some forces, but they remain part-‐time public order 
units. A PSU is made up of one commander usually of Inspector rank, three 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????, a total of twenty two 
officers. Some regional variation is apparent, and a PSU may also include a further 
three constables as drivers and another two as medics. Each force maintains a set 
number of PSUs and has an agreed mutual aid commitment.  
Many forces also maintain a level one capability such as the Territorial 
Support Groups (TSG) of the Metropolitan Police, whose members are employed 
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full-‐time in this role. They are trained to a higher level in conflict management 
and public order tactics, providing a non-‐firearms tactical intervention capability 
as well as being a resource for major events, major incident enquiries, crime 
exercises, searches and, of course, being the first response to spontaneous 
disorder situations. In provincial forces, such as the South Wales Police (SWP), 
these teams are smaller, and may have such titles as Operational Support Teams 
(OST), Tactical Aid Group (TAG) or Support Group. Ultimately all are a derivative 
of the Special Patrol Group (SPG), and provide a flexible and expeditious response 
to serious incidents, with many of them also being trained as a response to 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) incidents. All forces also 
have a CBRN PSU commitment for mutual aid, which is necessarily a growth area 
in the present climate. 
 The Public Order Command Structure has three levels: strategic, tactical 
and operational (KtP 2007), usually referred to as Gold, Silver and  
Bronze respectively. 
 
Fig.19 Public Order Command Structure KtP 2007 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
is designed for use at pre-‐planned or spontaneous incidents, and is flexible enough 
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to cope with a wide range of events. The command function is role not rank 
specific. That is to say those officers performing such roles should have received 
the necessary level of training, and have evidence of their specialist competence . 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? in Oldham 
and Bradford, the public order command function was recognised as being in need 
of improvement and became the subject of a development programme by 
?????????? ??????rsor of NPIA). From this came the Advanced and Initial Public 
Order Command Courses (APOC and IPOC) and, more recently, three distinct 
courses for each level of command have been developed (HMIC 2011).  
 Gold is responsible for formulating strategy, or the ?overall intention to 
combine resources towards managing and resolving an event or incident? (KtP 
2007). The Gold commander should make a number of strategic considerations 
when setting strategy, and has overall responsibility. Silver is responsible for 
devising the tactical plan ???? ?????? ??? ???????? ???? ????????? ???? ??? Gold?? ?????
2010). Silver is the pivotal link between Gold and Bronze, the latter being the 
ground commander and responsible for a geographical area or a specific function. 
Bronze ensures that the tactical plan is implemented on the ground. It is normal 
to have one Gold, one Silver and as many Bronzes as necessary. PAJ Waddington 
??????? ????? ????? ?????????? ????????? ?????? ?????? ???????? ???????? ??? ????? ??? ???????
Gold ??? ?????? ??????? ?he level and interfere with operational decisions on the 
ground through direct contact with Bronze without recourse to Silver and, it may 
be supposed, vice versa. Personal experience showed this to be possible when one 
Gold decided that a morale boosting walkabout would be appropriate during one 
of the FA Cup finals played in Cardiff. Whilst walking past a rowdy group of fans 
who were kicking a football around a packed approach to the stadium, the ball 
struck Gold in the ear knocking off his hat. It could have been much worse but the 
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lesson was salutary. Notwithstanding this example, ???????????????????????????????
problem if commanders are not role disciplined in line with KtP guidance. 
 At this time the KtP stands as British public order policing doctrine (that 
which is taught) for all levels of training, planning and command. KtP has always 
????? ?? ????????? ????????? ???? ???? ??????? ???????? is the third edition since its 
original publication. The main point here is that it is the only official manual of 
guidance for public order policing in Britain. It is a necessary reference for public 
order commanders, advisors and planners and is a comprehensive document that 
really does guide police public order agency (Interview sources). In its original 
foreword Chief Constable Med Hughes states ?Keeping the Peace will remain the 
comprehensive guide on public order matters and it will continue to evolve to 
meet future demands and challenges? (KtP 2007 p6). It is not though, a rigid 
document that contains everything: 
It is not intended to be exhaustive or restrictive and does not preclude the 
innovative use of strategies and tactics which are lawful, Human Rights 
compliant and have been adequately risk assessed. (KtP 2010 p8). 
 
The latest version contains core principles for application in the policing of public 
order incidents such as policing style; communication; command and 
proportionate responses. One model deserving of explanation is the Conflict 
Management Model, which is fundamental. It is widely used and accepted by 
practitioners. Experience has shown it to be applicable at all levels and to any 
conflict situations be they general policing issues, firearms or public order 
incidents (Interview sources). 
The Conflict Management Model (CMM)  
The CMM is taught to all police officers. It is taught on joining as part of officer 
safety and conflict management training and regularly reinforced in annual 
continuation training, which is compulsory in some format for all ranks. Officers 
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specialising in areas such as public order and firearms will have more regular 
exposure to it. 
 It is a model that has become indispensible to command and planning at 
strategic, tactical and operational levels (Interview sources). It guides individual 
officers whilst performing the police patrolling function. It also guides teams of 
officers performing specialist tasks and when used in organising and executing the 
biggest most complex operations, be they spontaneous or planned.  
 KtP states that this model gives guidance for the ?management of events 
and incidents with a risk to public safety or potential for disorder... assists in the 
decision making process and provides a structure for the documentation of 
decisions and their rationale? (KtP 2007 p30).  
 
 
Fig.20 
It is a cyclical model that works in an anti-‐clockwise direction. As can be seen 
above the model starts with information and intelligence on which the rest of the 
process is based. Any source of information is possible, from what can be seen to 
what is known or learned, which should inform any decisions or planning. Any 
impact factors can then be considered as part of the Threat Assessment which can 
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?????? ????? ?? ??????? ?????? ???? ????? ??????????? ??????? ??????????? ??? ??? ??th 
numbers, location or weapons to organisational reputational issues. Consideration 
would also be given to the situation in relation to the disorder model (KtP 2007). 
Community Impact Assessments and operational risk assessments would also come 
under this heading.  
Powers and Policies includes consideration of human rights issues such as 
necessity and proportionality, especially when attempting to balance the rights of 
conflicting groups. Any use of force including powers of arrest would sit here too. 
KtP 2010 also advocates that consideration of a Working Strategy sits between 
Threat Assessment and Powers and Policies.  
Tactical Options would include, for example, at an individual level such 
decisions as to what technique is appropriate to affect an arrest under the 
prevailing circumstances. KtP 2010 includes a list of tactical options that: 
...is not exhaustive and additional options and considerations may 
sometimes apply, dependent upon the unique nature of the operation or 
incident (KtP 2010 p96) 
This provides considerable flexibility in a ???????????? ????????? ??????? 
Commanders and individual officers are in no way precluded from adapting tactics 
to suit the conditions, but this must always be with due regard for the human 
rights of all concerned. 
 The final heading within the CMM is Actions and Contingencies (KtP 2010). 
The main point of note regarding this model is that any action that is taken will 
change the Information and Intelligence and it is necessary to ?spin the model? 
continuously; as the information and intelligence changes so it is necessary to re-‐
appraise threat and risk assessments and whether any course of action embarked 
upon remains necessary (KtP 2010). KtP also states that ?none of the stages should 
be seen as the sole responsibility of the police. The prevention of disorder and 
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restoration of order in the community relies upon the appropriate partnership 
?????????????????????????????KtP 2010 p46).  
The Disorder Model 
 This model ?explains the nature of disorder, and may assist in the 
management of policing operations, events and incidents where there is a risk of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? It can 
be a useful tool particularly when used in conjunction with the Conflict 
Management Model.  
 
The Disorder Model (KtP 2007) Fig.21 
Whilst it may serve to do this in a broad outline manner, it does not fully describe 
the nature and scope of disorder. What it is certainly not meant to be is a 
continuum on which to justify authorisation of higher levels of force. What it can 
do very well though, is to give commanders a framework on which to rationalise 
their decision making based upon human rights requirements of necessity and 
proportionality. KtP 2007 provides broad descriptors of each stage as follows; 
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State of Normality/Steady State:  
The day-‐to-‐day state of order and policing services provided within a community. 
This can vary widely from one area to another and even by time of day. Good 
community information and intelligence management will provide accurate 
information as to the current state. It should be recognised that communities are 
complex in nature and may be permanent or transient.  
Tension:  
This manifests itself as a level of increased concern, frustration or hostility within 
a community. A trigger incident may result in movement from a state of 
heightening tension to disorder. Such incidents can be caused by the police, the 
community or a third party.  
Disorder:  
This represents the stage at which mood is supplemented by action, whether 
isolated or sustained. It manifests itself in disruption, damage or violence. Such 
disorder may occur following a single trigger incident, or a series of incidents that 
have a cumulative effect. At this level, unchecked or uncontrolled activity may 
deteriorate into serious disorder. 
 Serious Disorder/Riot:  
An escalation into widespread violent behaviour. This may take the form of 
violent protest, rioting, criminal damage, looting, and include the use of 
weapons.  
Unrest:   
This is the period, sometimes prolonged, when the rebuilding of relationships 
takes place. Sensitivity and trust are key factors in this process. Police and 
partners should focus on a structured return to a state of normality, and should be 
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aware that it is possible to cause a return to disorder/serious disorder through 
excessive or inappropriate action (KtP 2007 p27). 
 The model can also assist in recording such decisions and the manual 
???????????????????? ????????????? ????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
The draft of the latest KtP changed this ???????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????, which when one considers that any return to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????? of it, ??????????????? is a  more 
realistic  description. The final version of KtP 2010 omitted the model entirely but 
it has been replaced in the new guidance manual 'Public Order -‐ Authorised 
Professional Practice' (NPIA source 2012). This amounts to a fairly comprehensive 
corpus of national doctrine, which attempts to ensure some degree of corporacy 
in an institution that allows up to forty three (or more) interpretations across 
England and Wales.  
This chapter has sought to contextualise the British model of public order 
policing and has outlined the historical, cultural and social development of this 
discipline. It has shown that policing in Britain has a local basis, with officers 
being appointed presently in over sixty geographical or functional areas, but also 
that a degree of centralisation has taken place and this process would seem to be 
an ongoing one. Public Order policing has grown into a specialist role but is still 
generally carried out on an ad hoc basis by normal police officers drawn together 
for specific incidents or events. It is around these structures, policies and 
traditions that the analysis will take place and the comparison with the French 
model be made. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Case Study: Disorder in France 
Introduction 
 
The policing of public disorder incidents in France is analysed in this 
chapter. In order to facilitate this analysis background information from a number 
of violent disorder situations that have taken place in France over the last four 
decades will be used to illustrate and contextualise the issues. Largely unreported 
by British media, France has experienced several serious violent disorders in a 
number of its cities. These disturbances occurred predominantly in the banlieues 
or suburbs that are found on the outskirts of most big French towns or cities. 
These areas house the troubled suburban minority group communities that are 
dogged by rampant unemployment and high crime rates. Incidents have most 
frequently taken place in the quartiers difficiles or cités (public housing estates) 
such as: Les Minguettes, Lyon 1981; Mas-‐de-‐Taureau, Lyon 1990; Mantes-‐la-‐Jolie 
1991; Sartrouville 1992; Melun 1993; Dammarie-‐les-‐Lys 1997; Toulouse 1998; Lille 
2000; Seine Saint Denis 2005; Villiers le Bel 2007; Bagnolet 2009; St Etienne 2009; 
Grenoble 2010. Nearly all of these violent urban disorders were triggered by 
police involvement in the deaths of local youths of Arab or African origin (BBC 
News 2010; Chrisafis 2009; Finn 1998; Jobard 2009 p29; Kchhor 2009; Lichfield 
2000). The above is not a definitive list but it does serve to highlight the relative 
frequency of such incidents in France. This chapter begins by providing a 
description of the Minguettes disorder, which is meaningful in that it led to the 
significant and conflictual French urban policy (Epstein 2009). It then considers 
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two other notable events that occurred in Paris, Seine Saint Denis (more precisely 
Clichy sous Bois) 2005 and Villiers le Bel 2007. These were more widely broadcast 
and analysed and are used here in a joint case study as the vehicle for a 
?????????????? ???????? that relies upon published academic studies and media 
sources that have analysed or reported on those events. Importantly, it will also 
draw upon the participant observations and informal interviews carried out with 
the Police National at Cergy Pontoise, the CRS at Vélizy Villacoublay in Paris and 
???? ???????????? ??????? ??? ???? ??????? ????????? ??????????????? ???? ??????? ???
Gendarmerie (CNEFG) at St Astier. Whilst there the researcher was given 
privileged access by virtue of his status as a serving police officer, which 
amounted to a hybrid of ?inside insider? and ?outside insider?. The experiences of 
officers involved in the disturbances are also used. Also, adding extra meaning to 
this study, are the experiences and knowledge of a number of highly qualified 
public order policing practitioners who are, or have been, instrumental in the 
development and delivery of present policy and practice.  
Les Minguettes, Lyon 1981 : t???????????????????????????????????????????policy) 
????????????? ??? ?????? ????? ??????????????????????? ???? ?? ????? ??? ?????????
???? ???? ??????????????? ???????????????? ... in the areas of housing and 
urban environment and in the socio-‐political fields of employment, 
academic success, health, public order and security and urban services... 
cites...  provided homes after the Second World War for the population 
arising through demographic growth (Epstein 2009 p134). 
This urban policy was initiated by the newly elected socialist President François 
Mitterrand after the ?disorders that set ablaze the mega-‐housing complex of the 
Minguettes... in 1981? (Epstein 2009 p135).  
There was no specific trigger to these disorders but they were an 
expression of frustration by local disenchanted youths. Nor was the form of the 
disorders anything new, but they were far more spectacular than those previously 
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??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and burned them out. There were consequent police chases and violent 
confrontations (Dikeç 2007 p43).  
?????????????????? ?????????? ??? ????????????? ??? ??????? ??????? ?????????????
constructed at Venissieux between 1961 and 1971 as a ZUP (urban priority zone) 
and like many new towns in France, and the UK, was seen as the way forward for 
urbanism. Isolated from the centre of Lyon it suffered all the problems of poverty, 
unemployment, youth delinquency, racism and exclusion (both political and 
geographical). In the latter half of the 1970s economic restructuring caused many 
businesses to move out of the locality and unemployment doubled and its 
population dropped by 10,000 in a ten year period. These problems were apparent 
but had not been explicitly articulated in a political sense. The disorders, that 
came as such a surprise to the general public, highlighted the underlying causal 
conditions that were already well known to both the authorities and the media. 
The 1981 incidents put the banlieues on the political map by giving them a special 
form (Dikeç 2007). They also gave ????? ???????????? ?? ??????ic place in French 
urban history as being the start point for contemporary French urban policy 
(Restate 2005).  
However, this policy did not succeed in resolving the problems and in spite 
of significant sums of money being allocated for improvement of conditions in the 
banlieues, a lack of consultation on the part of the authorities appears to have 
been responsible for further marginalising the populations (Epstein 2009). The 
communication processes were flawed and residents were not kept informed of 
simple but important facts such as when and where they would be re-‐housed and 
under what conditions. Public decision makers ?convinced of the validity of their 
actions and the inability of the residents to grasp a complex project? have left 
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them outside the process (Epstein 2009 p131) which was perceived as arrogant, 
demeaning and as yet another representation of ???? ??????????? lack of political 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
violence and confrontation with the police (Dikeç 2007; Epstein 2009). 
Clichy sous Bois -‐ Seine Saint Denis 2005 
The following events that occurred at Clichy sous Bois in 2005 sparked violent 
disorders that lasted for nearly three weeks, spreading to 300 French towns and 
cities. 4,000 offenders were arrested, many thousands of vehicles were burned 
and more than 125 police officers were injured (Goris et al 2009).  
In 2005 Clichy sous Bois was a selection of run-‐down, graffiti covered 
tower-‐blocks, with many broken and boarded-‐up windows that stretched for 
miles. It had a large population of young men of North and West African origin, 
many of whom were unemployed and felt discontented with and alienated from 
the state (Winter 2005). There were no job centres, and transport links to the 
centre of Paris were poor (there was neither suburban train station nor police 
station in the area).  
Not long before the events of October and November 2005 Nicolas Sarkozy 
had made his now [in] famous ?nettoyage au Kärcher? comment referring to the 
use of ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????after a 
young boy had been shot dead in a criminal shoot out on the 19th June 2005 at La 
Corneuve, another cité in Bobigny, Seine Saint Denis (Louis 2008; Mathieu 2008). 
On Thursday 27th October 2005 several young boys were making their way 
home after playing football at a local field in Clichy sous Bois. On seeing a police 
vehicle of the Anti-‐Crime Brigade (BAC), they scattered, running off in order to 
avoid being stopped and questioned by the police, who had been called there to 
investigate a nearby break in. The boys were not carrying any identification and 
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knew they would be taken to a police station if they were stopped. Three of them 
climbed into an electrical sub-‐station to hide. Two of them, Zyed Benna and 
Bouna Traoré were electrocuted and died. The other, Muhittin Altun, was badly 
burned (Canet et al 2008; Lagrange 2009; Roché 2006; Schneider 2008; 
Waddington D 2007).  
At the time the police said that they were investigating a burglary and that 
the youths had not been pursued. They also stated that they were unaware that 
the three youngsters had entered the electricity sub-‐station. However police 
communication logs later revealed that a chase did take place and it was known 
that the boys were at risk (Lichfield 2006). Two of the police officers concerned 
were prosecuted for ?non-‐assistance to a person in danger? (BBC News 2010). 
This tragedy was the spark that ignited some three weeks of rioting that 
spread to ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????France. During the 
worst night of that period as many as 274 towns and cities were affected. Many 
thousands of cars were burned and public buildings such as schools, sports centres 
and training offices were attacked. Some 3,200 arrests were made and 400 people 
received custodial sentences (Lichfield 2006).  On 8th of November the State was 
so concerned that emergency powers including the use of curfews were activated, 
using a law dating from 3rd April 1955, in order to expand police powers (PN ppt. 
2008). 
Considering the nature and scope of these events very few people were 
injured although one man, Jean-‐Jacques Le Chenadec, died in Paris after being 
assaulted (Button 2005) and another, Salah Gaham, died whilst trying to 
extinguish a car fire in a basement car park of student accommodation in 
Besançon (Le Parisien 2005). There were many confrontations with the police 
(Cepol 2006) but the main targets were cars and buildings. There is evidence that 
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firearms were used by rioters on a few occasions, but not by the police who were 
reported as having shown a great deal of restraint throughout, despite over a 
hundred of them being injured (Lichfield 2006). The use of firearms against the 
police in a public disorder situation is not unknown and at Villiers le Bel, two 
years later, firearms were used in a more directed fashion against the police 
lines. 
Villiers le Bel 2007 
?Two years on and the children and grandchildren of immigrants are in the streets 
again, attacking police with paving stones, Molotov cocktails and, in one case, a 
high calibre rifle? (M+C News 2007). Villiers le Bel is a typical Parisian suburb; it 
???? ?? ?????????? ??????? ??? ???? ?????? ???????? ?????? ???? ????????? ??? ?? ??????? ???
dilapidated tower blocks that were constructed in the 1970s. These now form part 
of a zone d'aménagement concentré (ZAC ? urban development zone) which is 
intended to facilitate the development of public space by private enterprise. The 
resident population of a ZAC tends to be largely of immigrant origin consisting of 
more than thirty nationalities (Lichfield 2007); beset by the same problems of 
discrimination, unemployment and urban decay as other French suburbs. 
Villiers le Bel is situated seventeen and a half kilometres to the north of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????via the ?creaky 
train line? (Riddell 2007) or a potentially very time consuming road journey. 
During the afternoon of Sunday 25th November 2007 two teenagers, Moushin 
Sehhouli (15) and Lakamy Samouri (16) were killed when the mini motorcycle they 
were riding collided with a police car. Subsequent accident investigation 
suggested that the two boys were travelling at high speed, were not wearing 
helmets and that the motorcycle was not road legal. There were conflicting 
accounts of exactly what had happened, with local youths claiming that the police 
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had deliberately rammed the bike. However, a number of independent witnesses 
did confirm the police account of the accident (Lichfield 2007). Again police 
involvement, however limited, in the death of young men of North African 
descent was the flashpoint for serious disorder. On this occasion the level of 
violence used by the crowd was far more extreme than previously experienced, 
with stones, bottles, petrol bombs and firearms being used against their perceived 
enemy, the police (Jobard et al 2009; Lichfield 2007(a); Mott Austin 2007; PN 
sources 1, 3 + 4; Zahra 2007).  
Reporting of the incident suggested that the police simply left the scene 
(Samuel 2007). However, the reality was that within thirty to forty minutes of the 
collision the situation had become extremely tense with the police officers being 
sufficiently ?????????????????????????????????????????????that they were forced to 
retire from the scene (PN ppt. 2008; PN source 3). When one considers that they 
had just been involved in a fatal road accident, and would have been under 
severe physical and emotional stress their perceived lack of action does not seem 
as callous as first reported. The disturbances in Villiers le Bel involved over five 
hundred youths on the first night and took the police by surprise. By 18.30hrs that 
day police reinforcements started to arrive and by 1900hrs the first CRS Company 
arrived. The disorder continued for three days with extremely high levels of 
violence aimed at the police (PN source 1). The railway station was damaged, a 
nursery school and the police station were burned out and a number of cars 
torched. By the end one hundred and thirty police officers had been injured, 
many by shotgun pellets and one by a round fired from a hunting rifle (PN source 
3).  
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Applying the adapted ???????????????????????? 
Structural 
According to Pierre Willen of the French National Police the 2005 riots did not 
come as that much of a surprise to the police, who were well aware of the ?latent 
unrest? in the suburbs that had been present over the preceding twenty years and 
that the many apparent social problems had not been addressed (Willen 2007). 
The issues in the suburbs were seen by the police as socio-‐political problems; the 
causes of this ambient level of unrest being cited as simply a product of people?s 
inability to get a job and because they did not feel safe. Lagrange (2009) came to 
a similar conclusion, saying that the inaccessibility of social positions to local 
youths was linked to the ethnic segregation in these poorest of areas.  
Large public housing blocks, now often ugly and run down, were built over 
the previous forty years, as part of a government policy that effectively 
concentrated the poorest, often the most recent, immigrant populations in a 
??????? ??? ????? ??????? ?????? ??? ???? ?????????? ??? ?????? ??????? ??????? ???? ???????
These areas have become nightly battlefields between resident youths and the 
authorities (Ford 2005). The 2005 disturbances that spread across France were 
observed to mostly have started in, and spread across, these public housing 
estates now known as ZUSs or sensitive urban zones (Lagrange 2009). The 
inhabitants of these Cités, mainly people of Arabian/Maghrebian or sub-‐Saharan 
African origin, share the economic and social characteristics of poverty, 
disenfranchisement and insecurity. Many were trapped in tenement blocks such as 
Chêne Pointu, inhabiting rented accommodation in now privately owned 
??????????? ????? ???????????? ????[ed] out room by room at inflated prices making 
?big money... fast and easy on the backs of those with the most insecure lives: 
those without legal papers like residency permits, people who work[ed] on the 
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black [market], single mothers? (Zambeau 2011). These tenants were people who 
had little hope and nothing to lose. 
The police are obliged to intervene when other systems such as welfare 
and housing fail, finding themselves in a dilemma, caught between their duty to 
citizens and the State (Willen 2007). This is similar in some ways to the dilemma 
faced by the disenfranchised residents of these estates. The perception that they 
lack loyalty to the French republic is not necessarily correct; the frustration felt 
by many of the people living in these areas occurs because most are French born 
and believe themselves to be theoretically rightful citizens of France. They have 
been taught to respect French republican ideals of liberty, fraternity and 
equality. They grow up to find that in reality there is a huge gulf between theory 
and practice (Ford 2005). France does not have a state religion as such and 
secularism has been the basic tenet of French progressive thought since the 
revolution (Astier 2004). ?In France, there is but one abstract community, that of 
its citizens? (Canet et al 2008 p15).  
Commentators said, after the disturbances at Villiers le Bel, that the 
underlying causes of frustration and anger for unemployed, poorly educated youth 
have not been improved since the disturbances of 2005, in the aftermath of which 
promises were made by politicians that millions of euros would be invested in the 
banlieues (M+C News 2007; Sciolino 2007). France has one of the highest rates of 
youth unemployment in Europe and young people from ethnic minority 
backgrounds also face the added obstacle of racism (Ash 2007). Schneider (2008) 
puts the unemployment rate for fifteen to twenty four year olds in France, 
particularly the black and Arab youth of non-‐European parents, as high as 47%. 
This is over double the rate of French youth of European origin. Other 
commentators put the rate as anywhere between 20% and 40% (Ford 2005; 
Lichfield 2006). 
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This level of analysis has focused on the macro-‐sociological factors, 
material inequalities, political powerlessness and social exclusion (Waddington D 
2010 p344) and shows that forty years of banlieue decay and growing socio-‐
political problems have made their mark. Ethnic segregation underscored by 
poverty, unemployment and insecurity means that the residents of these areas 
feel politically and socially excluded and powerless. Poor lines of communication 
with city centres and other potential sources of work worsen employment 
chances. Government policies such as ZUS? have not succeeded and at least 
twenty years of latent unrest and growing tensions exploded in 2005 as a result. 
Both the residents and the police continue to wrestle with the duality of the 
republican ideal.  
Political/Ideological 
During the 1980s the increasing tensions in the banlieues were exploited 
politically by the National Front, which gained a significant percentage (14.38%) 
of the vote in the 1988 elections. The outcomes were that France had a socialist 
President in François Mitterrand, a socialist Prime Minister in Michel Rocard and a 
right wing mayor of Paris in Jacques Chirac. In 1990, Chirac, having resigned as 
??????????????????????????????????????? ?launched a new attack on immigration, 
suggesting that the problems of French workers were a consequence of lax 
immigration controls? (Schneider 2008 p144). The political trend in France since 
then has been towards a more zero tolerance style of policing, in response to the 
????????? ??????????? ????????? ?????? ??????? ??? ?????????? ??????????? ????? ?the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
primary target of police action? (Mouhanna 2009 p180) and the police employed 
increased patrols in the sensitive areas to maintain control with greater use of 
stop and search interventions, that resulted in increased levels of tension 
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(Mouhanna 2009  p174). These police patrols were routinely subjected to abuse, 
missiles and intimidation, making the banlieues fearsome places in which to work 
(Mouhanna 2009), a factor that perpetuated the need for the increased police 
presence.   
This climate, when considered alongside the then ????????????????? ?????
line on immigration and criminality as well as the insistence on a performance 
culture in public bodies, was bound to impact upon the policing style adopted by 
officers on the ground (Roché 2005; Willen 2007). This ?enhanced centralisation 
and politicisation of national level security issues? (Mouhanna 2009 p181) has 
translated to a local level obedience to national directives rather than a locally 
negotiated problem solving approach that would better satisfy public needs. 
The police are seen as agents of state repression, in essence they are the 
state (Riddell 2007). They have become a ?metonymical symbol for a hostile 
society in the eyes of the youths who felt more and more justified in considering 
[them] as their sole enemy? (Jobard 2009 p34). Shortly after Villiers le Bel a CRS 
respondent said ?...when we go in there they are trying to kill us?, a statement 
which is not difficult to understand when he added that eighty of his company 
were injured in those disturbances, eight of them with gunshot wounds (PN source 
1).   
The 2005 disturbances were in effect an uprising of the disaffected youths 
as a result of pent up frustrations, or as Michael Moran put it: 
The riots thus expressed the profound dissatisfaction that prevails ... for 
the young people of the suburbs, despair and hopelessness overshadow 
many dreams of upward social mobility. This despair is compounded by a 
loss of faith in the justice system as a result of continued police 
discrimination and repression (2006 p5). 
 
So whilst the interactions between the young of the banlieues and the police at an 
individual level may be perceived as racist or even sadistic, this is not the crux of 
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the matter. It is more the perception, rightly or wrongly held, that when the 
police do breach human rights standards or the law, they are never held to 
account; it is the protection given to them by the institutions and the justice 
system that causes most frustration (Roché 2007; Schneider 2008). Nicolas 
Sarkozy, first as Minister of the Interior and then as President of the Republic, 
became the central object of hatred, due to his general and unashamed labelling 
of banlieue ???????????????????????????. This was allied with the fact that the most 
noticeable aspect of his ????????????????? ????? justice initiative was its 
punitiveness (Sciolino 2007). The result of this was that many young people of 
Arab or African origin felt like foreigners in their own country (Mott Austin 2007) 
though it is somewhat surprising, paradoxical even, that throughout these 
disturbances there was no real revolutionary sentiment: 
 
Throughout the violence there were no formal calls for the end of the 
Republic, for this is not the desire of those involved in the riots. It would 
appear that the youth of the suburbs were simply asking to be recognised 
for what they are: citizens of France, and to be incorporated into 
mainstream French society... The government must recognise the 
potential of these areas to positively contribute to French social and 
economic progression, and invest in the development of the suburbs. The 
trend of exclusion must be reversed or the French Republic will move 
???????? ????? ???? ???????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ???????? ???? ??????????? ???????????
would appear to be the testing ground for the Republic of the future 
(Moran 2008 p6). 
 
Moran makes some salient points here that do add weight to the view that the 
police in France are caught in the middle of a political conflict within the state of 
which they are a part but are powerless to change. 
Police knowledge and understanding of the residents of the banlieues is 
limited by a lack of community engagement and structure. Police agency is 
??????????? ??? ????????? ??? ?????????? ??? ?????????? ??????rs who are primarily 
concerned with their own safety, their perception that everyone is a threat is 
perhaps a significant factor in their use of higher levels of force. Consequently the 
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response to community needs by key political and ideological institutions, in this 
case the police, amounts to:   
a kind of authoritarian powerlessness... incorporating an insistence on 
militarised forms of policing (at the expense of neighbourhood policing and 
other forms of citizen-‐orientated policing)... and a policy path dependence 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
it has been reduced from 2002 onwards to a mere urban 
destruction/reconstruction programme (Jobard 2009 p36) 
 
This authoritarian powerlessness was exemplified on 11th April 2011 when France 
became the first country in Europe to enforce a ban on the public wearing of full 
face coverings such as the Islamic niqab/burkha. A young woman was fined 150 
euros for offending in a shopping centre in Paris. The police in France have 
articulated fears that this policy will increase tensions in the already fraught 
banlieues (Allen 2011) but as agents of the state they have a duty to enforce the 
law, without the discretion enjoyed by their British counterparts. The former 
Minister of the Interior, Claude Gueant, a strong supporter of Nicolas Sarkozy took 
a typically hard line on this subject saying ?secularism and equality between men 
and women... two principles upon which we cannot compromise... the police and 
the gendarmerie are there to apply the law and they will apply the law? (France 
24 2011).  
This level of analysis ???? ??????????? ???? ????? ?????????? ???? ????????????
?????????????? ?????????? ???? ???????? (Waddington D 2010 p 344) respond to 
community needs and provides an understanding of the following key points: The 
residents, particularly the youth, of the banlieues have very little social or 
educational support and are victims of employment discrimination. The politique 
de la ville that is imposed from above by the State means that residents have 
little or no influence over their own lives. Recent hard line immigration policies 
and the political currency of being tough on crime have resulted in a hardening of 
police attitudes with the youth of the banlieues being seen as social enemies of 
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the State. There is no community policing and the police themselves are seen as 
agents of state repression, the policing style reflects the state. Monsieur ??????????
performance culture for public employees has ensured that the police concentrate 
on enforcement rather than problem solving and ultimately have little influence 
on the policies that they must enforce. The marginalised populations of the 
banlieues have no faith in the justice system.   
Cultural 
The shared experiences of young people living in the banlieues included 
educational failure and unemployment (France 24 2010; Mucchielli 2011). The 
youth culture of the banlieue is thought to have developed as a result of a lack of 
social identity and residents having too much idle time on their hands through 
lack of work or other diversions. Young people with nothing to do hung around in 
their neighbourhoods and a territorial group identity developed in the absence of 
any other. Lack of parental control was a major factor, particularly with regard to 
young males. Young females were more likely to remain apart from these groups 
and did rather better educationally (France 24 2010). Large numbers of young 
people in similar circumstances resulted in a sharing and reinforcement of a 
mentality of exclusion, with the rejection of usual norms, and a development of 
their own value systems which often rejected anything symbolising the 
institutions. These new norms or standards often mean involvement in criminal 
activity as a means of survival and are then imposed on their public life by taking 
pride in a counter culture of deviance and violence against the racism and stigma 
they feel (Mucchielli 2011). Parallel economies thrived, ???????? ??? ???? ?????
trafficking (Bronner 2010) that was a ??????? ?????????? ????????????? ???? ?????
gang members as they slipped into criminality. Research has identified that these 
groups we???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????twenty years 
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and who had ?had their hopes dashed by discrimination and unemployment? 
(Hamidi 2009 p135) and those between 13 years and 20 years old who had 
?????????? ?????? ???????????????????????????????? ???? ?????????????????ed no such 
illusions (Hamidi 2009; Korkoref 2009 p151; PN Source 2009). These groups or 
gangs were predominantly male and ?represent[ed] a major form of juvenile 
sociability within poor housing estates. What [made] them particularly distinctive 
as social entities [was] the importance they attach to masculine and transgressive 
values and their permanent state of conflict with the remainder of society? 
(Mohammed 2009 p160). They were stable and enduring formations with their own 
dynamics: their cohesion and peculiar sense of social identity [did] not vanish 
during a riotous event (Mohammed 2009 p157). Violence is often a product of 
inter-‐group rivalry and there are local traditions of fighting with neighbouring 
groups (Mucchielli 2011). Inter-‐group rivalry can occur anywhere but is probably 
exacerbated by proximity and opportunity in urban areas such as the banlieues. 
The gangs are very territorial and fights with other gangs take place and have 
become more and more violent resulting in deaths and increased police attention. 
Typically when the police arrived at the scene of inter group violence they are 
seen as the common enemy. Gang involvement in the disturbances of 2005 has 
been viewed as a form of political agency but the reality of gang involvement at a 
political level in such events is limited, being ?reactive and situational, carried 
out by vulnerable people who lack political leverage and enjoy little access to 
national political structures? (Mohammed 2009 p171). 
??? ????? ??????????? ?????? the factors that predominate in most media 
reporting and in the views expressed in many relevant academic publications are 
the common themes of hatred, racism and violence (Riddell 2007). This is also 
reflected in the police view that cites the emergence of ghettos, suburban 
culture, suburban nationalism and religious fundamentalism as well as criminal 
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activity and a flourishing black market as major causal factors of deviance (GN 
source 2; Cepol 2006).  
Nevertheless, any comment to the effect that the violent disorders 
discussed above were purely race riots or the result of Islamist activism 
(Schneider 2008) does not bear scrutiny. The people in question were youths from 
a number of ethnic groups, white, black and brown, reflecting the racial mix of 
the banlieues, which are social rather than racial ghettos, a fact often ignored in 
media reporting (Heneghan 2007; Lichfield 2006). The religious aspect of cultural 
identity is also present in that many of Arab and African ethnicity have Muslim 
roots, but it is not a defining factor and is viewed by some as being more likely to 
restrain violence than inflame it (Bronner 2010). 
There has been a change in how the police are perceived by the French 
public with taxpayers feeling that they have some right of control over the police 
(Samuel 2007), to the extent that they have felt on occasion to be justified in 
intervening in arrests, e.g. at the Gare du Nord in Paris where serious violent 
disorder followed public intervention in an arrest that involved the use of what 
was seen as excessive force by the police involved (Samuel 2007). Police officers 
see this kind of activity as ?tantamount to privatisation? (Willen 2007), and the 
antithesis of the centralist structure and doctrine of French policing.  
In summary, this cultural level of analysis ????????????????????????????????
of life and patterns of thought that different sections of society subscribe to on 
???? ?????? ??? ??????? ???????????? ???????????? ?? ????? ?????? suggests that 
educational failure and unemployment are major factors and are in the main 
responsible for the development of the youth gang culture (Cepol 2006; GN source 
2; Mucchielli 2011). Gang membership gives them a form of social standing and 
self esteem. Lack of work and poverty has encouraged many young males to 
obtain a means of survival through drug trafficking and other forms of crime and 
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parallel economies have developed. Parental weakness in influencing the 
attitudes and behaviour has allowed their male offspring to become involved in 
gang culture, inter gang violence and criminality. The spectre of Islamic 
extremism does not appear to be the problem that some perceive it to be as 
Islamic teaching is probably more of a moderating influence. However, it is clear 
that the police are despised by the banlieue youth and become the common 
enemy when attending incidents (GN source 7; PN sources 1 + 3). All involved are 
bound up in a spiral of hatred, racism and violence. 
Contextual 
We have already seen that frequent conflict between the police and banlieue 
youth has become the norm in the Cités of France and this continues to be the 
case in spite of significant investment. There has been a repeating pattern of 
poverty and marginalisation, followed by disorder, then investment and support 
followed by more poverty and marginalisation and so on. The two disorders in 
consideration were globally reported by the media with much discussion of likely 
root causes as well as trigger events. The two cases were similar in that two 
youths died and the police were blamed by local youths who took on the police 
despite appeals for calm from the dead boys? families (Lichfield 2007). After the 
2005 disturbances police and gendarmerie sources were of the opinion that 
tensions had been raised by media exploitation of political, religious, economic 
and social frustrations (Cepol 2006; GN source 2). The police view of the media 
reporting of the Villiers le Bel disorder was that it had improved since the 2005 
Seine St. Denis incident in that whilst fear did spread beyond the boundaries of 
the area???????????????????????????????????????????????he media had developed a 
better understanding of its potential to raise tension (GN source 5). Nevertheless 
broad reporting of the 2007 events did include such statements as ??he suburbs 
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are like tinderboxes. You have people in terrible social circumstances, plus all the 
rage, plus all the hate, plus all the rumours and all you need is one spark to set 
them on fire? (Sciolino in NY Times 2007). Historically, in all cases that spark has 
been provided by some form of police intervention, whether intentional or 
accidental. 
The lack of effective communication structures between the public and 
the police was critical in both Clichy sous Bois and Villiers le Bel. It allowed the 
cloud of rumour to obscure the facts surrounding the deaths of both pairs of boys. 
A clearer, more transparent two way flow of accurate information would have 
given many of those involved less of a reason for protest. As it was any attempt by 
the authorities to engage the local populations in some form of negotiated 
settlement would have been frustrated by the lack of contact with potential 
community mediators (GN source 7; PN source 3). This also meant that the police 
lacked certain community information and intelligence that would have been 
essential in formulation or review of strategy and the tactical decision making 
process. 
Prior to the disturbances of 2005, when he was the Minister of the Interior, 
Nicolas Sarkozy had introduced a system where state employees had to 
demonstrate their efficiency and activity with figures. Any police officer trying to 
improve relationships with the residents of sensitive areas by adopting a proactive 
and communitarian approach, rather than a purely reactive one, might not 
generate the organisationally required evidence of performance. For these 
officers it generated a need to justify their proficiency through improved arrest 
and process figures, which encouraged a punitive style, which was a factor in 
perceptions of a repressive style of policing (Roché 2005 p259; Willen 2007). 
163 
 
Interestingly the police perspective regarding the lack of personal contact 
between them and the public was due, at least in part, to lack of resources which 
necessitated patrolling in vehicles rather than on foot. They also bemoaned the 
lack of police stations in the suburbs arguing that whilst there was a large ethnic 
population within the city centres of Marseille and Paris no rioting occurred there 
because they did have police stations and this ensured an understanding of local 
issues (Willen 2007).This suggests that a fixed point of contact is a positive factor 
in engendering a feeling of community involvement in their perceived security 
issues. However, it is apparent that in France generally, citizens do not have a 
??????????? ??????? ???? ???? ??????? ???? ??? ?????????????? ????????? ??? ??????? ??????????
the police simply deal with incidents. There does not appear to be any formal or 
informal fora for communication, such as community police meetings, 
neighbourhood watch schemes or surgeries. As a result community information is 
sparse and has to come from patrolling police units, informants, or from the 
?????-‐?????????? ??? ?????????????? ?????????? ?????? -‐ the intelligence of the 
departemental police). One police officer put it this way: ?prevention is difficult 
because the population does not like speaking to the police?????????????3). So, as 
already discussed, the lack of community policing in its normal conception does 
have consequences. 
The Unités Territoriales de Quartiers (UTeQ), founded by Michelle Alliot 
Marie, were a more robust but community based replacement for the Police de 
Proximité (community police) that had been established as part of the national 
police in 1998 by the Jospin government. The main aim of the Police de Proximité 
was to promote improved relations with communities and was seen by many as a 
step in the right direction (Roché 2005 p220), but was seen by Nicolas Sarkozy, 
when he became Minister of the Interior in the Raffarin administration, as too soft 
an option. He criticised the concept in a speech made in Toulouse in February 
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2003 saying that police officers were not social workers (Mairie-‐Info. 2003). So a 
more directed police force became focused on building local links in sensitive 
areas but at the same time trained in public order tactics. UTeQ units were 
directed towards developing close links with communities at the same time as 
combating street drug offences. However their effect was limited and they were 
often subject to ambush (RFI 2009). 
         ??? ?????? ??????? ??? ??? ?????????? ?????????? ???? ???????? ??????? ???? ??????
2010), in August 2010 Brice Hortefeux, Interior Minister, effectively disbanded 
UTeQ at the same time as replacing them with Brigades Spéciales de Terrain 
(BST), which translates as Territorial Special Brigades. Adopting a more ?muscular? 
approach, these teams were staffed by experienced officers wearing intervention 
uniform, whose byword was ?the ground, the ground and yet the ground? 
(Libération France, 2010). They were aimed at restoring public confidence by 
stopping crime using a targeted approach in sensitive areas, intending that in time 
conditions in the area in question would improve and the BST could then move on 
to another more sensitive location. M. Hortefeux also said that they would be 
targeted against urban violence and drug trafficking and would not give an inch in 
that regard, thus ensuring a very robust approach to community policing 
(Libération France, 2010).  
 ???? ????????????? ??? ?????????????? ?????????? ?????? ??? ??????????????
highlights several key issues. The history of negative experiences between the 
police and residents has produced a steady worsening of relations between them 
???????????????????????????????????????saw the removal of the only official form 
??? ?????????? ????????? ???????? ??? ????????é?? ???? ???? ?eplacement by UTeQ and 
then BSTs, which were tasked with targeting urban violence in a ?muscular? 
fashion. There were no apparent communication structures to assist in police 
community relations and the police suffered because of the consequent lack of 
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community intelligence. A number of youths have died during incidents involving 
the police with rumour and blame resulting in violent disturbances. In the past, 
media exploitation of political, religious, economic and social frustrations has 
increased tension in the banlieues but more informed and restrained reporting has 
been evident since 2005. 
Situational 
In the 1960?????????????????????????????????????????????é? (HLMs ? cheap rent 
council blocks) for the working classes who, as their standard of living improved, 
vacated them. Local administrations replaced these tenants with those who were 
forced out by state slum clearance programmes ?along with new immigrants and 
large families, thus encouraging spatial and social segregation? (Zauberman and 
Levy 2003 p1071). As in Britain such segregation created separate communities 
living parallel lives ?? la Cantle? (2001) and a consequent lack of understanding. 
Whilst neighbourhoods can change markedly over relatively short timescales 
people do take pride in their home neighbourhoods, they are bound together by 
the social constructs of their locality and scale and rate others based on the 
neighbourhoods that they come from (Sampson 2010). 
Both Clichy sous Bois and Villiers le Bel have a number of high rise blocks 
of flats that are constructed fairly close to one another but in their own grounds 
so that each one has its own communal grassed area and access road with nearby 
car parking (PN source 2009). Numerous footpaths connect the blocks, making it 
easy for bands of youths to confront the authorities and make their escape 
afterwards. In these run down areas of French cities confrontation with the police 
is a frequent, even normal, occurrence (Lichfield 2007) and the banlieues remain 
difficult areas. T?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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nationalistic sense. This dangerous status quo could be an example of what Robert 
Sampson would call an enduring neighbourhood effect (Sampson 2011). 
Confrontation with the forces of law and order is often sought after by local 
youths, who band together in a tribal manner (Cepol 2006). There is nothing new 
in inter-‐group violence though, nor is it restricted to youths in urban areas, as 
evidenced by the communal rural violence experienced at village fetes in the 
Gard region (Mucchielli 2011).  
The geography of these areas does not generally lend itself to 
straightforward crowd management in that the people to be dispersed are likely 
to live in the area they are to be dispersed from. This is clear to see in the 
following figures (22 + 23), which show the nature of the ground that the CRS 
units had to operate in at Villiers le Bel. When dispersing a crowd it is necessary 
to have somewhere to push it towards, away from the problem area. When 
disorder occurs and escalates police from outside the area are usually brought in 
to deal with the situation. Normally, certainly in Paris, these would be units of 
CRS or GM who are well versed in public order tactics but may well not have a 
high level of local knowledge or understanding of local issues. Indeed when the 
CRS and GM entered the estates in both 2005 and 2007 they were confronted, 
stoned, petrol bombed or fired at and then their assailants would disappear into 
the estate to regroup. 
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Figure 22 Villiers le Bel 2007 (PN ppt) 
 
Figure 23. Le secteur Bois-‐Joli de Villiers le Bel (PN ppt) 
Any containment, arrest or dispersal operations were therefore tactically 
challenging, if not impossible (Cepol 2006; PN and GM sources). It also requires 
significant numbers of police to effect a successful operation of this type. It is 
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equally probable that such operations would have achieved only short term 
tactical gains. 
????? ????????? ??????????????????????? ??????????????? ????????? ??????????? ???????
????????????? ??? ?????????? ???? ????????? ????? ???????????? ??? ???? ???? ????? ??????
itself to dispersal of crowds, police surveillance and the symbolic nature of the 
?????????? ??????? ?????????????? ??? ???????????? ??????????????????????????The 
spatial and social segregation of the people who live in the banlieues has been 
achieved unintentionally as a consequence of government policy and the 
architecture of the housing blocks. They are usually situated on the edge of towns 
and cities in clusters of several blocks with access roads and linking footpaths that 
make for ????????????????????????????????????????The large number of police officers 
required for crowd control in this environment often necessitates the drafting in 
of EGM or CRS units from elsewhere, whose agents may lack detailed knowledge 
of local geography and issues. This favours the resident youths when they engage 
the police using hit and run tactics, before disappearing into the Cit???. 
Institutional/Organisational 
This level adds depth to the model because it focuses ?on such recognised 
influences on police behaviour as national traditions of policing? (Waddington D 
2010 p346). It also ensures consideration of the ?circumstances in which they act? 
(Waddington P.A.J. 1999a).  
When considering this level of structuration it is important to remember 
that ?it is the Préfet and not the local authorities, who directs police operations? 
(Mouhanna 2009 p 102). The Préfet has access to expert police advice and a direct 
relationship with the police commissioner, but is ultimately the state?s 
representative in a Département and therefore police strategy is in effect 
dictated by the state. ?Any notions of the police being in the service of or 
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accountable to, the public are largely incompatible with the French model of 
policing? (Mouhanna 2009 p179).  
The departmental police forces are structured so that individual patrols 
are unusual; public safety and order maintenance operations in the banlieues tend 
to be carried out by departmental teams such as the BAC D (plain clothes) and CDI 
(department public order teams). CDIs are trained in public order tactics, which 
are thought by some to be used in ?preference to talking to or negotiating with 
their civilian adversaries? (Mouhanna 2009 p175), as part of the national policy 
that considers public order maintenance to be a major priority (Mouhanna 2009). 
After the widespread urban violence of 2005 an analysis of the police response to 
the increasing threat levels found it necessary to improve police capacity in less 
than lethal response options (PN source 3; GN source 5). ???? ???? ???????
commissariat had a total of ninety CDI members who were able to deal with the 
regular outbreaks of disorder that occured. In addition to their normal sidearm 
they we??? ????????? ????? ??????? ?????????? ???????????? ????? ????????? ??? ??? ???-‐
lethal, discharging only a soft rubber ball. They were also equipped with Calibre 
40 (a gun with a range of up to fifty metres that fires paint or baton rounds), 
???????????????????????????stinger grenades (grenades de désencerclement) that 
are used to get out of trouble if surrounded (PN source 3).  
If an incident required more police the mobile public order forces of EGM 
and CRS would be brought in. As outlined in an earlier chapter, these were 
distinct from the locally based units and their assistance to local police in public 
order maintenance was requested through the Unité Coordination des Forces 
Mobiles (UCFM). In response to the new forms of crime and urban violence the CRS 
have revised their role to one that is presently threefold aimed at protection of 
personnel, conducting enquiries in hostile environments and identification of 
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perpetrators of attacks against the police for judicial process (PN source 4; CRS 
ppt 2010). 
When it comes to actually stopping disorder situations the French police 
adopt a strategy ??????? ?????? ???? ??? ???? ?????? ??? ?????? ???????????? ??????????
2009 p175), which amounts to the deployment of sufficient numbers of police to 
make an immediate impact using stop and search, containment or dispersal as 
appropriate (Mouhanna 2009; CRS/EGM sources). This is possible because of the 
number of such specialist officers that are available due to their national 
structure and regional bases.  
If a disorderly crowd is present the legal remedy of attroupement may be 
used in line with human rights considerations and the use of force continuum. 
Attroupement (Article 431-‐????? ???? ????????????? gives the police the power to 
disperse, by force if necessary, ?an unlawful assembly... on the streets or in 
public places that is likely to disturb public order? after two warnings have been 
issued by the ?prefect, the sub-‐prefect, the mayor or one of his deputies, any 
police officer responsible for public safety, or any other police officer, bearing 
the insignia of their office?. Anyone not complying with the requirement to 
disperse can be arrested for the offence of attroupement. Normally, where 
possible, the police give more than the required two warnings to allow more time 
for people to leave the area. A red flare is also fired into the air as a visible 
warning that force may be used (PN source 3). Attroupement is a regularly used 
piece of legislation and CRS/EGM units are permanent teams who are highly 
trained and very experienced in public order techniques. The tactical use of tear 
gas is quite usual, often with many hundreds of grenades being fired with little or 
no complaint from the wider public. Tear gas makes an area uncomfortable to 
remain in and people are kept moving using this deterrent until the threat is no 
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longer apparent. More than 700 grenades were fired at one protest in 2009 (GN 
source 5). Tear gas launchers such as the Cougar fire grenades in an arc into a 
crowd but are not pinpoint accurate. Grenades may bounce about on hitting the 
ground, which can be contentious, as it was in 2005 at Clichy sous Bois when a 
grenade landed outside a mosque causing further protest (BBC News 2005).  
With the aim of reducing such errors, and indeed the reliance on tear gas 
as the main means of dealing with violent crowds, the French police have 
concentrated on the research and development of better technical methods of 
achieving strategic and tactical advantage. Obtaining improved levels of 
information and intelligence and the availability of more effective operational 
communication systems and better tactical equipment gives them better 
reactivity. To this end modern surveillance equipment and methods have been 
identified in order to enhance police operational control of situations. CCTV and 
video enhancement are being used more and more as is night vision equipment. 
Evidence gathering as a police discipline has been put into practice, as have 
lightweight aerial surveillance devices (ELSA) or drones. Artificial lighting systems 
and electronic jamming equipment that will block all mobile phone 
communications have also been procured (PN ppt. 2008). It is evident that much 
has been invested in acquiring the best means of achieving success on the ground 
and it is reasonable to assume that the funding for these has been provided by a 
government intent on pursuing strong law and order policies.  
The key points from this level of analysis centre on the fact that the 
French model of policing is a state function, which gives some substance to the 
view that they are not at all accountable to the public. The police then are agents 
of the republic and police operations are directed by the Préfet. Community 
policing in its usual conception is not a priority; public safety and the 
maintenance of order are paramount. CDI and BAC D officers appear to have the 
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most contact with banlieue youths through stop and search or arrest. Recent 
escalation in the levels of violence aimed at patrolling police officers has 
necessitated research and development of better defensive and offensive police 
equipment and improved methods of electronic communication, much of which 
has been provided and had ?? ?????????? ???? ????? ?????????? ?????????? ????????
policies. These developments also mean that police officers have even less reason 
to speak to members of the public. The national structure of the PN and GN 
provides for ready availability of mobile public order forces, which means that 
when necessary large numbers of police can flood an area. The offence of 
attroupement ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
tactical options such as tear gas are used frequently.  
Interactional 
The main issue in the banlieues of France is widely reported as being the 
relationship between the youth and the police, which has become one of constant 
conflict. The young residents and the police see each other as enemies (Cepol 
2006; CRS source 2008; Ford 2005; GM source 2009; Heneghan 2007; Mott Austin 
2007; PN source 2009; Samuel 2007). 
??? ???? ??????????? ???????????? ???? ?????????????? ??? ?????????? ???????? ????
police and the public over a prolonged period has resulted in a relationship 
characterized by conflict and tension with the representatives of justice 
viewed as an enemy, symbolizing a justice system that appears corrupt to 
the inhabitants of these areas, rather than a positive social element 
(Moran 2008 p5). 
 
Communication between the police and the youth of the banlieues appears 
to be limited to the words necessary for carrying out a stop and search 
intervention. Issue has been raised with regard to ??????????????????????????????????
because of its informality and implied disrespect and which has become habitual 
for police when addressing both young and older residents. It also contradicts the 
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police code of ethics (Mouhanna 2009; GN source 2). The use of modern 
technologies such as the internet, intranet and police digital radios has also been 
cited as a factor in reducing police/public contact (Mouhanna 2009). These 
advances have reduced the need for officers to engage the public in conversation 
or to ask them questions in an informal context as to their wellbeing or current 
situation. Such action, requiring little conscious effort or expense, might establish 
at least some degree of interaction or even understanding. Police officers 
complain that the public do not like speaking to the police (Mouhanna 2009; PN 
source 3) but it may be that the police are no longer in a position to listen. The 
main learning points from the 2005 operations were outlined in a European Police 
College presentation and one of the points made was that the Gendarmerie were 
at least aware ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????; GN source 2).  
The experience of the 2005 disturbances was that most of the youngsters 
involved were aged between 13 and 15 years and many were of African origin. 
Wearing light clothing, reversible jackets, hoods and face coverings and 
numbering ten to thirty in strength they engaged the police in nocturnal group 
actions. They were loosely structured, very mobile and had an intimate 
knowledge of their ground and had planned escape routes. They threw missiles 
including petrol bombs, bottles of acid and petanque boules (effectively a half 
kilo plus cannon ball). For communication they used mobile phones adroitly 
sometimes recording incidents with cameras and videos (Cepol 2006). They 
worked in an organised manner using dynamic and decentralised tactics such as 
harassment, multidirectional assaults and ambushes. Public lighting was 
neutralised and both public and private property damaged or destroyed. Acting as 
?????? ??? ????????????? ????? ?????? ???????? ?????? ???????? ??? ??????? ????????
opportunities (Cepol 2006; GN source 2).  
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At Villiers le Bel the levels of organisation were even more evident. The 
degree of preparedness shown by the youths was surprising. At very short notice, 
some wearing their own versions of protective equipment (sports padding), they 
went to rendezvous points, armed themselves with missiles, petrol bombs, blunt 
instruments and even samurai swords, meat cleavers, kitchen knives, sharpened 
screwdrivers and files and used them to attack ?government staff? including 
firemen, paramedics and police (PN source 4; PN ppt. 2008).  Some had tanks of 
petrol ready and ?pouring gasoline (onto the road surfaces) was standard 
operating procedure to prevent the use of tear gas grenades? (PN ppt. 2008) in the 
knowledge that the police could not fire them in that situation because of the 
potential for the canisters to ignite the petrol vapours (PN source 4; PN ppt. 
2008). Even allowing that all of this was true it needs to be remembered that the 
hard core of criminally intent youths amounted to only a small percentage of the 
crowds. Most were there for the thrill of it or had simply become caught up in the 
moment (Bronner 2006b). 
The experiences of the youth living in these areas was that they were 
subject to stop and search by the police regularly, frequently and unnecessarily 
with these interactions often taking a long time. Also these interventions had 
been getting ?rougher and rougher? over time and the perceived unfairness 
discredited the police, and hence the state legitimacy, in their eyes (Ford 2005).  
Recent figures released in an Open Society Institute study show that in Paris, 
black people are overall six times more likely than whites to be stopped by the 
police,  with Arabs generally over seven times more likely to be apprehended 
(Goris et al 2009). This study also showed that there is a strong relationship 
???????? ?? ???????? ???nic appearance and style of dress, and the likelihood of 
being stop checked, suggesting that police officers make ready links between a 
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??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? (Goris et al 2009), rather 
than basing such judgements on behaviour.  
Youths in Villiers le Bel were quoted as saying ?the police treat us like 
animals each day. Now they have declared war. Well, they can have a war? 
(Lichfield 2007). This hatred of the police seems to have been borne out by the 
extreme nature of the violence experienced at Villiers le Bel, which included the 
deliberate use of firearms. This in turn drew a cautionary response from a police 
union spokesperson who asserted that a line had been crossed and a guerrilla war 
was taking place, and that whilst police officers have worked hard to avoid using 
excessive force they would not be able to avoid responding if people shoot at 
them (Sciolino 2007). The police did discharge firearms in self-‐defence at Villiers 
le Bel and at Grigny the following year (Bronner 2008; Jobard et al 2009 p242), 
which suggests that criminal use of firearms within a public disorder situation is 
not such a rare event nowadays, a worrying development and one that will 
doubtless eventually result in the serious injury or death of both police officers 
and members of the public. In an international symposium presentation on urban 
violence a French magistrate concerned about this escalation of violence was 
quoted:  
Torching a school, a library, a police station or other buildings is now 
almost considered as routine. However, the second night at Villiers le Bel 
showed an escalation in violence, that media and government will be 
reluctant to publicize, but which might be a new step, the use of 
firearms... Apparently, from riot to riot, tactics are getting harder, 
methods are becoming increasingly professional and police and 
gendarmerie will probably face urban guerrilla experts, ruthlessly willing 
to use firearms (PN ppt. 2008) 
 
Murderous intent was also evidenced by other means: 
Offenders even used improvised explosives and handmade grenade 
launchers (fireworks, agricultural hail bombs), in an attempt to cumulate 
blast and fragments effects in this anti-‐ personnel role. Some domestic gas 
canisters or fire extinguishers were loaded with nails... an improvised 
blasting device (PN ppt. 2008) 
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On the 8th May 2007 police were engaged by a gang of thirty to forty youths 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
what was described as a ?particularly tough? confrontation. Stones and petrol 
bombs were thrown at the police and they opened fire discharging between seven 
and nine .357 calibre magnum rounds at the youths (Bronner 2008). The rules of 
engagement are well defined and levels of justification for use of what amounts 
to lethal force are the highest. Even where the police perception of threat is such 
that they think it necessary to open fire to protect their own lives in such 
situations, when they do, no matter how well aimed a shot might be the nature of 
violent disorder is such that targets move very quickly and there is potential for 
innocent people to be hurt. Developments such as these are bound to impact upon 
both the political and operational dimensions of policing public order and police 
tactics are constantly evolving to meet such new threats.  
The strategy of space saturation employed when units of EGM or CRS are 
deployed minimises the potential for this kind of incident and, as Mouhanna points 
out, the broad aim of the French riot police includes preventing:  
... deaths occurring as a result of police actions. This objective is partly 
humanitarian but is also political in orientation: public authorities have 
long appreciated that the violent deaths of demonstrators are capable of 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
their lives. The prime goal of the riot police is therefore always to arrest 
the rioters without ever killing or seriously wounding them... [they] have 
generally succeeded...  (2009 p175) 
 
At this interactional level it is clear that the relationship between the police and 
banlieue youth is one of mutual fear and hatred. The police are targeted by the 
youths and they in turn are seen as enemies of society. Consideration of the 
?quality of interaction between the police and relevant civilians? (Waddington D 
2010 p 346) shows that the only contact between the two groups is conflictual and 
usually to do with stop and search or arrest.  
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Summary 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
public disorder in France, concentrating on the disorders of 2005 and 2007. 
Adherence to the structure of the model has ensured consideration at each level. 
The interdependence of the seven levels is very apparent and the inevitable 
overlap was anticipated.  Globalisation of world markets saw a vast reduction in 
manufacturing jobs in post industrial France, leaving huge numbers of the 
unskilled immigrant workforce without gainful employment. Subsequent years of 
suburban decay and growing socio-‐political problems have made their mark. 
Ethnic segregation underscored by poverty, unemployment and insecurity has left 
the residents feeling politically and socially excluded and powerless. This 
geographic and social distance is exacerbated by poor lines of communication 
with city centres and potential sources of employment. Social and educational 
support is scant and people are victims of employment discrimination. 
Government policies have not worked; the politique de la ville that is imposed 
from above means that residents have little or no influence over their own lives. 
Recent hard line immigration policies and the political currency of being 
tough on crime have resulted in a hardening of police attitudes and the youth of 
the banlieues are seen by the police as social enemies of the state. There is no 
community policing and the police are seen as agents of state repression. Former 
president ?????????? ???????????? ???????? ???? ??????? ???????es has ensured that 
the police concentrate on enforcement rather than problem solving.  The police 
ultimately have little influence on the policies that they must enforce. They and 
the people that they police both wrestle with the duality of the republican ideal. 
The marginalised populations of the banlieues have no faith in the justice system.   
Educational failure and unemployment and parental weakness are 
responsible for the development of the youth gang culture. Gang membership 
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gives young males a form of social standing and self esteem in the absence of any 
other respectability. Many of them resort to criminality and drug trafficking in the 
parallel economies that have developed. Gang culture, inter gang violence and 
criminality are rife in the banlieues.  
Islamic extremism is doubtless present in these areas but is not a major 
factor. Islamic culture is probably more of a moderating influence than a problem. 
The police are despised by the banlieue youth and become the common enemy 
when attending incidents. All involved are bound up in a spiral of hatred, racism 
and violence. 
The history of negative experiences between the police and residents has 
seen a steady worsening of community relations and government policy has 
stepped further away from community policing preferring a more ?muscular? 
approach to urban violence. An apparent lack of formal and informal 
communication further restricts community relations and the police suffer 
because of the consequent lack of community intelligence. Past media 
exploitation of political, religious, economic and social frustrations has increased 
tensions and this was a significant factor leading up to the 2005 disturbances, 
since when a greater understanding of media effect has developed. The spatial 
and social segregation of the banlieue populations might have been achieved 
unintentionally by government policy and an architecture that was of its time, but 
the locations and geography of the banlieues makes them ideal gang territories or 
????????? 
The police are agents of the republic and operations are directed by the 
Préfet. The police are not accountable to the public. Community policing in its 
usual conception is not a priority the emphasis being on public safety and the 
maintenance of order. Police contact with local youths is largely only through stop 
and search or arrest interventions and there has been a significant escalation in 
179 
 
levels of violence aimed at patrolling police officers. The police have deemed it 
necessary to invest in better defensive and offensive police equipment and 
methods of electronic communication rather than in community relations, which 
has a strategic fit with tougher state policies aimed at urban violence. These 
developments also mean that police officers have even less reason to speak to 
members of the public.  
The national structure of the PN and GN provides for ready availability of 
mobile public order forces, which means that when necessary large numbers of 
police can flood an area. The offence of attroupement provides the police with a 
legal remedy for unlawful assemblies and tactical options such as tear gas are 
used frequently.  
Black and Arab youths have been shown to be far more likely to be stopped 
by the police than white youths on the basis of their appearance rather than their 
behaviour. It is clear that the relationship between the police and suburban youth 
is one of mutual fear and hatred. The police are targeted by the youths and they 
in turn are seen as enemies of society. Contact between the two groups is usually 
conflictual and the deaths of youths resulting from any kind of police presence 
results in violent disturbances, such as those at Clichy sous Bois and Villiers le Bel 
that have clearly shown that banlieue youths did target the police and that there 
had been an escalation in the levels of violence used. The deliberate use of high 
powered firearms against the police lines at Villiers le Bel evidences an intent 
that has been likened to a guerrilla war; the potential for serious injury or death 
on both sides is of public concern.  
The recent political trend in France has been towards a more zero 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
crime and urban violence. This, when considered alongside the previous 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????, was bound 
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to impact upon the policing style adopted by officers on the ground. Community 
?????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????? ????? ??? ??????, and 
been ditched in favour of a more politically advantageous, punitive but less 
socially aware, structure and agency. It remains to be seen how the residents of 
?????????????????????????????????????s????????and more ?muscular? approach of the 
BST.   
 The central and critical theme of this analysis is the effect of the ????????
centralised control of the police and the lack of structural links with the 
communities of the banlieues. There is no meaningful ideology of consensual 
policing. Policing is part of a policy of state control that is well established, but 
fallacious and unsatisfactory to those on the margins of society. The police in 
France appear to be purely reactive and in a general sense remote and distant 
from the citizens. Consequently there are few, if any, lines of communication 
between them. For the residents of the banlieues this, ultimately failed 
relationship, does not bode well for the future. 
Whilst the forces of law and order are well structured and situated to be 
able to react and deal with outbreaks of disorder, there seems to be little in the 
way of preventative measures. Such measures as exist amount to no more than 
the threat of significant and sometimes lengthy but not permanent police 
occupation of the territories in question, and are focused upon law enforcement 
rather than problem solving. It seems evident that if the police in France are to 
be successful in improving public confidence and lowering crime rates, they need 
to be allowed to develop working relationships with the people they police. 
Somewhat paradoxically, this seems to be more the case in rural, rather than 
urban areas, where gendarmes appear to be in harmony with the residents of 
smaller towns and villages and can be seen buying their baguettes and drinking 
coffee with the locals. Such a relationship with the communities of the banlieues 
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seems impossible without a sea change in state policy, which would allow those 
communities a political voice, and the police to formulate their own strategies, 
based upon community intelligence and needs.  
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Chapter Six 
Case Study: Disorder in Britain 
From April to July 2001, the northern English towns of Oldham, Burnley 
and Bradford saw violent confrontations between young Asians and the 
police, culminating in the clashes of 7-‐9 July in Bradford in which 200 
police officers were injured (Kundnani 2001).  
Introduction 
In order to analyse public order policing in Britain, this chapter considers the 
urban violence that took place in Bradford on the 7th July 2001. Whilst public 
disorder incidents have occurred in Britain since that date, at the time of the 
empirical research, that ?????????? ??????? in Bradford were the most recent, 
significant and sustained urban disorder occurring on mainland Britain to have 
been widely reported. It was also the catalyst for changes to police public order 
command doctrine. This chapter examines those disturbances, applying an 
analytical framework, an adapted form of ????????????????????????????????????, 
described earlier in this thesis. It draws upon published academic studies and 
media sources which have analysed, or reported on, the events of that day.    
Importantly for this study, it also includes the experiences of police officers who 
were involved in the disturbances in a number of strategic, tactical and 
operational roles. At the time of the research the author was still a serving police 
officer and a public order specialist; as such he was an ?inside insider? and had 
privileged access to sources. Consequently, this study also draws upon the 
experience and knowledge of several highly qualified public order policing 
practitioners who have been instrumental in dictating present policy and practice.  
The popular press often use the term riot to describe inner city or other 
disturbances, and there has been some debate as to whether or not such 
terminology is fair or accurate. It is suggested that the term violent urban protest 
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is a better framing concept for the interpretation of such incidents (Farrar 2002), 
and this study will resist the use of riot as a general descriptor in deference to the 
legal definition of riot as being ?twelve or more persons present together...for a 
common purpose? (Blackstones 2009 4.6.4 p222) which is used as the national 
charging standard in any criminal case of riot. In the following, the terms 
disorder, disturbance, violence, protest or other descriptors will be used 
interchangeably as appropriate.  
 In order to supply the data required for a Flashpoints analysis some 
history, and contextual description is necessary. To this end a summary of 
significant events leading up to the Bradford disorder will be provided, along with 
relevant social and demographic information. Some discussion of similar incidents 
that took place in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley prior to the 7th July will assist in 
this aim.   
When discussing earlier disorders that took place in Bradford in 1995 (not 
covered in this paper) Bagguley and Hussain make the important point that ?one 
of the distinctive features of Bradford in comparison to Burnley and Oldham is 
that it has a more widely known history of troubled political conflict involving the 
mobilisation of South Asian Muslims? (2008 p50) and their research rightly includes 
the views of Muslims of Pakistani origin because religion is an important factor 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
sense of cultural identity? (Waddington D et al 2009 p74). This assists with 
understanding at the cultural, situational and contextual levels of analysis.  
The series of disorders that took place later in 2001, sometimes called the 
Milltown Riots (Kaufman 2008 p13; Waddington D 2001) occurred in northern 
towns with similar ?post industrial ethnoscapes? (Bagguley and Hussain 2008 p39) 
and ?cannot be divorced from a context in which minority ethnic communities 
were alarmed by the mobilisation of neo-‐fascists such as the BNP and the National 
184 
 
Front (NF)? (Bagguley and Hussain 2008 p2). Bagguley and Hussain go on to say 
that ?perhaps the most important features of the events prior to the riots were 
the role of the mobilisation of the far right and the South Asian ???????????? 
perceptions of the failure of the police to deal with this. In each case the details 
differ but these two common threads run throughout? (Bagguley and Hussain 2008 
-‐ emphasis added).  
Bradford April 2001  
 On Sunday, 15th April 2001, disturbances occurred in the Lidget Green area 
of Bradford. These were reported to have started as a result of insults directed at 
some Asian (Hindu) men in a public house by a number of white football 
supporters. Also in that public house were a number of guests, celebrating the 
engagement of a Hindu woman to a white man, who became caught up in the 
incident (Bagguley and Hussain 2008). There has been some criticism of the 
slowness of the police response to this incident (Bagguley and Hussain 2008) but 
what ensued was a somewhat drawn out policing operation that involved up to 
200 citizens, and  attended by 130 police officers dressed in protective 
equipment. Police reports confirm that a number of incidents  took place between 
7.30pm and 11pm that evening, involving damage to four public houses, a pizza 
parlour, a hairdresser?s and a chemist??? shop. A total of ninety six crimes were 
reported in the locality for that period, including injury to a thirty eight year old 
nurse who was passing the scene in her car, plus numerous other assaults, and 
damage to fifty four cars with eight being set on fire (West Yorkshire Police 
source). These incidents are not generally seen as a precursor or causal to the 
later disorders but, as Bagguley and Hussain suggest, they  may have drawn 
Bradford to the attention of the British National Party (BNP) ?and others looking 
for local political opportunities? (2008 p55). Press reporting of the incidents such 
as ?Eight injured in Bradford Riots? (Guardian 2001) and ?Hindu wedding clash 
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sparks night of riots? (Telegraph 2001) may well have achieved this. The similarity 
and timing of the disorders that took place at Oldham and Burnley that year make 
them both contextual and potentially causal of the July disturbances at Bradford, 
and necessitates some consideration of their effect in this thesis. 
Oldham April 2001 
  A number of factors have been identified as causal in relation to the 
Oldham and Burnley disturbances (Kalra and Rhodes (2009). These are: socio-‐
economic deprivation; the presence of far right organisations; poor police-‐
community relations; competition for scarce resources; white victimisation; young 
male alienation/frustration; criminal gangs (Kalra and Rhodes 2009 p43). So these 
disturbances were more, or as much, to do with the wider social issues than 
simply the issue of race (Kalra and Rhodes 2009 p44).  
At that time Oldham was the thirty eighth most deprived district in 
England (Ahmed et al 2001). The unemployment rate for white people stood at 
four per cent. The rate amongst Pakistanis was 16 per cent and amongst 
Bangladeshis it was twenty five per cent (Vasagar and Ward 2001). The estimated 
unemployment rate for young Asian males overall was as high as forty per cent 
(Ahmed et al 2001). These high rates of unemployment were caused by the rapid 
economic changes of global capitalism, where unskilled migrant workers who had 
been recruited for the textile industry, primarily from Pakistan and Bangladesh, 
found themselves out of work because it was cheaper to employ workers in their 
own countries (Kundnani 2001). Consequently a low paid, but working community 
was ?transformed at a stroke into a severely impoverished? one (Waddington D 
2007 p91). Also Oldham had become ?synonymous with all that is seen... to be 
wrong in terms of ethnic relations? (Bagguley and Hussain 2008 p46) and racially 
motivated crime against white people was higher there than anywhere else in the 
Greater Manchester police area. These statistics were released to the press in 
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January 2001, figures which according to the Campaign against Racism and 
Fascism (CARF) were ?highly suspect? (CARF 2001). Not surprisingly the 
sensationalist reporting of these statistics raised existing tensions between white 
and South Asian communities in the town (Bagguley and Hussain 2008; Waddington 
D 2007). Media interest also increased the climate of recrimination and hostility, 
encouraging a stronger interest in Oldham as a potential area for recruitment and 
possible electoral success for the far right, notably the BNP (Bagguley and Hussain 
2008). On March 3rd 2001 Oldham ???? ???? ?????? ???? ?????????? ??????? ?????????
rally after which approximately 150 members of the audience protested, outside 
Oldham Police Station, against Asian attacks on white people. Also that month, 
gaining opposition from local trade unions, religious groups, politicians and 
community leaders, the NF announced that it intended to march through Oldham 
on the 31st March.  The media response to this should not be underestimated in its 
effect on local and national tensions (Waddington D 2007). This march was 
subsequently banned by the Home Office and did not take place.  
Press reporting of an incident that took place on 21st April further raised 
tensions locally and nationally, when a seventy six year old white Second World 
War veteran, Walter Chamberlain, was assaulted by three Asian youths whilst 
returning home from watching a rugby league match (BBC News 2001). This 
occurred ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
areas for whites in Oldham, and this assault ?crystallised all the fears that report 
invoked? ?????? ??????? ????????? ??? ??????? ?????????????? ?????? ???????? ????
bloodied face appeared on the front pages of local newspapers under 
inflammatory headlines. Whether or not it was a racially motivated attack, or 
simply a robbery, was not explicitly decided at the time, but the damage caused 
to local race relations was a reality. Right wing groups seized the opportunity to 
occupy, and fully exploit, the moral high ground. On the 24th April the BNP 
187 
 
announced that it would contest the Oldham West seat in the next General 
Election.  
A football match played between Stoke City and Oldham Athletic on the 
28th April further heightened tension. Asian shop owners had received threats of 
violence and, just prior to the match, racist chants were made by football 
hooligans towards non whites in the town centre. These supporters were then 
escorted towards the football ground by the police, who took them through the 
Asian part of town. Some managed to break away and cause damage to Asian 
shops and houses. Some locals even had to barricade themselves inside their home 
to avoid being attacked (Waddington D 2007; CARF 2001). After the game, against 
advice from community leaders, the police again escorted the supporters back 
through the Asian area. Many Asian youths came onto the streets to defend their 
area, and stones and petrol bombs were thrown. Once the football supporters had 
been removed from the area the police employed dispersal tactics, dogs and 
batons, to clear the Asian youths from the streets. Hatred of the police ???????????
?????????? amongst young Asians (CARF 2001). It was widely perceived that the NF 
and racist groups had achieved their aim of marching through an Asian area using 
the football match as the pretext (CARF 2001). 
On May 5th approximately fifty supporters of the NF journeyed to Oldham, 
arriving from the Midlands and London (CARF 2001). On this occasion the police 
prevented them from entering the Asian areas of the town, and were criticised for 
containing a rival group of demonstrators (Waddington D 2007). A number of 
racially motivated incidents occurred that bank holiday weekend and, for the rest 
of the month, right wing groups held meetings in a number of Oldham public 
houses (CARF 2001). 
   It is fair to say that the Oldham riots of the weekend of the 26th May 2001 
took place as a result of a number of factors, and were a ?manifestation of deep 
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and long-‐standing social problems related to racism and deprivation within 
communities of all ethnic backgrounds? (Ahmed et al 2001) and ?must be seen 
within a context of repeated incursions instigated by the BNP, NF and C18? (Kalra 
and Rhodes 2009 p48). That these conditions existed prior to that weekend is not 
an issue for this study, suffice it to say that many commentators on the subject 
have analysed and evidenced this to be the case (Ahmed et al 2001; Bagguley and 
Hussain 2008; Kalra and Rhodes 2009; Waddington D 2007).  
  The flashpoint for the disorders that occurred that weekend was an 
incident involving two Asian brothers aged eleven and fourteen years (Ahmed et al 
2001; Kundnani 2003; Waddington D 2007). They were walking past a chip shop 
situated on the border of two districts of the town, Roundthorn and Glodwick, 
when one of them was hit on the leg by a brick deliberately thrown at them by a 
white youth. When the injured party, accompanied by his nineteen year old 
brother, went to the house the assailant had entered, a woman living there 
became racially abusive towards them. This was aggravated by the appearance of 
a number of other Asian youths resulting in the police being called. A telephone 
call was made by the woman to her brother who was drinking in The Britannia 
public house in the town centre with a number of right wing BNP and Combat 18 
members, who were also involved with the Oldham Athletic football hooligan 
element. This group arrived in Glodwick shortly after her call, and started 
smashing the windows of Asian homes and business premises. When the police 
arrived the majority of the white offenders were arrested, but this did not stop 
numerous Asian youths coming into the area, as a result of rumours that the 
police were not stopping the white attacks. During that evening and night around 
five hundred South Asian men were involved in disorder that included building 
barricades and throwing missiles and petrol bombs at the police (Bagguley and 
Hussain 2008 p48; CARF 2001; Waddington D 2007). 
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Burnley June 2001  
 Burnley, population <90,000 inhabitants (Census 2001) was once one of 
??????????????????????rtant mill towns. The disturbances in question ?centred on 
three adjoining districts Stoneyholme, Daneshouse and Duke Bar? (King and 
Waddington 2004). Daneshouse, was the second most deprived ward in Lancashire 
and the 62nd most deprived of over 8,100 wards in England (Tyler 2001). The 
racial composition of the borough was 91.77% white and 7.16% South Asian or 
South Asian/British, predominantly of Pakistani origin. The largest religious groups 
were Christian -‐ 74.5% and Muslim 6.6% (Census 2001). The chair of the Burnley 
Task Force stated that ?increasing unemployment, derelict and outdated buildings 
and infrastructure, significant in work poverty... and an under-‐skilled workforce, 
combined with under-‐attainment at school remain key features of the local 
economy? (Clarke 2001 p8). The Asian population of Burnley was segregated along 
ethnic and cultural lines, living mainly in the Daneshouse (Pakistani) and 
Stoneyholme (Bangladeshi) areas to the north of the town centre (Bagguley and 
Hussain 2008 p48). Duke Bar situated to the east of Daneshouse, ?is more racially 
integrated than either of its neighbours? (King and Waddington 2004). 
 Segregation in housing led to segregation in education...a generation of 
whites and Asians was now growing up whose only contact with each other 
was through uncertain glances on the street or through the pages of local 
newspapers. Mutual distrust festered (Kundnani 2001). 
 
The police are reported to have estimated the State of Normality (KtP 
2007) in these areas before the disturbances as ?one in which racism was not a 
problem and was certainly less apparent than in nearby Oldham? (Waddington D 
2007 p103). The ?civil disturbance? incidents that occurred 22nd ? 25th June were 
initiated by non racist criminal acts but were aggravated by ?deliberate attempts 
to turn the violent acts into racial confrontation? (Clarke 2001 p37). The Daily 
Telegraph reported that ?the troubles in the Lancashire town were subsequently 
exploited by organised racists and fuelled by the tensions arising from grinding 
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poverty? (2001). The task force report also emphasised that the events of that 
weekend were not wholly spontaneous, and a number of people had heard that 
something was going to happen. Previous disturbances in Bradford and Oldham 
had already raised tensions, as had the BNP gaining 11% of the General Election 
vote in Burnley on 7th June. Consequently there had been a ?growing political 
disaffection within a context of high socio-‐economic deprivation; the 
weakness of the mainstream political parties and the politicization of race? 
(Rhodes 2006 p1), aggravated by the activities of the BNP and other right wing 
groups. 
Key events leading to the disturbances included a dispute between white 
and Asian neighbours, where damage was caused to property (Bagguley and 
Hussain 2008; Waddington D 2007) and an attack on an Asian taxi driver whose cab 
was vandalised by white males.  He was then struck on the head with a hammer 
by one of the group when he alighted his vehicle to inspect the damage, 
sustaining a fractured cheekbone requiring hospital treatment (Bagguley and 
Hussain 2008 ; Tyler 2001; Waddington D 2007). Unfounded rumours that the taxi 
driver died in hospital further increased tension. Attempts to defuse the situation 
failed, and later that Saturday evening a gang of white men attacked several 
Asian food takeaways. The landlord of the Duke of York Public house had closed 
the pub early because of rumours that it would be subject of an attack, and 
around 11pm, possibly as an act of revenge, approximately seventy Asian men 
broke windows and firebombed the pub.  
The Burnley disorders seem to have been detailed by very few 
commentators, and it is difficult to find precise reporting of police activity during 
the Saturday evening. There seems to have been a lapse in policing with a 
significant time lag between strategic developments and practices on the ground 
(King and Waddington D 2004). This intermittent policing may have affected the 
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perceptions of residents. If the police are not in evidence it can give the 
impression that they are unable to cope, or that they do not care, or both.  
The next day, Sunday the 24th June, the disorder continued. As a 
consequence of the closure of the Duke of York its youthful white clients moved 
to another pub, The Baltic Fleet. There they were allowed to remain outside and 
proceeded to racially abuse Asian passers-‐by. The police strategy seems to have 
been one of high profile reassurance, an objective that was not achieved 
(Waddington D 2007). The police were probably deployed in sufficient numbers to 
deal with this disruptive group but failed to deal with the situation expediently. 
The Bronze commander withdrew officers and redeployed them to other areas in 
the hoping to de-‐escalate the situation. Contrarily this ?signalled to the Asian 
communities that, since the police were apparently unwilling or ill-‐prepared to 
defend them, they would have to take their safety into their own hands? (King and 
Waddington D 2004 p134???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
also undermined police credibility in the eyes of the white youths. The lack of 
physical and moral restriction allowed them to go into the Asian areas and 
disorder occurred.  
The following day the police took a much more assertive approach and 
moved the abusive crowd from outside the pub, and then dispersed the opposing 
Asian youths whilst reassuring the residents that the white racists were no longer 
a threat (Waddington D 2007). The high levels of tension continued into the next 
day when further disorder occurred during which Shahid Malik, a well known local 
Labour Party member and son of the deputy mayor, tried to stop the violence. He 
was injured by the edge of a riot shield wielded by a ?very hyped-‐up? police 
officer dressed in riot gear, and was then arrested (BBC News 2001b).  
 The Burnley Task Force concluded that the disturbances that took place 
over the weekend of the 23rd ? 26th June 2001 were ?caused originally by criminal 
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acts followed by deliberate attempts to turn the violent acts into racial 
confrontation?, and that elements from within both white and Asian communities 
were not unprepared for the confrontations that occurred (Clarke 2001 p37). The 
BNP had established a foothold for further electoral successes in the region that 
?can be viewed as a typical case of far right breakthrough? (Rhodes 2006 p14). The 
outcomes at Oldham and Burnley had favoured right wing groups and this was a 
factor leading up to the disturbances the following month in Bradford.  
Bradford 7th July 2001 
For ease of analysis the following description of the Bradford disorder follows the 
chronology of events. It is aligned and sub headed in accordance with David 
?????????????????????????????????six levels of structuration (Waddington D 1989), 
plus an additional level that takes into account police traditions, policies and 
organisational/operational doctrine. It is not intended to provide a new detailed 
analysis of the causal, or contributory factors relating to the events of that 
weekend, but to use existing data to contextualise the policing of them. It uses 
primary data gathered in the form of semi-‐structured qualitative interviews with 
police officers who were involved. This is entirely appropriate, as the Flashpoints 
model relies upon subjective interpretations for its analysis. Nor is it intended, 
some ten years after the date, that this study will provide a definitive analysis of 
those events, particularly as other commentators have already shown it to be 
impossible to  achieve (Bagguley and Hussain 2008 ; Pearce and Bujra 2006; 
Waddington D 2010). T??? ???????????? ???????? ??????? ??? ?????????????? ???? ?????
interrelated and interdependent, thus some blurring of the boundaries will be 
apparent and indeed essential. 
193 
 
???????????????????????????????????????? 
Structural    
Bradford today is a metropolitan city and district in West Yorkshire. The 
2001 census gave its population as 467,665. The industrial revolution transformed 
a number of northern towns and Bradford, like Oldham and Burnley had benefited 
from the boom of the textile industry. From the end of World War Two in 1945 the 
textile industry began to shrink, although other industries ensured ????????????????
economy continued to grow throughout the following two decades. The success of 
the other manufacturing industries necessitated the employment, immigration 
and settlement of largely unskilled migrant workers, many from Pakistan and 
Bangladesh. The recession of the 1970s and 80s, and the globalising of markets 
brought mass unemployment to these workers who remained unemployable due to 
their unskilled status (Kundnani 2001).   
  
Figure 24. Bradford 2001 Ethnicity (Census 2001) 
It is a fact that Bradford shared many ?economic and social characteristics? with 
Oldham and Burnley (Bagguley and Hussain 2008 p63) and indeed many other 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????d in or around 
Manningham the ??????? ??? ??????????? ?????????? ?????????? (Kundnani 2003), 
which is an area of the city situated just to the north of its centre. As the above 
graph shows, the largest percentage of non ? white citizens of Bradford were of 
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Pakistani origin, and Bradford was indeed seen by them as their heartland in 
Britain, often referred to as Bradistan (Shackle 2010). 
 The earlier disorders at Oldham and Burnley had resulted from significant 
right wing activity in those areas, and the reporting of these events had doubtless 
raised tension in Asian communities around the country (Bagguley and Hussain 
2008 p107; Waddington D 2007 p18; 2010 p344) It ?????????????????????????????????
(Kundnani 2003) that the events at Bradford between the 7th and the 9th July 2001 
took place.  
As a consequence of this diversity, and the recent history of troubled 
political conflict, the policing of the communities of Bradford required an 
understanding of a variety of issues and was extremely challenging: 
 Yes, disengagement and exclusion is not just down to the police 
and you can see that from Scarman... w?? ?????? ????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????? ????? ????? ???? ?????? ????? ????? ?? ?????? ????????????? ????? ????????
places to go, that there's adequate public transport, that people have 
money (Interview 3). 
 
It was also recognised by senior officers that policing areas such as Manningham 
was very much linked to global events in a globalising world: 
 Actually that really came home to me when I started to work in 
Bradford...  world events were triggering local responses... for example, 
flooding that happens in a coastal village in Bangladesh has an impact on 
local communities.  You realise how interconnected everything is in that 
sense as shock waves run through the community (Interview 4).   
Such connectedness also shows how the macro levels of analysis are closely linked 
to the micro levels, and this is reflected in a necessary degree of flexibility 
between the levels in this thesis. 
West Yorkshire Police had invested a great deal of time and resources into 
the policing of Bradford, and there were a number of police and community 
initiatives already running prior to the disorders of 2001. It is apparent that these 
were not as well developed, or as well understood as part of the policing function 
as they are today; nor, in fairness, had the decision makers of that time benefited 
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from the results of enquiry and research carried out by the Burnley Task Force, 
Herman Ouseley or Ted Cantle that were initiated by that series of disturbances: 
 I think the context community intelligence was being kicked around then.  
???? ????? ????????? ??????? ????????? ??? ??? ??????? ????? ???? ??? ????? ??????
ongoing which came on the back of it, of course, which we now take for 
granted I guess (Interview 4). 
 
[regarding tension indicators] ?????????????????????????????????????????????
honest.  I had been out of Bradford for a couple of years because I was on 
the Operational Support Unit at the time so whether things had developed 
I never really recall any great play being made on signal crime??? ? ????????
think we were very sophisticated around the intelligence model (Interview 
8).   
 
Another interviewee, a senior police commander, noted the importance of 
recording and reacting to community issues saying that, whilst there is still some 
way to go in this regard, the police are reliant upon the interpretation of 
community information if they are to be prepared, and that often what is viewed 
as ?tittle tattle? can be essential to that understanding. Events and issues can 
change the mood in a community very quickly and close contact between them 
and the police is important: 
I think its key that we have neighbourhood policing...  ????? ???????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????? ??? ???????? ? ????? ????? ?mportant that commanders have an 
understanding of communities...  at any given time. As things start to 
????????????? ???????????? ???? ??? ????????? ????? ??? ????????? ?????????? ????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in the tactical units, the support groups, bringing those into a community 
will alienate the community (Interview 2). 
 
This section has focused on relevant macro-‐sociological factors, inequalities, 
political powerlessness, social exclusion and collective grievances (Waddington D 
2010 p344). It can be seen that the factors surrounding the South Asian 
community living in the Manningham area of Bradford were distinct. There were 
evident material inequalities and relationships with the authorities, notably the 
police, were strained. Even though this had been recognised by the police and 
they had made genuine efforts to improve the relationship there were still 
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significant underlying grievances relating to lack of political influence, social 
exclusion and deprivation. Consideration of these structural factors is useful, 
overlapping with and contextualising the following levels of analysis. 
Political/Ideological  
This level of structuration is concerned with the way key political and ideological 
institutions including the police, respond to groups or communities objectives and 
needs (Waddington D 2010 p 344); therefore the policing style operated by West 
Yorkshire Police in Bradford during the years, months and days leading up to and 
during the disturbances of July 2001 is an important factor. At that time police 
officers viewed a posting to Bradford, and in particular areas of it such as 
Manningham, as a form of punishment, a difficult and conflictual area to police, 
and one to be avoided if at all possible; this would seem to have resulted in a 
???????????????????????????????? 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to be there and you see the community that you are policing as a problem 
??????????????????????????????????????????erview 8). 
Nobody wants to work in Bradford in West Yorkshire so you get a pot for 
crap officers; you get posted there for punishment. ..If you have bad 
policing on top of all those social and economic issues it amplifies it out of 
all recognition and I think that's where you get all those trigger points 
(Interview 3). 
These feelings were repeated in a number of other interviews which gave 
interesting insights into police styles on the ground.  A posting to Bradford was 
often involuntary, thus creating a feeling of antipathy and conflict. There was 
little support amongst officers for community policing, which they described as 
the ???????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????? style. In everyday 
police community relations terms, it was yet another information and intelligence 
gathering opportunity that was ignored, which also showed ??????????????????????
relationship manifested itself generally. The result was that the policing style, at 
that time, did little to defuse tension in situations of disorder.  Interviews 
197 
 
suggested that policing technique has moved on since then, but the policing style 
of that period was not conducive to negotiated solutions, or to defusing tension.  
The local community were well aware of this policing style and reacted 
accordingly. One commander described Bradford as ?racially emotive and highly 
politicised? (Confidential document). In sum, political and ideological factors 
helped to shape, in general terms, the style adopted by the West Yorkshire Police, 
which was generally of a reactive nature, with officers attending calls in vehicles, 
dealing with the incident and then leaving; it was enforcement of the law rather 
than relationship building and problem solving at the vital day to day level. This 
left them ill-‐equipped to deal with situations of public disorder of the magnitude 
that occurred at Bradford in 2001.  
Cultural 
The cultural level can be said to be different to the political/ideological level, in 
that it refers to local views and approaches born of shared experiences that 
amount to ingredients of a shared identity. Reference has been made to the local 
history of political conflict involving a community that had a South Asian, Muslim 
identity (Bagguley + Hussain 2008 p50; Waddington D et al 2009 p74).  
The policing of public order is considered to be ?singularly the most 
sensitive of issues? (Jordan 2007) and this was reinforced more recently: ?Public 
order is still absolutely critical... It certainly is our number one sensitivity... and 
remains so? (Interview 5).  As such, in multi-‐cultural Britain, sympathetic policing 
is necessary if the avoidance of increased tension in critical areas is to be 
achieved.  How policing style can affect relationships has been touched on above, 
and it is very important that police strategists get this right if they are to police 
according to Peelian principles. The style of policing employed in any given area 
will stem from the strategic direction given by Chief Constables. When asked how 
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important an issue public order is for Chief Officers, another interviewee put it 
this way: 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
disorder for about 5 or 6 years.  Inevitably the focus shifts on to other 
things...  performance issues... the focus had shifted. I think if you want 
evidence of lack of commitment, you look at the attendance rates on West 
Yorkshire police on public order training...  How important a focus was it 
for senior managers?  I would say not very because it was not the thing 
that was grabbing our attention at the time (Interview 4).   
?????? ????????? ???????? ??????????? ???? ?????????? ????????? ??????? ??? ????? ????, 
shifting priorities towards a more performance driven style of policing. Investment 
in public order training, at least in West Yorkshire Police, had consequently 
waned. The necessity for deployment of units from out of force was seen as an 
embarrassment, and directly linked to the fact that public order policing had been 
low on the list of financial priorities. It is fair to assert that had greater 
investment in training and equipment been made, those local officers who were 
deployed on that day were likely to have been better equipped, commanded and 
more able to deal with the disorder that occurred.  
Respondents talked of the media coverage of the issues in Bradford, which 
they felt had further marginalised those who lived there. The wider British 
??????????????????????????????????????sian community was affected, and Bradford 
was viewed very negatively because of its poverty and perceived hostile cultural 
environment. Reporting of right wing political activity, notably of the BNP, as well 
as the attitude of local football hooligans had amplified existing cultural tensions. 
Local (Manningham) Asian youths felt alienated by police attitudes and this 
disconnection resulted in an absence of dialogue, engendering a deeper lack of 
trust, the police being seen as the servants to right wing politics:  
...the penny just had not dropped with these youths who saw the police 
and fascists as almost like a united body. That was really disappointing 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
march on the streets and it was that sort of representation and that 
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isolated incident of dislocation between that particular community and the 
police (Interview 3).  
 
 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????being 
under constant threat of attack. Bradford was: 
?a bit of a powder keg in relation to the approach of policing there... you 
had issues... police officers coming under attack or being threatened or 
going to places in larger numbers than you would normally do to deal with 
incidents? (Interview 3).  
 
Officers coming in from outside the area were not aware of how ?out of kilter??
this relationship has become and found that, even when policing celebratory 
events such as Mela, totally innocent interventions, such as a police officer 
holding the hand of a missing Asian toddler whilst en route to a place of safety, 
could be misinterpreted very quickly and volatile crowd control situations develop 
without warning (Interview 3). 
 Some officers were of the opinion that the Asian youths were caught 
between two cultures in that ?????? ?????? ??????? ????????? ????? ?????? ?????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????? ?????????...? (Interview 8). Young Asians born and brought up in Britain 
were also acutely aware of their inequality of employment opportunity and how 
they were not the ?favoured people?. Local officers did not fully understand the 
depth of this disenfranchisement, the sensitivity of the police to these social 
factors being not as sophisticated as it has since become. 
This was seen as a factor in the policing of the area, when officers from 
out of force were deployed without local command as part of mutual aid 
agreements. One interviewee linked this to his earlier experiences saying ?the 
???????? ?????? ???? ???? ??? ????? ????? ??? ???? ???????? ??????? ??????... that people 
police without context... If you burn out your local staff you lose all your 
contexts? (Interview 6). 
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So from the perspective of officers that policed the disorders of July 2001 this 
Cultural level of analysis does seem important. The shared ways of life and 
attitudes that different groups subscribe to (Waddington D 2010) and their 
behaviour towards one another contributes to the creation of a climate for 
conflict. ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
next section.  
Contextual 
The ?active communication processes that are liable to intensify the emotional 
significance of a potentially disorderly encounter? such as a history of negative 
relations with the police, negative media reporting, inflammatory rumours and 
anticipation of violence (Waddington D 2010 p345) are considered in this section. 
 It has already been mentioned in the Political/Ideological and Cultural 
sections of this analysis that the media reporting of the events earlier in the year 
at Burnley, Oldham and Bradford, particularly regarding inter-‐racial incidents, had 
ensured that ethnic tensions had increased. The communication processes 
between the police and the Asian community of Bradford, particularly the 
residents of Manningham, were dysfunctional and this is corroborated by a number 
of sources. There was a ?community wide dissatisfaction with the police? linked to 
a perceived poor quality of service provided by them (Bagguley and Hussain 2008 
p103). The role of the media in reporting the recent Burnley and Oldham 
disturbances as well as the Lidget Green incident in Bradford had resulted in a 
general distrust of police by Bradford Asians (Bagguley and Hussain 2008  p107). 
One police commander further confirmed this, expressing exasperation at the way 
even minor incidents were reported in the press as race riots: ?negatively, 
absolutely negatively!, race riots, immediately there are headlines when we have 
minor disorders? (Interview 4). The media were responsible for transmitting 
rumours regarding BNP and NF demonstrations that fuelled local suspicions and 
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fears (Interviews 3, 4, 6). Whereas all the hard work, successfully carried out by 
the police and the local council, getting the march banned by the Home Secretary 
and that was the subject of official media releases, went unnoticed in the 
??????????????????????cident. Rumour had trumped accurate information, which in 
Bagguley and Hussain?s words, affected the actions of a group towards whom 
there was already considerable hostility and aggression (2008 p19). 
Manningham was well known for high levels of criminality, a locality that 
accommodated drug dealing and prostitution. The police had made concerted 
efforts to eradicate these problems and had managed to reduce overt drug 
dealing. Due to its well known problems, Manningham was policed regularly, but 
the potential for improving working relationships between police officers and 
community contacts whilst fighting crime on their behalf was missed. It is 
probable that cooperative relationships could have made a difference at the time 
of the later disorder. The very formal nature of interactions that did take place 
militated against communication of a more informal and direct nature. This may 
have given police commanders a clearer understanding of the potential for 
community disorder, and the need to broaden their focus:  
we assumed that we would be preventing a disorder between the far right 
???? ???? ???? ????? ???? ?? ?????? ????????? ???? ???? ?????? ?????????? ??? ??????
somebody we would end up fighting with but the far right came and went, 
the far left came and went and then the community ended up fighting the 
police and I do remember thinking, how has this happened, we were 
supposed to be here stopping the Anti-‐Nazi League having a go at the BNP 
and vice versa.  I think we missed the obvious bit (Interview 8). 
Bagguley and Hussain highlight the failed relationship between the community and 
the police and the controversial role of ?an unrepresentative self-‐perpetuating 
elite?? performing the role of community leaders (2008 p110) as central to the 
problem. This was confirmed by a police interview source: 
... I think there was a degree of community engagement by the police but 
whether we were engaging with the right people is a good question 
because quite often, and particularly in Asian communities, people put 
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themselves forward as being representatives of that community, they are 
not necessarily representative of anybody but themselves... (Interview 8). 
 Had better lines of communication been available more explicit messages could 
have been conveyed by the police about their intentions regarding the NF and the 
violence that took place may have been prevented (Bagguley and Hussain 2008 
p68). There were a number of police initiatives in place that should have assisted 
in this regard, such as neighbourhood renewal, the council neighbourhood forums, 
and the Bradford Minority/Police Liaison Group. Whilst none of these prevented 
the disorder, they did perform an important role in the rebuilding process 
afterwards.  
Other commentators recognised that the police had indeed ?made sincere 
efforts? to improve relationships in Bradford (Bujra and Pearce 2009 p62) and 
initiatives such as the Minorities Police Liaison Committee and an embedded 
projects officer in the Community Involvement Unit  was in place, but had limited 
success ?particularly with regard to Muslim youth?. They also commented that 
?????? ????? ???? ??????? ??????? ???? ????? ?????? ????? ???? ????????? ???????????? ???????
stratifications that conferred power upon the upper caste elders (Bujra and 
Pearce 2009 p61). 
From this analysis it is apparent that, during the build up to the serious 
????????? ?????? ??? ???? ???? ???? ??? ???? ????????? ??????????? ???? ???????????
??????????????????????????who were sought out and asked to assist by the police 
were unlikely to have been very productive when trying to negotiate a peaceful 
resolution with the younger members of their community. It can also be seen that 
the communication structures in place at that time were inadequate, and that 
this enabled the power of rumour to mislead all parties involved. The media 
reporting of previous disorders had heightened tensions, and the lack of workable 
communication processes had frustrated the flow of information and intelligence, 
which could have been crucial to the police decision making process. 
203 
 
It is becoming increasingly clear that, with the possible exception of the 
???????????????? ???? ???? ??????? ??? ???? ????????????? ????????? ???? ???????????
contextual, ???????????? ????? ???????? ?????? ??? ????????? ???????? ??? ????? ??? ????????
Perhaps a more appropriate de????????? ?????? ??? ???? ??? ???????????????
??????????. This is a discussion that will be returned to later.  
Situational  
This level of structuration seeks to explain ?situationally specific spatial or social 
determinants of disorder? and includes such ingredients as how the area lends 
itself to dispersal of crowds, or police surveillance and the symbolic nature of the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????It has 
been observed that the ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of Manningham and Bradford as imaginary spaces of diasporic belonging has been 
found to be central to... accounts of how the riot developed? (Bagguley and 
Hussain 2008 p77). The idea of ???????????????? is symbolically significant and 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????  
It is also important to take account of the police view, or indeed 
sensitivities, with reference to the possibility that any given geographical area 
?????? ??? ?? ???? ???? ????. Only one respondent entertained the idea of their 
existence in police terms and equivocated with ?probably? (Interview 2). Others 
said things such as ??? ?????? ????? ??? ??? ?????????? ????????????? ??? ?????????? ???
getting in th???? ???? ????????? ????? ????? ??????????? ???? ?????????? ?????? ????
(Interview 15); ???? ?????? ????? ????? ??????????? ???? and ?????? ??? ???????? ??????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????. The evidence then is 
that police officers are generally ??????????????????????????????????????????????
exist and the police service will work hard to ensure that they do not, even if that 
means employing a more robust policing style than usual or the use of specialist 
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officers and tactics. Personal decisions are significantly dependent upon ones 
social environment and cultural perceptions (Sampson 2010). 
Other cultural but situationally?specific spatial factors around the policing 
of Manningham had also been recognised by the West Yorkshire Police, and most 
certainly by operational officers. One respondent described police stations as 
fortresses (Interview 3). Another how the police station in Manningham was a ?big 
ugly building? with a security wall around it, built on the top of a hill (Interview 
8). In this respondents view, the community it served ?hated it? because 
symbolically it sat above them; a physical barrier between them and the police. 
Frequently missiles would be thrown over the walls and local delegations would 
often gather outside when an arrest had been made (Interview 8). 
Existing structures within West Yorkshire Police regarding the 
identification and collation of tension indicators, or signal crimes that may have 
assisted in the development of strategies aimed at the prevention of disorder, or 
at least intervention at the earliest opportunity, were also under-‐developed at 
that time. It was felt by some respondents that whilst systems were in place that 
should have taken account of signal crimes and events, they were not very 
sophisticated. Also whilst officers seemed distinctly aware of tension indicators 
and the potential for flashpoints, at no point in the build up to the disorder on the 
7th July 2001 was there any mention from within the Asian community of the 
potential for a riot. Which is a little surprising when weighed against Bagguley and 
?????????? ???????? ??? ???? ???????????? ??????? ???? ???????????? ??????? ???? ??????
community that Bradford would follow ?in the wake of events in Oldham? (2008 
p66). Tension indicators were being recorded by WYP??? ??????????? ?????????????
??????? ????????????????????????already been set up, but it  was a new initiative 
and not yet as fully developed or as sophisticated as it needed to be. It is 
probable that this lack of structure caused important information to be missed.  
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It seems evident that the main factor for the increased tension in Bradford 
was the intended National Front march through its streets. This came on a wave 
of increasing support for the NF in the region, after the well reported unrest and 
urban violence in Lidget Green, Oldham and Burnley. It can be argued that West 
Yorkshire Police should have been better prepared to deal with protest and 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 2007) for the area 
is viewed as vital by police officers, and dictates the policing style. Whilst this 
was known in Bradford, it is possible that the knowledge was taken for granted, 
and hindsight suggests that a lot of significant happenings went unnoticed by the 
police. That said, the WYP operational review of the Bradford disorder states that 
?a medium rather than low level of community tension is regarded as the norm. 
Prior to the events of Saturday 7th July this medium tension had risen to high? 
(Police source 2009). Given this awareness of the potential for disorder, at least 
between the left and right wing, it could be argued that better contingency 
planning should have been made for  local community involvement in the Anti-‐
Nazi League demonstration  scheduled to take place in Centenary Square that 
day. Officers present recall that members of that organisation were indeed 
responsible for inflaming feelings within the crowd (Interview 7). 
In any event the NF march was cancelled under a Home Office ban, and 
the police ensured that no NF members were allowed to enter Bradford. Another 
reason, or source of raised tension, was that the final day of the Bradford Festival 
had been cancelled on the grounds that the NF might attend regardless of the ban 
(Bagguley and Hussain 2008 p66). This was identified as contributory, albeit after 
the event, by at least one senior commander who stated that this may have given 
the impression that it was done to avoid the need to deal with the real issues. 
Public perceptions were that the police were powerless to stop the NF coming to 
Bradford, even though they had in fact been stopped (Interview sources 3, 7; 
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Bagguley & Hussain 2008). Police resources for the protest comprised eleven 
??????? ???????? ????????, and many other police support officers, with the 
operation being run from a command centre at the Tyrls police station that had 
views over much of the city centre. 
  Officers were drafted in from all over the West Yorkshire police area for 
this Anti-‐Nazi League counter demonstration at Centenary Square, many coming 
on duty at 0700hrs for their briefing at Bradford Central at 0800hrs. Even so, 
there were definite feelings of foreboding amongst operational officers. The 
briefing given that morning, to an unusually very silent group of officers, was 
different to others in that it was obvious that all was not well (Interview 3).  
The briefing made it clear that no NF or BNP supporters were going to be 
allowed to enter Centenary Square. During subsequent interviews  of officers 
concerned, no mention was made of any reference to the policing style advised 
for  that day; it is however, recognised by police officers who were there, that 
such direction is necessary in order for them to  be able to respond appropriately 
in line with the planned strategy. It gives them context or structure for their 
agency.  
The geography of Bradford is suc???????????????????????????????????????????????
going uphill. The main route towards the Yorkshire Dales is the A6181/6144, which 
takes the following roads out of the city centre: Westgate into White Abbey Rd 
and then along Whetley Hill through the Manningham area. These are busy, fairly 
wide roads that climb a significant gradient towards the city boundary. There are 
many side junctions into housing estates and business premises. Any police crowd 
dispersal operation along these roads would be tactically challenging and 
extremely physically demanding, especially so on a hot ???????? day (see Fig. 
25).   
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Figure 25. White Abbey Road (BBC News 2001d) 
 
Institutional/Organisational  
If we wish to explain why the police behave in a certain way we need to consider 
not only the circumstances in which they act (Waddington PAJ 1999a) but also 
what conventions drive their agency. This study requires a further level of analysis 
to provide greater understanding. Indeed David Waddington himself sees value in 
a seventh level focusing ?on such recognised influences on police behaviour as 
national traditions of policing? (2010 p346). These include structures and doctrine 
affecting police agency such as public accountability, policing philosophies and 
standard operating procedures (Waddington D 2010) as well as the rule of law. 
The core doctrine in public order policing is the ACPO Manual of Guidance on 
Keeping the Peace (KtP), which in 2001 had recently replaced the previous 
manual. 100% of respondents cited KtP as their guide, which is presently in its 
third edition.    
 The British model of policing has already been described as based upon the 
nine points of the law or Peelian Principles that esta?????????????????????????????
1829. On joining the police service officers are taught that, first and foremost, 
their role is the protection of life and property, and the prevention and detection 
of crime. This was reflected by all respondents, with a Chief Constable saying ?I 
go straight back to Rowan and Mayne because the role of police in society has not 
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changed since the original formation of the police service?.  It is from those 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????developed, with 
the belief amongst police officers that they are part of a society  in which they 
perform a role for the greater good. This in turn has ?????????? ?? ????? ????
approach based on pragmatism and positivism that, over time, saw the police 
become ??????????????????????????????????????? issues that are often impossible to 
resolve readily. Countless policies have been developed by forces to deal with 
such issues, to the extent that policy often seems to trump decisions. 
 There are many well discussed and documented drivers of police agency, 
but the rule of law imperative is central to operational practice, and ignorance of 
the law is never acceptable as a defence for police errors. Ethical and 
professional standards have become more defined, with accountability and 
transparency given greater importance. Bodies such as the IPCC, force 
professional standards departments, HMIC and NPIA serve to ensure accountability 
and sanction where necessary, which can be linked to police officers? strong 
desire to avo?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Necessity and proportionality have always been the main considerations regarding 
police use of force or restriction. This is reflected in doctrine, and the Human 
Rights Act 1998 has defined this in law.  
 Many such factors impacted on police agency during the disorder of 7th July 
2001. Respondents articulated this in a number of ways. WYP had a ?tangled 
policy? and had wanted to avoid a heavy handed approach. Operational memory 
was short and their focus had shifted away from public order training and 
resources. Public order as a discipline had slipped ?down the ladder? and other 
priorities such as corporate manslaughter, health and safety, civil liabilities, 
firearms incidents and day to day policing were given higher priority. The policy 
of training all officers to CMS regardless of motivation had served to produce 
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?????? ???????? ?????, and recent events had caused a realisation that the force 
?????????????????????????????????????.  
The Gold, Silver and Bronze command structure was in place but did not 
function, with communication between the command roles being a problem. Lack 
of training and understanding of roles was apparent, and at one stage the Gold 
commander was situated in the Silver command room and there appeared to be 
more than one Silver commander in play. Of decision making it was said: 
I thought I had a handle on it in terms of command...  You just hope you 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
pretend that was through having a firm grip.  I think we did but it could 
have easily gone wrong (Interview 4). 
 
Even though KtP (and common minimum standards) is national doctrine there are 
local interpretations of it, and this was seen when units from outside were 
deployed and operated more efficiently. As a doctrine it is generally viewed as 
being fit for purpose and some of its models are used consistently, in particular 
the CMM, which is used across all policing disciplines. Every respondent agreed 
that such models are useful as a guide, one cautioning that they are ?for informing 
decision making, not driving them???????????????.  
  There was a general view that the policing structures and agency 
seen at Bradford, both in the lead up to the disorder and during it, did not 
amount to good practice for a number of reasons (Interviews 3, 4, 7, 8). These 
events were the catalyst for significant changes in commander training and 
development, which have proved to be more than a single phase project, having 
become an ongoing process. That said it was also commented that some of the 
initiatives put in place after Bradford have already been discontinued, and there 
is concern that shifting priorities will again diminish public order capability, to the 
extent that British public order policing may prove to be unfit for purpose. Some 
of our respondents? words may prove to have been prophetic in this regard, as the 
present priority of severe cost cutting takes effect.  
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This level of analysis has shown that policing philosophies and traditions do 
impact upon police agency. Statute and policies are strong drivers of policing 
approaches and styles, and police officers still aim to protect the public according 
to those original Peelian principles. It links well to the following level of analysis. 
 
Interactional  
This level deals with ?the quality of interaction between the police and relevant 
civilians? (Waddington D 2010 p 346).  It has been found that questionable police 
strategies are a common factor in most riots (Kanol 2010) and, given the 
structures that were in place prior to 2001, together with the linked political, 
ideological, cultural, contextual and situational sensitivities, or other ingredients 
in this mix, any police intervention, no matter how well intended or executed, 
was going to be contentious. Such is the nature of public order policing and the 
events of 7th of July 2001 would bear this out.  
 The previously mentioned growing tensions, aggravated by anticipated 
BNP and NF activity, give much of the context; the cancellation of the last day of 
the Bradford Festival, linked to the banning of the BNP march, ?designed to 
promote unity and understanding? (Waddington D 2010 p349) and allowing the 
undeniably contradictory ANL counter demonstration in Centenary Square 
provided the conditions for an entirely foreseeable flashpoint. That said, the first 
few hours of the protest progressed without notable incident, and this is borne 
out by respondents in this study. 
Officers dressed in protective uniform were deployed early to Centenary 
Square, the site of the ANL demonstration. As numbers grew officers were subject 
to verbal abuse and gestures, including Nazi style salutes and it was evident that 
some present were intent on winding up the crowd. It was apparent to officers 
that key individuals within the protest had an ?ear for the crowd? and used it to 
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good effect (Interview 7). The strategic intention of the police throughout the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
this remained so, as the protest developed into disorder. 
 Respondents and commentators have cited the trigger for the disorder as 
an incident, or incidents, involving Asian youths and football supporters (possibly 
with BNP connections) at a public house, where a number of Asians were subject 
to a beating, and one or more white opponents were stabbed (Bagguley and 
Hussain 2008 p71; Waddington D 2010 p350). Police were called to the scene and 
in the view of respondents successfully segregated the groups ?beating the 
hooligans back into the pub? (interview 3). However, the perception of local Asian 
youths was that the police stood back and did nothing (Bagguley and Hussain 2008 
p71). At some stage after this incident it was decided to push the disorder out of 
the city centre, even if the tactical options available at that time were limited. 
Whether this was a defined strategic aim, or simply a reaction to events, is open 
to debate, but ultimately it was decided that the city centre needed to be 
protected and that the police would ?clear this out....Bradford is shut? (Interview 
4); which was a dynamic tactical command decision rather than a review of 
strategy. The situation was recognised as serious and assistance was requested as 
part of the mutual aid agreement, and neighbouring forces sent supporting units. 
The crowd was pushed out of the city centre and moved towards Manningham 
(either by design or simply because many of the crowd lived there but all sources 
describe this as what happened). The recollections of the respondents to this 
study are summarised in the following paragraphs. 
Police units that had been on duty all day found themselves dealing with 
sporadic conflict situations, as they made their way out of the city centre. As the 
crowd ran off towards Manningham, rather than being pushed, some went around 
the rear of the Beehive pub, where damage was caused and people assaulted. 
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Shortly after this a barricade was erected on White Abbey Rd, where 
approximately three PSUs were deployed. Level one trained officers from the 
Operational Support Unit (OSU) were also present, and CMS tactics were 
implemented in order to keep the crowd moving. It can be argued that at this 
????????????????????????????, as one respondent put it, ????? you start using those 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? (Interview 6).  
It seemed to officers that the area was at one moment clear and then a 
short while later filled by a crowd numbering thousands, accompanied by the 
sounds of disorder, and the smell of burning petrol. Figure 25 overleaf gives a 
sense of that day. All respondents perceived at least some degree of preparation 
on the part of those engaged in the disorder, based upon the ready availability of 
?stashes of missiles, petrol bombs prepared...they were firing rocket fireworks at 
us? (Interview 7) and ?we were sucked into something that they might have been 
more ready for than we were? (Interview 8). Not all those involved though were 
intent on violence and a number who were arrested and subject to later heavy 
sentences from the court ?had never been in trouble with the police before, good 
kids, good families...  it was exciting, they got swept up in it a moment of 
madness? (Interview 4).   
 
Figure 26. White Abbey Road, Bradford 7th July 2001 (BBC News 2001d) 
213 
 
The road was littered with rocks and many officers were injured and had 
to be carried away. At one stage units acting on their own pushed the crowd all 
the way up the hill to the Melborn pub, only to be told by Silver command to 
withdraw back to the city centre, a distance of some 700-‐800 yards. This was 
done and a Bronze command then ordered that they should take the road as far as 
the Melborn again, in full kit on a hot day. By now even the fittest of officers 
were exhausted and had come to a standstill, resulting in many more injuries. 
Cars, some on fire, were pushed or driven towards the police lines and missiles 
continued to be thrown.  
Several ???????????? ????? ??? ???? ????? ????? ?????? ??????? ??? ??????
????????????? ??? ??????? ?????? ????????? ???? a relevant factor. Many officers 
deployed there, including commanders, had received little or no public order 
training and were neither suitable nor fit for role. The force policy on training 
every officer to the CMS was seen as problematic, because it provided many 
people with a basic knowledge of tactics, instead of fewer but more highly 
motivated, confident, efficient units. That said, even the level one units training 
had been reduced. 
Silver command was frustrated because intended flanking and diversionary 
tactics seemed impossible due to a lack of radio contact, and found that the 
tactics ???????? ??????? ?????, notably because badly dehydrated, exhausted 
officers were trying to fight uphill. At this stage there were no fresh reserves.  
Units on the ground were frustrated because there seemed to be little 
coordination from the Bronze command level, so they just clung on, advancing 
and withdrawing trying to minimise injuries whilst holding the ground. The use of 
mounted tactics was crucial to this, without them the police would have been 
overrun. As it was, after over ten hours on the ground, some units were depleted 
through injuries by 70% -‐ 80% (Interview 3). 
214 
 
The levels of violence experienced were unforeseen and police units were 
?massively underprepared? (Interview 8). Many officers were of the view that 
when the disorder was at its peak, and heavy casualties were being taken, baton 
rounds should have been used to create distance between the police and crowd. 
In fact consideration was given to the baton gun option (Attenuating Energy 
Projectiles/AEP): 
that night I almost used those baton guns on my own authority... I thought 
it was so critical ... thinking that this is madness we will have to do something... 
but when you think about it later... about the wider strategic issues it would have 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????
?????????????? ?????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
possible (Interview 16). 
 
The baton gun option has been deployed but never fired on the British mainland. 
Authority to make AEPs available for use must come from an officer of at least 
Assistant Chief Constable/Commander rank after which their use is a Silver 
command decision (KtP 2010). 
This interactional level of analysis provides us with a view on how actions 
on both sides contributed to the way this incident evolved. From video footage of 
events it is clear that some members of the community tried valiantly to deter 
violence, as did police officers, but to no avail. Once the violence had erupted 
things became very reactive, and did not quieten down until those involved in the 
disorder had tired and fresh police resources had arrived. This analysis shows that 
the break down in the police command function and communication, coupled with 
an apparent lack of operational preparedness, hampered them in dealing with the 
violence once it had started. One commander put it this way:  
You can do what you can but unless everything joins up and you can get 
that message across clearly to your community then you have got a 
problem (Interview 4). 
This interactional level analysis of these events suggests that they are 
consequent to that of the preceding six areas of discussion. The findings of this 
??????????????????????????????????are summarised below. 
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Summary   
Post-‐ industrial Bradford has suffered economic deprivation caused by the 
closure of the large manufacturing industries that brought many immigrants from 
Pakistan and Bangladesh. The consequent mass unemployment severely affected 
the largely unskilled South Asian Muslim population of Manningham, which is seen 
as the centre of ?????????? Asian community. Bradford has taken on significance 
????????????????????????????????uth Asian population, and is sometimes referred to 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Britain and have voiced their grievances regarding political powerlessness, social 
exclusion and deprivation (Bagguley + Hussain 2008).   
???? ???????????? ?????????????????? ???? ????????????? ??????????? ???? ??????, 
was strained despite several initiatives to improve links. Sincere attempts at 
police community engagement had been made but with limited success and 
Bradford was a difficult area to police being ?racially emotive and highly 
politicised?? ??????? ???? ??????? ????? ????. Police officers saw Bradford as a 
?????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????
soon as they could and adopting ????????????????????????, a poor basis on which 
to make friends and share information and concerns. Local officers felt that they 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
mentality had been adopted on the ground. This disconnection was physically 
represented by the fortress-‐ like appearance of the police station Lawcroft House, 
literally standing above the community. Parts of Manningham were notorious for 
drugs and prostitution, and had been subject to high profile policing initiatives in 
order to deal with these issues. This would have necessarily involved stop and 
search interventions, which may have further alienated the local population.  
So called community leaders existed, but sources doubted the efficacy and 
credibility of what amounted to unrepresentative, self appointed elites 
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(Interviews; Bagguley + Hussain 2008; Waddington D et al 2009). WYP did have 
systems in place to deal with community information, signal 
crimes/events/tension indicators but they were not sophisticated enough, and did 
not alert the police to the depth of community tensions. Cancelation of the last 
day of the Bradford Festival was also seen as counter-‐productive.   
Also significant was the media reporting of right wing activity and the 
recent events at ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
conflict involving South Asian Muslims. A number of incidents had been 
sensationalised and used by extremists for political gain, and Bradford had been 
the subject of negative media attention characterised by its transmission of 
rumour regarding BNP/NF intentions that had ?????????????????????????????????????
(Kundnani 2003). There was an expectation within the community that disorder 
would occur in Bradford (Bagguley + Hussain 2008) and this may have led to a 
degree of preparation by some that were involved in the violence (Interviews).  
Given all these sensitivities, by the time of the counter protest at 
Centenary Square, even the most well intentioned police intervention could have 
sparked a violent reaction. Nothing other than a faultless, sensitive approach 
could have succeeded. The deployment of officers in protective equipment does 
suggest some contingency by the police and may have ?upped the ante?, but in 
itself should not be viewed as antagonistic. However, it did give agitators 
ammunition for verbal abuse, including references to fascism that linked the 
police to the right wing. All police agency seems to have been aimed at ensuring 
that the BNP/NF and the ANL did not meet, and in this the police were successful. 
The possibility of local resident involvement seems to have been overlooked. In 
the event, the protest was attended by significant numbers of the local South 
Asian community.   
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The spark that started the conflagration was probably the fight at a nearby 
public house involving football hooligans and Asian youths. The police dealt with 
the incident but not to the satisfaction of some of the Asian community who were 
present, and a number of violent situations ensued, leading to a command 
decision that the city centre needed to be protected. The crowd was pushed out 
of the centre and moved towards White Abbey Road and Manningham. Even at this 
stage there was still a possibility that the crowd would disperse but, in response 
to the damage and physical injury it was generating, police units were deployed in 
????? ?????? ??? ?????????? ?????????? ????????? ??????? ???????? ???? ?????????? ????????
were employed to clear the streets, but the growing crowd, estimated to be many 
thousands in number, was on home turf, and had very quickly availed itself of 
petrol bombs, fireworks and a vast amount of varied missiles aimed in a sustained 
barrage at the police as they advanced and withdrew along the road. This further 
suggests that there had been some degree of preparation by sections of the 
crowd, and this readiness had not been identified by the existing intelligence 
systems, and thus took the police by surprise.  
The lack of investment in public order training, equipment and command 
now proved to be critical. Failure of ??????????????????????????????????????????
police units lacking a strategic aim and tactical plan found themselves acting 
independently. Under trained and unfit officers found that they could not operate 
at the required physical levels on wh??? ???? ?? ???? ????????? ????? ?????????????
communication failure and a high casualty rate made the police operation grind to 
a halt, and all officers could do was hold the line until fresh reserves became 
available. They were unprepared for the levels of violence experienced with, for 
example, cars being pushed or driven, some in flames, at the police lines. 
Questionable structures, and problematical strategies and tactics contributed 
significantly to the lack of success of the policing of that disturbance. This 
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perceived failure prompted a review of doctrine and the introduction of a new 
national public order command level training package, which has since been 
subject to further and ongoing development.  
The 2001 disturbances also prompted a number of reviews (Cantle 2002; 
Clarke 2001; Ousley 2001) and are seen as a ?turning point in British policy? 
(Thomas 2009 p92). Public order policing became a priority once again and 
national policy dictated that forces sign up to the new commander development 
concept based upon selection of the right people for the role, with competency 
based qualification. It remains though, a discipline of policing that generally relies 
on officers who are practitioners on a part time ad hoc basis, who receive only 
four days training a year ? or less.  
This Flashpoints analysis of what occurred during the build up to, and 
through the disorder at Bradford, has shown the frailties and contradictions that 
existed within the British tradition and structure of policing, the bedrock of which 
is community, or neighbourhood policing as it is now called. In part it seems that 
the traditional values of the British approach to policing are at odds with the need 
to have a ????????????????????????? response to large scale disorder when it occurs. 
The ensuing review of Bradford highlighted public order command competence as 
an issue, and a new command level training package was written and rolled out, 
and it is fair to say that some improvement has been achieved as a result. All 
public order commanders now have to evidence competence in the workplace at 
whatever level of command they will perform, and to carry out such duties at 
least twice every year. What has not been achieved is a truly national standard; 
each force has its own priorities and peculiarities, which means that commanders 
in large cities will gain vastly different experiences, in terms of variety and 
frequency of events, than their colleagues in rural forces.   
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The main criticism of command at Bradford was directed at the Bronze 
level. This command role is without doubt the most demanding, because it is 
?????????? ???? ???? ????????????where the tactical plan is translated into action, 
and where decisions need to be made under physical and emotional duress. This 
was where the greatest deficiency was apparent, a fact confirmed by a number of 
interviewees. With the notable exception of Northern Ireland, serious disorder of 
the magnitude seen at Bradford is rare in Britain, but major public events or large 
protests are frequent, especially in London. Large cities and seats of government 
do have the potential for disorder as witnessed in London in 2011 with the student 
demonstrations. It is in such circumstances that an experienced, well trained 
command function is vital if escalation is to be avoided. When serious disorder 
does occur it is difficult to see how some officers can be expected to fulfil a 
demanding command role, when their experience may amount to only a training 
course and two happy events, or, more succinctly, no real experience of policing 
disorder at all. It is here that the British model of policing can be, and sometimes 
is, found wanting and where experienced, capable commanders leading officers 
who are well trained, fit for role and motivated make the difference.   
The recently published HMIC report Adapting to Protest ? Nurturing the British 
Model of Policing (HMIC 2009) came as a response to concerns raised regarding 
the policing of the G20 protests on the 1st and 2nd April 2009, during which a 
protester died after coming into contact with the police. It makes several 
recommendations regarding the policing of protest in Britain that appear to be 
mainly based upon two aspects: the role of the police in terms of  the importance 
of their approachability, impartiality, accountability and the desire to use 
minimal force, combined with ?the distinctiveness of the British model of policing? 
(HMIC 2009 p29) in its tolerance and public consent, both derived from the 
Peelian foundation. There is a dilemma here for the police, who as ever when 
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dealing with any form of protest, whether a demonstration or civil unrest, find 
themselves between opposing views, and must wrestle with the often impossible 
task of balancing competing human rights. The British model of policing, certainly 
on the mainland, seems incapable of condoning the use of distance control 
measures, such as tear gas or water cannon, ????????????????????????????????????
?????????? ?????? ??? ???????? ???????? ??????? ???? ???? ??lice that often results in 
close conflict and physical injury. It is here that the British model succumbs 
because, once such conflict starts to escalate, it is extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to stop it without use of limited dynamic police tactics, such as 
dispersal or enforced containment, at least until the threat has diminished. This is 
where PAJ ????????????? ????? ??? ???? ????????? ??? ?? ????? ???????????? ??????????
makes sense, with better trained, more experienced and ideally full time public 
order resources being used, giving improved command and control of officers and 
better outcomes for both the police and the public (Waddington PAJ 1993 p355 ? 
373). This is not possible for most forces, even with mutual aid because of their 
present structure and financial constraints. The ???????????? ???? ???? ??????????
policing style at the local level, where the police know the public and vice versa 
(Peelian principle No.7) and where vital community intelligence, signal events and 
local knowledge are best and most easily acquired so that ?the contours of the 
risks and threats to which a community is exposed? can be calibrated and targeted 
(Innes and Roberts 2007 p1) is not disputed. 
 However, the profile of public order policing still needs to be further 
raised and better recognised, if the negative experiences of Bradford are to be 
eradicated. A more centrally controlled but regionally based approach to public 
order policing could well be an option for consideration, where practitioners and 
especially commanders would achieve higher levels of professional knowledge, 
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experience, professionalism and accountability. This may well be true for all 
protective services.  
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Chapter Seven 
British police are there essentially to guard against crime, French police 
essentially to keep order (Lawday 2000) 
French and British approaches to public order policing compared 
Introduction 
The preceding chapters have described and highlighted a number of key points 
and issues related to the structure and function of the British and French police 
services but direct comparison (a declared aim of this thesis) has not yet been 
made. In this chapter such comparison is made in a structured fashion with the 
intention to arrive whenever possible at evidenced conclusions. It is fair to say 
that public order policing approaches in France and Britain are perceived by many 
observers (professional and lay) as being distinctly different. However, whilst 
there are indeed many significant differences, it is equally apparent that there 
are many notable similarities. In order to present comparisons derived from the 
data of this research project in a readily comprehensible manner, a degree of 
flexibility has been employed in the use of the analytic framework. Structures, 
traditions and practices are contrasted and this is where the products from the 
????????? ?????????????? ????????? ??ve been utilised and the seven levels of 
structuration have been woven into the narrative. It is where much of the critique 
may be found.  
The chapter initially deals with the operational dimension, reviewing the 
police traditions and procedures, contextual, situational and interactional levels 
of structuration. Then follows examination of the institutional dimension, where 
French republican ideals and British foundational principles are considered. Once 
this has been achieved the historical, social and political contexts of policing in 
the two countries are compared. This provides a more meaningful 
contextualisation of the institutional and operational issues and permits the 
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conclusion to flow better than a stricter adherence to the original model would 
have allowed. Where possible the significant issues have been grouped together 
but it has been necessary at times to compare some on a point by point basis. 
 It is timely at this point to remind ourselves that the policing of public 
order in both countries is a contentious issu?? ???? ???? ??????? ?????????? ???-‐
??????????? ????????? ?????? ???????? ????????? ??? ???? ?????? ??? ???????????? ????????????
(Bittner 1980 p75), which sometimes involves the use of aggressive and potentially 
injurious police tactics to disperse crowds of people involved in protest of one 
type or another. Also, it is clear that violent urban disorder is almost always a 
form of protest, whether as a manifestation of dissatisfaction with social or 
political issues or, often, simply a reaction against the immediate perceived 
illegitimacy of a police intervention.  
This chapter offers an understanding of where the differences and 
similarities of the French and British approaches are significant. These provide the 
insights that form the basis for a number of conclusions to be drawn in the 
following chapter. The comparison chart that follows below allows the reader to 
refer more readily to the key issues and shared dilemmas illuminated by the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????table. 
224 
 
 Figure 27 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
Level France Britain 
Interactional ? Police/youth relationship 
conflictual 
? Police targeted by youths  
? Only contact stop and search or 
arrest 
? Little informal dialogue 
? Black/Arab youths stopped on 
basis of appearance rather than 
behaviour 
? Escalation in levels of violence  
? Deliberate use of firearms 
against police  
? Only small percentage criminal 
hard core  
? Actions on both sides 
contributed to evolution of 
incident  
? some police and community 
members tried to deter violence  
? Communications failed 
? Once violence erupted it 
continued until crowd tired and 
after fresh police resources 
arrived 
? Police command function broke 
down 
? Police efficiency compromised 
by lack of operational 
preparedness  
Police 
Tradition + 
Procedure 
? Policing a state function ? no 
public accountability  
? Police -‐ agents of the republic -‐ 
police operations directed by 
Préfet 
? Maintenance of order not 
community policing  
? Main contact with banlieue 
youths by stop and 
search/arrest 
? Escalation of violence = 
defensive and offensive police 
equipment  
? Tough urban violence policies  
? National structure = availability 
of mobile public order police  
? ???????? ??? ??????????????? -‐ 
tear gas used frequently 
? Policing philosophies and 
traditions affect police agency 
? Traditional police role conflicts 
with order maintenance role 
? Statute and policies are strong 
drivers of policing style 
? Police aim to protect public 
according to foundational 
principles 
? Local commanders have 
flexibility and discretion  
? HO national policing plan and 
national doctrine drive agency 
Situational ? Spatial/social segregation of 
banlieues unintentional  
? Access roads/linking footpaths 
make crowd control or 
dispersal tactically challenging 
? Operations require large police 
numbers  
? EGM or CRS drafted in often 
lack local knowledge 
? Youths engage with hit and run 
tactics, disappearing into the 
Cit??? 
? Enduring neighbourhood effect 
significant 
? ????????????????????????????????????
roads out going uphill 
? Main northerly exit route 
through Manningham area 
? Busy, wide roads with significant 
gradients 
? Many side junctions into housing 
estates and business premises 
? Crowd dispersal tactically 
challenging and extremely 
physically demanding   
? Enduring neighbourhood effect 
significant 
 
Contextual ? History of negative experiences 
between police and residents   
? Police legitimacy weakened 
? ??????????????????????????????
?????????????????????? 
? ??????????? ?????????? ??? ??????
violence  
? Lack of communication 
structures = lack community 
intelligence 
? Deaths of youths = rumour 
? ??????? ?????? ??? ???????????
???????????????????????? 
? Communication structures 
inadequate  
? Rumour misled all involved 
? Media reporting heightened 
tensions  
? Lack of effective communication 
frustrated flow of information 
and intelligence  
? Heightened tensions need to be 
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resulting in violent 
disturbances  
? Media exploitation of 
frustrations increased tension  
seen in context of 
structural/political/cultural 
issues 
 
Cultural ? Educational failure and 
unemployment  
? Lack of social identity -‐ gang 
membership gives social 
standing/self esteem 
? Drug trafficking/crime as 
means of survival  
? Parental weakness influences 
attitudes/behaviour of male 
youth 
? Involved in violence + 
criminality 
? Islamic extremism not to blame 
-‐ Islamic culture probably a 
moderating influence  
? Police despised by youth -‐ 
become common enemy  
? Spiral of hatred, racism and 
violence 
? Similar to French situation  
? Attitudes and behaviour of all 
groups contribute to climate of 
conflict 
? Social exclusion ? 2nd class 
citizens 
? Gang involvement not so clear 
but 
criminality/drugs/prostitution 
evident  
? Parental control/influence on 
children not as strong as in older 
South Asian tradition 
Political + 
Ideological 
? Little social or educational 
support for communities  
? Employment discrimination 
? ???????????????????????? 
? Hard line immigration policies 
? Tough on crime policy = 
hardening of police attitudes -‐ 
youth seen by police as 
enemies 
? No community policing -‐ police 
seen as agents of state 
repression 
? Performance culture  
? Police have little influence on 
policies they enforce  
? Lack of police accountability  
? Little public faith in system 
? Political and ideological factors 
shaped by reactive nature of 
WYP 
? Officers attend incidents in 
vehicles, deal with them and 
leave 
? Law enforcement rather than 
relationship building and 
problem solving at day to day 
level 
? Ill-‐equipped to deal with 
situations of public disorder 
? Lack of public confidence in 
police accountability 
  
 
Structural ? 40 years of decay and growing 
socio-‐political problems 
? Ethnic segregation; poverty, 
unemployment and insecurity = 
exclusion/powerlessness 
? High unemployment  
? Inadequate links with city 
centres  
? ???????????????????????????? 
? Twenty years of latent unrest 
and tensions exploded in 2005 
? Communities and police wrestle 
with duality of republican ideal  
? Distinct macro-‐sociological 
factors around South Asian 
community -‐ evident material 
inequalities 
? High unemployment ? low 
prospects 
? Relationships with 
authorities/police strained 
? Genuine efforts to improve 
relationships ineffective 
? Significant underlying grievances 
-‐ political powerlessness, social 
exclusion and deprivation 
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The Operational Dimension 
 The operational dimension refers to how the police do policing or, for this 
study, how they deal with society or sections of it. How the policing organisations 
relate to and communicate with their communities is directly linked to the 
historical, social, political and institutional dimensions, for it is these that 
characterise the police of any nation. It has been said that society gets the police 
it deserves (anon). It is within this dimension that the similarities of French and 
British policing aims and the differences in doctrine and method are most stark. 
Here the additional Police Traditions and Procedures level of structuration of the 
?????????????? ?????????? is especially useful bringing more depth, breadth and 
understanding to the analysis.  
The centralised structure of French policing ensures that it is very much an 
arm of the state, directed at ensuring state control of the population through rule 
of law. With its two policing bodies, the Gendarmerie and the Police, France has 
comparatively high numbers of police with a combined total of 225,000 for its 
population of approximately 65 million. 'Britain has approximately 140,000 police 
officers divided amongst some sixty police organisations, serving a population 
approaching 62 million (Internet World Stats 2011).  
The two French police organisations have separate but similar doctrines 
that seem to complement one another. They have shared responsibilities in many 
areas that have necessitated efficient working relationships that are not 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
is sometimes seen in Britain (Bassett et al 2009 p5). The recent consolidation of 
their function under the ministry of the interior has further streamlined their 
operational capability, certainly in terms of strategic aims and procurement. 
During informal conversations with both PN/CRS and GN/GM sources they were in 
????? ?????? ?????????????? ?????? ????? ???????? ???????????? ?????????????? ??????? ???
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the same time openly preferring their own organisational codes. Clearly their 
classic rivalry still existed even if it was no longer as explicit as it once was.  
In the CRS and the GM the French have approximately 30,000 full time 
public order specialists who are multi-‐functional and can respond readily to 
national requirements or emergencies of whatever type. This response capability 
is envied by their British counterparts, one of whom said: ???? ????????? ?????????
????? ????????????????? ????????? ???? ??????????????????????????????????????????????
basis they can pool resources and they get people all understanding the same 
man?????????????????????????????????????????? 
GM and CRS members receive frequent and regular professional training 
and are deployed daily on public order and public safety duties. This contrasts 
vividly with the British structure, that whilst having its own particular 
foundational principles and national aims, lends itself to potentially as many as 
sixty differences of approach, style, equipment and policy. Differing 
interpretation of doctrine was highlighted by an interview respondent who said 
about the 2009 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????? ???????? ????? ??????? ??????????? ???? ?????????? ?????????? ???????? ?????
operated different tactics and trained to a different manual (Interview 2). This 
evidences frailties in spite of national standards and doctrines having been in 
existence for a number of years. This is the case despite the fact that 100% of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of them agreeing that it was a doctrine that was fit for purpose.   
The British police forces maintain approximately 16,000 public order 
trained police officers available for deployment, all trained to the national CMS 
for mutual aid. However???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
a??????? ???????????????????????? ????????? these officers are spread across the 
country and require tasking either at the request of neighbouring forces or by 
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PNICC, which takes a significant amount of time. This is especially problematic 
when reacting to an immediate but unplanned need. According to national 
standards British PSU officers should receive a minimum of four days CMS training 
annually and should ideally maintain their operational experience. However, as 
previously stated, different forces have different priorities and budgetary 
restrictions that mean in reality this standard is not maintained and this was the 
case with WYP before the Bradford disturbances of 2001.  
In the present economic climate it is highly likely that chief officers will be 
ma????? ???????? ?????????? ??? ?????? ??? ???? ?????????? ??????????? ??? ???????? ?????
politically initiated industrial disputes are likely to generate (Independent Police 
Commission 2012). Once again this underlines how one cannot divorce policing 
from politics as protest is usually directed at seats of government such as London 
and Paris where: 
Institutionalised pressure is more successful in enticing the police into 
confronting protesters. Parliament, government, royalty, foreign 
embassies and national shrines, as ?????????????????????????????????????????
a robust immunity to disorder and its consequences that the police feel 
compelled to maintain. These are the places where, and occasions on 
??????? ???????????????????????? ??? ????? ??????????? (Waddington PAJ 1996 
p137) 
This was clearly evident at the Countryside Alliance demonstration in 
Westminster, London in 2004, when police officers used what has been described 
as unnecessary force against people protesting the hunting ban (Hardman 2009). 
This may not have been justifiable but it needs to be clearly understood that the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????? ???????????? ????????? ???? ?????????? ?????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 The established military structures of the GM and CRS give them a distinct 
advantage over their British colleagues when it comes to teamwork. Their full 
time status allows a level of teambuilding and professionalism that is impossible 
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for part-‐timers to achieve, no matter how committed and enthusiastic they may 
be. These full-‐time units enjoy regular training and operational deployments that 
ensures greater fitness for role and understanding between team members. When 
they are tasked to deal with the truly violent situations that they often encounter 
in the banlieues they can rely upon and have confidence in one another.  
The structure of British public order policing has developed in a piecemeal 
manner as a counter to shortcomings of response to disorder situations. It has not 
even yet been given the necessary holistic strategic and political support or 
?????????? ??????????? ???? ??? ??? ??? ?????? ??????????????? ?nd fit for purpose. Public 
order practice has ????? ???????? ??? ?? ???????? ??? ?????????????? ??????? ???????? ??
more disciplined approach for many years as a result of operational need, a case 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? British public 
order policing has evolved over a number of decades and especially after Lord 
?????????? ??????? ???????????????? ?????????? ????? ?????????? ????? ?????????? ????
still not gone far enough and Bradford 2001 and some more recent public order 
incidents, notably the G20 protests of 2009 and the August 2011 disturbances in 
London, have brought further criticisms and calls for better training aimed at 
improving public confidence (Interview sources; HMIC 2009; BBC News 2010b; 
HMIC 2011a).    
The increasing militarisation of public order policing in Britain has been 
debated fairly thoroughly by commentators such as Peter Waddington (1987/93) 
and Tony Jefferson (1990/93) who have made cases both for and against it. This 
study accepts that a more disciplined military structure should not necessarily 
give an impression of aggressive units intent on using force, rather one of tighter 
control and greater efficiency. Ultimately, well commanded, such a structure is a 
???????????????????????????????????????????????? for a more disciplined response to 
??????????? ???? ???????? ??????????? ????? ??? ????????? ??? ???????????? ?????????
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(Waddington PAJ 1993). Consequently, where the ?thin blue line? ?????????????????
way for the benefit of society, greater militarisation should mean a better, more 
professional service with less potential for those unintentional or individual 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of force without effective command and control is the proverbial loose cann????
(Waddington PAJ 1993 p366) and use of force is more likely to be the minimum 
required and accountability for it ensured because of the clear command 
responsibility inherent in such a structure (Waddington PAJ 1993). This highlights 
once again the absolute necessity for highly trained and well experienced public 
order commanders who have the necessary personal qualities. This is particularly 
important for ground or Bronze commanders who operate at the interactional 
level. 
At the contextual, situational and interactional ????????????????????????????
framework the Parisian banlieues of Clichy sous Bois/Villiers le Bel and Bradford 
had obvious similarities with local histories of adverse and counterproductive 
experiences between residents and the police. The perceptions of both groups 
were negative and often irreconcilable (Waddington D et al 2009; Interviews 3 + 
8). Media exploitation of the circumstances in both countries had heightened 
tensions and there were no effective communication processes through which to 
ameliorate the situation, which meant that any police activity, or lack of it, was 
likely to be a trigger for escalation. In both French cases this trigger was provided 
by police involvement in the deaths of local youths. In the Bradford case it was 
probably provided, in large part, by the rumour that the police had done nothing 
about an Asian youth being stabbed outside a public house.  
Given what is known about policing in France it is clear that French public 
order commanders would have had access to even less community information and 
intelligence than the Bradford commanders who, whilst seemingly unaware of the 
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planned violence, were aware of the increased tension. Right-‐wing activism, their 
admittedly limited links with the South Asian community and the earlier disorders 
at Burnley and Oldham had ensured this.  
The French police have little or no community contact other than trying to 
ensure compliance with the law. Consequently they are less likely to be party to 
useful intelligence from community sources, especially in the banlieues. British 
policing is founded on a close relationship with those who are policed. According 
to Peelian logic they are one and the same and consequently the police are, at 
least in principle, naturally ?????????????????ublic concerns. This was reflected by 
100% of the British respondents who saw community engagement as essential to 
policing, an opinion which clearly links back to Peelian principles. 
In the years since the Bradford disturbances British policing has returned to 
a more community focused approach, reinvigorating its neighbourhood policing 
with the aim of building relationships with communities, thereby engendering 
public confidence, whilst at the same time trying to respond well to emergencies. 
This has achieved some success in that neighbourhood policing teams are now well 
established. Conversely the French have moved away from their tenuous local 
policing initiatives (Police de Proximité and UTeQ) towards a more punitive style 
as promoted by President Sarkozy and his Minister of the Interior, Claude Guéant 
and their special brigades (BSTs). These look set to avoid any public contact other 
than a reactive one of stop, search and arrest. This approach is unlikely to be 
successful and will not furnish police commanders with the necessary information 
and intelligence on which to make effective policing plans and build relationships 
(Vitale 2005a). This said, there has been a recent change of presidency and the 
new socialist government may well seek a distinct change of approach and 
possibly the re-‐establishment of some form of proximity policing. 
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The spatial and social segregation of the populations of the French 
banlieues were such that the potential for disorder was increased. All were 
situated away from city centres and were difficult areas for the police to operate 
in. The youths that were involved in disorder were resident there and had 
intimate local knowledge that the police did not. Any police dispersal or 
containment of the crowd required great numbers of officers and was unlikely to 
achieve any meaningful tactical advantage.  
The events of Bradford 2001 showed us that the public order capability of 
British policing fell short of good practice. This was caused by shortcomings in the 
following areas: ground command; tactical awareness; fitness for role (physical 
and moral); information and intelligence; police community relations and trained 
resources (Interview sources 3, 4, 6, 7, 8). With hindsight this was not surprising 
when the following factors are considered: PSU officers were in many cases 
??????????????????????????????? ?????? ??????? ???? ?????????? ????????? ????????? ???
maintain the minimu???????????????????? ????????????????? ?????????? ???????????
poor and strategic and tactical commanders lacked the local knowledge, 
information and intelligence necessary to make informed decisions; many PSU 
officers lacked the required levels of physical fitness and were unable to sustain 
any effective dispersal of the crowd.  
Even more telling was the fact that these officers were also hampered by 
untrained and inexperienced ???????????? ??????? ??????????? ???????????? ??????
lack of understanding and leadership neutralised those brave individual actions 
that were attempted. This, and the high casualty rate, was disheartening for the 
officers on the front line. All they were able to do was hang on and hope until 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
or thought... there were no flanking movements, no pincer movements, no 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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???????????????????????????????? ??? ??????????????????????????????????????????????
by appropriately selected and better trained practitioners, would have given the 
police the tactical edge necessary to deal with the situation more expeditiously.  
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
are fairly obvious in terms of response times and capability. Many British forces do 
have some full time units available for deployment in a number of roles, such as 
the TSG in London, which are full-‐time units that provide a more competent and 
professional service. However deployment of such units does have disadvantages. 
This was identified by a senior commander who observed that when specialist 
units are deployed communities and media recognise that they are not local 
officers. They are targets for blame when things go wrong and overlooking this 
???? ??? ????????? ???? ????? ???? ?????? ???? ?????? ????????????? ???? ?????? ???? ??????
empathy... we, as the provider of public order support, work with the local 
borough around a very clear remit of what the job is at hand, the strategy... 
????????? ????????????? ???? ????????????????? ??????????????????????????rs markedly 
from the French approach, which lacks the community engagement and clearer 
communication that could reduce the potential for conflict.  
At Bradford there was a distinct lack of operational preparedness resulting 
from the operational and financi??? ???-‐???????????????? ??? ??????? ??????policing by 
WYP. The present economic situation in Britain is likely to promote a similar 
response from chief officers seeking to make substantial cuts in their force 
budgets. One respondent observed that recently large scale protest and disorder 
has been relatively rare, probably due to improved community threat assessment:  
 ... our intelligence use is better and our tactics have probably 
improved; but G20 shows that you are always on a knife edge and we are 
probably moving back into a period of increasing disorder. I think public 
order is cyclical and very largely pinned to prevailing economic 
conditions... recession, unemployment, disaffected people; more people 
on the streets (Interview 13).  
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This increased likelihood of protest and disorder reinforces the need for best 
practice in informed and sympathetic public order command. 
The events that took place at Bradford caused public order command level 
training and command competence to be reviewed and improved. However the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
a year and only deployed on public order duties on a part time ad hoc basis, be 
expected to be truly professional -‐ capable, calm and proportionate in such 
?????????? ???????????????   It is fair to say that the ground command role is a 
demanding one, consequently ????????? commanders require not only the 
knowledge and understanding of the role but also the following attributes that are 
not explicit in the present national standards: high levels of physical fitness, 
mental acuity and clarity of thought and the ability to think on their feet under 
physical and emotional stress.  
In spite of a continuing process of adaptation and improvement, and an 
NPIA assurance ????? ??????? ??????????? ????? ?????? ?????????? ??? ?????? ???
?????????? ???? ????????? ??? ??????? ??????? ?????? ???? ??? ?? ????? ??????? ???????, 
mandated nationally, supporting all commanders coupled with the prospect of 
further improvement through national annual refresher training (NPIA source 
2012), it remains the case that there is no real national standard because there 
are still forty three or more differing approaches. Also the system still allows 
commanders to gain a theoretical knowledge in the safety of a classroom with no 
real test of competence under the pressure of a real time exercise situation. This 
seems unfair to those officers volunteering to perform public order command 
roles.  
The levels of violence experienced at Bradford were shocking for both the 
officers on the ground and the British public who had not seen anything like it 
since the violent disorder at Broadwater Farm, London, in 1985 and it served to 
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show that extreme levels of violence were still possible in Britain. More recently, 
in France they have experienced even higher levels of violence including the 
deliberate use of high calibre firearms against police lines, which evidences a 
murderous intent.  
Had a similar situation to Bradford been encountered in France by CRS or 
GM units they would have had the experience, teamwork, training and command 
capability necessary to deal more readily with the disorder. It is highly probable 
that they would have reacted more promptly with sufficient resources to gain 
territorial dominance. In all probability, once authorised by the Prefét, by 
resorting to distance control methods, such as tear gas, that would have 
minimised police and civilian casualties, dispersing the crowd and weakening the 
resolve of those remaining that were intent on violence. Any necessary further 
reinforcements would have been available at shorter notice and the area would 
have been swamped with police officers. Any further opportunity for the crowd to 
cause harm or damage would have been denied giving time for police reflection 
and review of strategy.  
This may not be viewed by everyone as appropriate to the British tradition 
but there comes a point beyond which community engagement through normal 
channels becomes impossible and where more impactive methods of crowd 
management are necessary. It is at that point that the British model still lacks 
answers and where lessons can be learned from foreign counterparts. British 
respondents? perceptions of the French approach varied, but most saw it as being 
very reactive with the use of distance control measures such as tear gas and water 
cannon being regarded as heavy handed. The following responses give a flavour of 
???? ?????? ?????????? ?????? ??????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? ?????????? ????
only see the worst of their approach... However on the operational side you can 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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high??? ???????? ???????????? ?????? ?????????? ??????????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ?????????
were negative:  
I think we could probably learn tolerance from them because I do 
think that protest is more widely accepted in France... where I totally 
disagree with their methodol?????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????hat delivers that. Very 
militaristic (Interview 2).  
A subjective but perhaps more operationally realistic view was articulated by 
another respondent who said that the French are effectively risk averse when it 
comes to crowd dispersal techniques and offer a commensurate level of violence 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
There was an acceptance by some British police officers that there are 
things to be learned from the French and other European colleagues, whose 
reliance on distance control methods in the first instance can result in lower 
levels of police force being used than by the British politically and institutionally 
based reluctance to deploy such means. Fairly often such reluctance necessitates 
the use of baton and horse charges to keep a violent crowd at bay, with greater 
potential for injury to both sides (Interviews 1, 2, 6, 8). Interestingly, as 
mentioned in an earlier chapter, the Gendarmerie see the British use of police 
dogs for crowd control as unacceptable. That said the French do also use baton 
charges and indeed firearms. 
 Another respondent was less enthusiastic about European crowd control 
methods saying:  
... not from Fra????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to Belgium, France, Italy and I have got to say their method of policing, in 
my view, and certainly public order, the biggest difference is that they sit 
back, wait for it to happen, then once it happens they go in all guns 
???????? ??????????? ???? ?????? ??? ????????? ???? ????? ?????? ??? ???????? ??????
intervene. It goes back to the basic principle of preventing crime.  They 
???????? ???? ?????? ??????? ??? ?????? ????????? ????? ????? ???? ?? ?????? ??????? ??
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total different ????????? ?????? ???????? ??????????????????????? ????? ?????????
and white. I think our intervention policy is far better (Interview 14). 
 A similar and perhaps more illuminating opinion follows from another senior 
British public order specialist: 
????? ?? ????? see and am less sighted on is the community policing 
impact... that tries to, either before or after, cement the cohesion bonds 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
will come out in your thesis, we have water cannon, AEPs are Home Office 
and ACPO approved. The possibility of using them in London in the next 
few years is pretty remote. We have looked at them but they would 
probably, unless used very sensitively in very, very, specific situations 
drive a coach and horses through everything we try to do in terms of 
community cohesion... Having said that I still take a lot of influence from 
my officers because we go toe to toe when something like that would be 
??????? ?????????? ????? ?? ????? ???????? ???? ???? ??????? ?????? ??licing world 
(Interview 13).  
This is an informed opinion that sums up the operational dilemma of policing 
public order in Britain rather well. It supports the policing of protest or disorder in 
a manner that is capable at the same time as being proportionate, legitimate and 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??? ????????????????????????
local requirements as well as the corporate requirements... we have got to 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ften 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? a very similar dilemma to 
that faced by French police forces and one that is proving to be impossible to 
resolve ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
When potential police responses to disorder in both countries are fully 
considered they boil down to being simply: prevention or reaction; containment or 
dispersal. Figure 28 below provides a schematic of these options.  
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Fig. 28 A Simplification of Police Response to Disorder 
 
So in this reductive diagram, the strategic aims boil down to prevention or 
reaction. Police tactical considerations can be very complex and broad but crowd 
control ultimately necessitates a choice between containment and dispersal. 
Containment and dispersal can both be used in a preventative and reactive 
manner. Prevention is the ideal outcome in both countries but is dependent upon 
structural and political contexts that may be beyond the scope of the police, 
certainly in isolation. In Britain the preferred methodology is to use community 
intelligence to monitor community tensions and where appropriate to stop group 
formation. Prevention in France is more directed at ensuring that crowd members' 
behaviour remains lawful with no directed police agency beyond crowd 
monitoring. 
 Containment is an approach usually aimed at limiting the space available 
to protestors so that disorder is either avoided or restricted to a locality. It is 
often considered to be a lower impact option than dispersal, but this depends 
upon the manner of it. The arrows linking containment and dispersal in the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
can both escalate and de-‐escalate tension. Conversely, a well conducted dispersal 
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of a crowd can alleviate a conflict si????????? ???? ??????? ??????? ???????? ????????
how any police intervention has to be well-‐judged and timely if it is to be 
beneficial; if not it may worsen the situation.  
 Reactive dispersal of violent crowds amounts to a similar broad aim in both 
countries. The manner of this though can be quite different. In Britain it is likely 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
available and PSU shield formations used in dynamic running lines of officers who 
may use batons. In France it is more likely to be achieved, once authorised, by 
the use of tear gas in the first instance, followed up by advancing formed units of 
CRS, GM or CDI. In effect the use of tear gas as a distance control method is likely 
to give crowd members a greater opportunity to leave before the arrival of police 
lines than the British method. It is also more likely to result in fewer injuries to 
both sides. These differences of approach are grounded in the extremely powerful 
institutional, historical, social and political variables. 
The Institutional Dimension 
???????? ?????????? ???????? ????? ???? ??????? ????? ?? ??????? ?????? ??? ?? ??????? ????
?????????? ?????? ??? ?????? ???????????? ???? ????? ???? ???????????? ??? ?????? ??? ????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????ts (1996 p39). He goes further 
??????? ????? ???? ??????? ???? ?? ??????????? ???? ???? ?????????? ???? ??????? ??????? ??? ??
?????????????????????????????????????????????and that ???????????????????????????
in defining and defending the state, particularly in the court of first instance, the 
???????? ??????????? ????? ?????? ? ?? ??????? ???????? ??? ??? ?????????? ?????? ?????????????
important as both a sign of state functionality and health and as an arm of 
government, regardless of whether the country in question operates a centralist 
or devolved system. National policing traditions have developed out of their 
respective state structures and culture. 
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 This section compares the institutional issues that have been identified by 
this research. The institutional dimension is important because it directly impacts 
upon the operational dimension of policing with institutional characteristics in 
many ways defining the operational style. It has been said that no institution can 
be successful if it is purely reactive and must try to address concerns and issues 
proactively and in response to public need if it is to maintain legitimacy (Vitale 
2005a).  
Actions taken by individuals and institutions to maintain their privileged 
positions produce the sorts of structural constraints and cultural settings 
typically emphasised by sociologists. We live in places that have social 
meanings and structured differences inscribed all over them (Sampson 
2010 p374) 
As such the police, in particular, must have a real understanding of their 
institutional dimensions of mission, values and core strategies (Vitale 2005a) 
which are the foundations of their identity. In order to truly appreciate these 
dimensions a further contrast between French republican ideals and British 
Peelian principles must be made.  
Republican Ideals v Peelian Principles  
 
French republican ideals have fostered a nationally structured code of 
policing with comparatively large numbers of Gendarmes and Police regionally 
based throughout the mainland and readily available for deployment. These ideals 
have also caused a contemporary dilemma for French police officers who, whilst 
being very loyal to their organisational mission and values which amount to 
structurally implanted customs, traditions and procedures, have voiced 
frustrations born out of their own perceived failure to stop or reduce localised 
criminality and disorder as seen in such places as Seine St Denis and Villiers le Bel 
(Willen 2007; PN sources 2, 3). These frustrations do not come as a result of being 
unable to subdue violent dis??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to deal with the causal social and political issues evident at the structural and 
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political/ideological levels of the analysis framework.  As part of this centralist 
structure the police are agents of state control who carry out their function but 
are not allowed to formulate their own core strategies, which in France is the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
The French policing tradition is not one based on community engagement 
and proactive initiatives but upon the state responsibility to guarantee security. 
France seems to prefer to react to criminality and disorder rather than prevent it 
and this was echoed by a GN source (5) who said that whilst there is a desire to 
help solve societal problems the rule of law must come first. This rule of law 
imperative is based upon the concept of graduated response, where any use of 
force must be at the lowest level possible and this is strictly regulated by their 
legal framework. When it comes to operational maintenance of public order on 
the ground the French forces of law and order are professional, very able and do 
their duty without question and as already evidenced at the interactional level of 
this study, often at great personal risk.   
At both the structural and political/ideological levels it is the entrenched 
republican ideals of freedom and fairness that cause similar but opposing 
frustrations. The experience of the marginalised populations of the French 
suburbs is that these ideals do not apply to them. The resulting lack of life 
chances, especially for their youth, has pushed them into criminality as a means 
of income and ensured the continued attention of the authorities, notably the 
police in the first instance. This does little to improve police community relations; 
??????????? ????????????? ??????? ??? ???? ?????? ???? ????????? ?????????????
?????????? ???? ?????? ??? ??????? ???????? ???? ???? ???????? ???????? ????? p105). The 
police must be seen to uphold basic values if their actions are to be viewed as 
legitimate and for the public to respond positively (Vitale 2005a). 
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  At the cultural and situational levels of examination it is clear that over 
time the relationship between the French police and their citizens has become 
increasingly polarised with frequent and violent clashes. At times, some of these 
have resulted in death and serious injury as clearly evidenced at the interactional 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????seen that this state of affairs is indeed cultural and 
has become in effect an ongoing guerrilla war that is not widely reported in 
Britain. However, this does not mean that such an environment is entirely 
unknown to police officers patrolling the sink estates of Britain and the murder of 
Constable Keith Blakelock during the violence at Tottenham in 1985 underlines 
this. Indeed, both the French and British case studies highlight similarities of 
????????? ?????????????? ???????? ????? ???? ????????? ??? ???? ???????????? ???????????
(Sampson 2011 p383) of social conflict that impacts upon communities and 
policing. This sense of place is significant ???????? ????????? lives and lifestyles 
conform greatly to where they live (Sampson 2011). 
The contemporary British model of policing is founded upon the nine 
principles of policing that are usually, and erroneously, attributed to Sir Robert 
Peel. If one asks a British police officer what their role is they will tell you about 
the protection of life and property and the prevention and detection of crime. 
This was reflected by the 79% of interview respondents that quoted these aims 
specifically when asked. A further 14% gave the more general but related answer 
??? ???????? ???? ???????? ?????. The other 7% did not answer (Interview sources 
2009).  
These Peelian principles hark back to a time when the idea of a 
professional police force was viewed with some suspicion by the British and were 
articulated to make being policed more acceptable to a dubious public. This is 
perhaps why so much emphasis was placed upon the public being the police and 
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the police being the public; of one another for the good of one another. The HMIC 
????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????er 
saying, ??????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
state or any other interest group ? ????? ?????? ???? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????
Somewhat paradoxically, it is from this principle that the modern policing 
dilemma stems ? that of successfully policing protest in accordance with a 
contemporary understanding of human rights and within the British tradition. Such 
bold claims by HMIC are likely to be confusing in that Britain remains a democracy 
with an elected government that acts on behalf of the people as regards policing 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????? ???? ??????????????? ??? ?????????? ???? ??????? ??????? ??????????? ?????
p44). The core strategies for policing in Britain are driven by the political 
imperative in that the annual policing plan is a Home Office directive. Even 
though chief officers of police have operational autonomy and can dictate the 
policing style within their force boundaries, they are duty bound to comply with 
national policy. However, communities in Britain do have at least some say in how 
they are policed. The present tripartite relationship between chief officers, local 
and police authorities ensure that neighbourhoods are considered. This local 
emphasis has much to commend it and it has proven to be a workable structure 
over many years but does have drawbacks when it comes to a truly corporate 
approach. National doctrine sometimes conflicts with the doctrine of Constabulary 
Independence (Savage, S. Charman, S. & Cope, S. 2000) in that it is subject to 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
2) by them. This is why a codification of operational practice is necessary. 
So it is clear that in spite of the different structures and approaches the 
police forces of both France and Britain face similar problems of policing liberal 
????????????? ???????????? ???? ????? ?????????? ????????????? ???????????? ?? ?????
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p29) of urban conflict, whilst balancing their operational approaches against their 
duty to uphold civil liberties. It is less clear whether the founding principles of the 
two policing traditions remain wholly valid. It is possible that they have become 
more aspirational than achievable, amounting to contemporary dogma that 
adversely impacts upon operational matters. 
Historical, Social and Political  
France and Britain share close and intertwined histories that inevitably impact 
upon contemporary issues. From the middle ages the development of policing in 
both countries has followed similar but divergent paths and the police services of 
both nationalities have similar origins and nomenclature, vestiges of which still 
exist. Both nation states are liberal western democracies but are essentially 
different.  
France i????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
human rights. Social contract philosophy, based on ideas from thinkers such as 
Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau, form the foundation of their republican ideals 
??? ?Liberté, Fraternité, Egalité??? ???? ?????????? ??? ????????????? ??? ??????? ??? ????
elected head of state and holds significant political power.  
?????????????????????????? ????? ?????????????????????????????beit lacking a 
written constitution. The monarch is the head of state but has no political party 
???????????? ??? ???????????? ??????? ?????????? ??-‐codified constitution relies on such 
documents as the Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights and is held in the laws and 
customs of the land. It could therefore be subjected to change by the legislature 
whereas in France, or any other country with a codified constitution, laws that 
are unconstitutional are generally forbidden.  
In 1968 Lord Denning held that police independence is necessary and this is 
??????????? ????????? ??? ??? ?? ??????? ????? ??????? ?????? ??????? ????? ???????? ????????
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???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
It is the contention of this thesis that police practice, since ????? ??????????
judgement, has for a number of valid reasons, become reliant upon a more 
centralised national approach. National training, policies and policing plans have 
developed to the extent that British policing now amounts to a de facto national 
institution. This, in turn, is suggestive of an inconsistency in the HMIC report, in 
that it promotes what amounts to the exceptionalism of British policing at the 
same time as promoting national frameworks and standards for public order 
policing (HMIC 2009 p69). As such it is reasonable to assert that, in both countries, 
whilst they have no involvement in the formulation of legislation or in making 
legal judgements, the police are state institutions that are situated within the 
ambit of the executive.     
France and Britain were both involved in the foundation of the universal 
declaration of human rights and are very strong advocates of a human rights 
culture. Both have experienced the reality of social unrest being policed by 
military units as evidenced (see earlier chapters), by the deaths of citizens at 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
civil protest or unrest to be policed by a civil authority using legitimate means is 
now well recognised by the two countries. 
The imperial past of these neighbouring European states with their 
competing quests for global influence, linked to their particular world view of 
colonialism, has resulted in a significant contemporary diversity of population. 
This is described by ??????? ???? ????????? ??????? ??? ?????????????? ???????????? ???
France, which might be better described as post-‐imperial multiculturalism in 
Britain. In both countries ethnic minority groups are often visibly different and 
first arrived as immigrant workers. Many of these people have not been fully 
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??????????? ??? ???????????? ????? ???? ????????? ???????????, even after several 
generations and in spite of explicit policies of assimilation or integration.  
In France the decaying suburbs of larger cities and towns are often populated by 
people originating in the Maghreb, the Sahel and Sub-‐Saharan countries of Africa 
whereas in Britain the residents of the old and often run down inner city areas 
commonly have South Asian or African Caribbean origins and the psyche of these 
groups is marked by their links to the respective colonial influences rooted in 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
poverty, discrimination, government policy and segregation, whether externally or 
self imposed, been marginalised socially, politically and geographically. This has 
resulted in what Ted Cantle described as parallel communities (Cantle 2001). 
They feel politically powerless and socially excluded and this has ultimately 
resulted in civil protest and sometimes violent disorder. The communities of these 
sensitive areas, in both countries, suffer from unfair and enduring neighbourhood 
effects, as their personal decisions are significantly dependent upon their social 
environment and cultural perceptions (Sampson 2010). 
The defined separation of state and religion in French public life or laïcité 
(law since 1905), which has become an increasing source of conflict in 
contemporary French society, was intended to be a step towards political 
stability. The ban on institutional recording of ethnicity, which is closely linked to 
personal identity, ?????????????????????????????????????????????????Canet et al 
2008; Zauberman & Levy 2003) and its denial of any identity other than that of 
French. This has a paradoxical exclusionary effect on minority groups. 
 At present, French society is witnessing a selective application of the 
values and ideals upon which the Republic is built. The suburbs exemplify 
?????? ????????????? ???? ??????-‐?????? ??? ???? ?????????? ?? ??????? ??????
concentrating all the challenges that face contemporary French society ? 
immigration, discrimination, unemployment, education and justice, to 
name but a few (Moran 2008 p6). 
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The multicultural policies of Britain are generally considered to be more 
inclusive in that they do not isolate ethnicity from Britishness but in reality offer 
little more in terms of social harmony than the French model due to a similar lack 
of political influence with perceived institutional discrimination. This lack of voice 
is without doubt a source of great frustration for those in question. It was 
apparent at the political and ideological level of analysis in both case studies and 
is an issue that was apparent in th??? ?????????? ???????? comparisons of the 
institutional and operational characteristics.  
The police forces of both countries are caught between their civic duties 
and the above mentioned social and political reality. However, in discussions 
British respondents did point out, at the structural and political/ideological 
levels, how important it is that whatever the nature of any police activity, it 
takes place within a defined geographical BCU/borough area. They emphasised 
that even the most sensitive jobs must have some form of local liaison, even if it 
is only with the area commander, because community engagement will be 
necessary to minimise any rise in tension (Interviews 13, 16). Consequently 
national and local structures have been put in place to achieve this. The 
importance of community engagement and intelligence was emphasised by many 
respondents at every level o?? ???? ?????????????? ?????? ?????????? ?????? ????? ????
things: 1. How community involvement in policing is fundamental to police 
thinking in Britain. 2. How interdependent and interrelated those levels of 
analysis really are, linking the political/social and operational dimensions.  
It should also be noted here that throughout the research into the French 
model, beyond political rhetoric, local police community engagement was not 
apparent. Policing as a discipline seemed more distinct and distant from the 
populations, certainly of urban areas. However, a more natural relationship does 
seem to exist in rural areas and it is not unusual to see a baguette bearing 
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gendarme in friendly conversation with local citizens, so it can and does happen 
informally but not in the areas where it is most needed.  
The foregoing comparisons of this chapter have illuminated a number of 
key areas. Comparison of the operational dimension shows strong elements of 
convergence. The sustained trend towards a more militarised structure, 
equipment and agency in the policing of public order evidences this well. At the, 
more politically sensitive, institutional dimension it seems clear that trajectories 
are rather more divergent even though there are also recognisable similarities of 
historical and social context. This divergence is bound to affect the operational 
dimension in terms of national policies but this does not diminish the significance 
??? ?????????????? ??????? ???????s steered ongoing police operational development 
at strategic and tactical levels. 
Whilst exact parallels were not always obtainable, areas of distinctiveness 
and similarities have been identified as required by the thesis research questions. 
These are related to the role of the police in dealing with disorder and the areas 
of convergence and divergence of ideas, structures and practices evident in the 
British and French policing styles invite a number of conclusions, which are 
explained in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Eight 
If disorder is ever to be prevented by force, it is better that it be done effectively 
and with only as much force as is necessary  (Waddington PAJ 1993 p366) 
  
Conclusions 
 This thesis has established how the strategies and tactics of public order policing 
are shaped and influenced by particular configurations of history, interpretations 
of the police function and operational culture. Through the application of a 
comparative research design it has been shown how different trajectories of 
development can be detected in French and English approaches to public order 
management and that contemporary approaches can only be properly understood 
by connecting to these deeper issues of social organisation. 
The comparative research design informing the study has afforded valuable 
insights into the nature and style of the approaches adopted in the two countries. 
Structured and focused comparisons have been made, where the research 
questions and the class of events to be studied were specified. The variables were 
defined and characterised (George & Bennett 2005) by the ?Flashpoints? 
framework. The comparative approach facilitated the development of a more 
critical perspective on both French and British public order policing, by using each 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????by-‐product??has probably 
allowed a greater degree of neutrality than would otherwise have been possible 
through a straightforward juxtaposition of the two national codes.  
These insights have furnished the evidence for conclusions to be drawn in the 
following areas related to the policing of public order: national cultures; 
central/devolved structures; institutional dimensions; public approval; 
operational readiness and efficacy; community engagement; and the usefulness of 
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????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
knowledge and suggest how both French and British responses to public order 
might benefit through their consideration. Policy relevant knowledge includes 
conceptual models, generic knowledge and actor specific models and can assist in 
bridging the gap between theory and practice (George & Bennett 2005). Whilst 
this might be ?indirect or limited? in terms of policy formulation, it should be 
considered as ?critical for the development and choice of sound policies? (George 
& Bennett 2005 p285). The findings of this study amount to policy relevant 
knowledge. 
 These conclusions are grounded in the foundations illuminated by this 
study. First, in a liberal democracy an effective civil police force is a necessity 
given that ?policing is at the heart of the functioning of the state? (Reiner 1992 
p761). In such democracies civil and human rights are foundational principles that 
allow citizens the right to peaceful protest, which may require tolerance of civil 
disobedience and minor breaches of the law. Balancing the rights of diverse 
groups is complex and sometimes extremely challenging but violent disorder is not 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
or riots, of the kind seen at Bradford in 2001 and in Paris in 2005 and 2007 does 
amount to a form of protest, for in the words of the then Federal Communications 
Commissioner Nicholas Johnson, speaking after the 1968 riots in Washington, D.C. 
?A riot is somebody talking. A riot is a man crying out; l????????????????????????????
?????????? ????????????????? ??? ????????????????????????? ??????????? (Gilbert 1968). 
Resistance is a natural reaction to dissatisfaction and should be understood as 
?always necessarily being part of the order being resisted? (Leite 2001 p24).  
When violent disorder does occur it can easily fall beyond the capability of 
????????? ????????? ??? ?????????? ??? ???????????? ???? ????????? ?????????? ??? ???? ?????
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studies carried out for this thesis. As such, it is necessary that an effective public 
order policing capability is available and that this capability must be disciplined, 
highly trained and above all well commanded. This requires investment of time, 
expertise and ultimately money.  
It is apparent that the French model caters very well for this requirement 
with its full time specialist GM and CRS assets that are available in significant 
numbers at short notice allowing for early resolution of disorder situations. The 
British model of ?????????????????????????????????contrôlée? system than a national 
corporation. As such its response to public disorder of any magnitude is less 
effective, hampered by its present ponderous call out requirement that provides a 
minimally trained, part time, ad hoc response to mutual aid requests as was 
evident during the disturbances that started in London during August 2011. There 
is a strong case for suggesting that the British model needs to change. It is not 
inconceivable that a refinement to the existing system is possible and that public 
order policing in Britain would benefit from a more centralised national structure 
controlling regionally based but locally deployable units. Consideration needs to 
be given to the idea of augmenting and improving the existing public order 
capacity and capability. The need for this was recognised by a number of 
respondents, when referring to many issues, who listed: the efficiency of 
response; increased professionalism; a national code of conduct with minimum 
standards; understanding of the application of human rights at a tactical level; 
improved command and fitness for role; all of which would be better catered for 
in a national structure similar to that implemented for serious crime etc..   
The very recent events that occurred between 6th and 10th August 2011 in 
London and other large cities around Britain highlighted the initial lack of an 
effective police response. Simply put there were not enough police officers 
available to stop the blatant and serious crime and disorder that was taking place. 
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The result was that a number of businesses were looted and some totally 
destroyed. These disorders were strikingly similar to those that occurred in France 
??? ??????????? ??????? ??? ??????? ?????? ????? ???? ????? ????????????? ???????????? ????
police or other public service personnel.  
There has been a great deal of comment to the effect that British police 
strategy and tactics were ineffective and require development, particularly with 
regard to the mobility and fluidity of the groups involved and their use of modern 
communication technology. Whilst there is always benefit to be gained through 
review, this study has already shown that British police public order tactics deal 
quite adequately ????? ?fluid, mobile and networked groups practising guerrilla 
rioting tactics?? ??????? ??????????? ?n truth such tactics are in use almost weekly 
throughout the football season when dealing with risk groups intent on violent 
confrontation with other groups or the police, or when dealing with small but 
organised protest groups such as the Animal Liberation Front and other extreme 
single issue groups. Such events though are usually planned for and police 
resources are consequently more readily available.  
The operational problem in the early stages of the August 2011 
disturbances was simply that the police could not muster sufficient officers to key 
locations quickly enough due to the cumbersome mutual aid system described 
earlier. Lack of usable intelligence was also a factor (HMIC 2011a). When police 
reinforcements eventually arrived the disorder ceased. It is fair to say that 
dealing with several seats of disorder across a large area in any country is always 
going to be extremely challenging, sometimes even impossible, but the French 
would have had access to the 30,000+ members of their specialist GM and CRS 
units within a much shorter timescale. Such a capability affords a realistic 
strategy of early resolution. This reinforces a contention of this thesis ? that the 
public order response in Britain requires restructuring and refinement.  
252  
  
Whether or not there is any real prospect of a distinct intermediate 
national policing body directed towards protective services such as public order, 
anti-‐terrorism and serious/organised crime is debateable due to the tenacious but 
somewhat dogmatic defence of existing traditions apparent in the HMIC report on 
nurturing the British model of policing. Whilst that report makes some very 
sensible recommendations, it seeks throughout to justify the British model, rather 
than give real consideration to more radical alternatives that would add to and 
enhance what might be becoming a false idol. If the British model of policing is to 
be true to its ???????? ???????? ???? ??????? ??? ???? ??????????? ??????? ?????? ??? ???
raised. At Bradford in 2001 this level of policing was a posting that officers sought 
to avoid or to get away from (interview sources 3 + 6). This is still echoed around 
the country with local policing, both response and neighbourhood, seemingly the 
place that few wish to remain, with better prospects, remuneration and higher 
status possible in the specialist departments. This needs to be turned on its head 
and local policing viewed as the pinnacle of the organisation???????????ntion of the 
????? ??? ?????????? ??? ???????? ??????? ???? ?????? ??? ???????? ???????? ???????? ?007 
p216). Ideally these officers should be the most able and receive higher reward 
than their departmental colleagues, to reflect the importance and difficulty of 
the role, as it is here that the difference is made.  
This thesis argues that the more defined and ultimately less intractable 
policing functions such as public order, firearms and criminal investigation would 
??? ??????? ??????? ??? ????? ??? ?? ???????????? ?????????? ??????????? ????? ??? ????????
deployed, regionally based and nationally structured. Such a mode of organisation 
would offer better command and control of units that would be able to respond to 
a variety of problems more quickly and effectively than at present. 
???????????????? ????? ????? ?the police are providers of a mundane public 
service, not sacred totems of national pride? (1992 p780), whilst probably not 
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widely subscribed to in policing circles, does have a contemporary resonance as 
British police forces wrestle with the effects of the current economic crisis. 
Budgetary cuts and an increasing likelihood of significant industrial disputes will 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????will have 
to continue to make unpopular decisions such as the closure of local police 
stations (BBC News 2011/2011a; Sawer 2007;  This is Bristol 2011). These stations 
are a physical representation of police permanence in communities and their 
closure further signals an ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
identification with their police.   
The case studies developed in this thesis show that where both French and 
British public order policing failed was in the area of community engagement and 
the consequent information and intelligence deficit. This is a key area as 
intelligence has to provide the justification for the policing options that are 
planned for in any operation, as it is the key to judicial approval (3 Serjeants Inn 
2002). In the case of Bradford, the structures necessary for effective gathering of 
community information were in place, albeit inchoate. But due to police attitudes 
towards Bradford, and in particular towards the South Asian population of 
Manningham, the flow and interpretation of it was not sufficient or sophisticated 
enough (Interviews 3, 4 + 6). Whilst the practice of obtaining and analysing 
community intelligence has improved nationally, it is fair to say that even now 
intelligence systems in Britain do not always provide the contextual or specific 
detail necessary for predictive interpretation and effective prevention of 
disorder.  
In this specific area some further restructuring and refinement of 
community intelligence procedures would be required for a national or regional 
protective services approach to be successful. It has been found that 
implementing a methodology where police officers have to critically engage by 
254  
  
??????? ??????????????? ????? ?? ????????? ????? ?????????? ???????? ??? ?????????? ???
effective levels of intelligence are to be secured (Innes and Roberts 2007 p6; 
Innes 2011 p79). It has also been said that police officers can be resistant to 
submitting intelligence if they perceive that it has little or no direct relevance to 
their role. It is right then to assert that a meaningful connectivity between local 
police teams and a national/regional body would only be possible if intelligence 
was processed and structured so that the interpretation and sharing of it were 
procedural, or in other words, embedded in police culture. In this way it would be 
possible to ensure that any regional or national response to local policing issues, 
within a preventative strategy or as a reaction to serious crime or large scale 
disorder, would be appropriately informed.  
This study has shown that in community intelligence terms, the 
comparative lack of community engagement by the police in France makes their 
operational decisions less well informed than those of their counterparts in 
Britain. The French case study showed that the relationship between the police 
and the residents of sensitive areas was wholly conflictual and the lack of any 
effective communication systems ensured that the police were relatively starved 
of any useful community feedback. It is apparent that community engagement is a 
necessity if police officers are to discharge their duties in a manner beneficial to 
both the public and the state. As such the British model, when implemented 
correctly, is more effective in communitarian terms than the French. In truth 
French police officers and previous policy makers have recognised this and it was 
precisely that recognition that resulted in the establishment, albeit only 
temporaril??? ??? ???? ???????? ??? ??????????. If this initiative had been given the 
necessary political, institutional and financial investment it may have developed 
into a more effective community service than it did. It has become even clearer 
that in respect of community policing, the British and French models are 
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increasingly divergent as the recent conservative French government moved away 
from this approach again and opted for a more punitive but politically 
advantageous course. Even local French policing teams adopted a more overtly 
????????????????????????????????????????????????, which did little to persuade the 
marginalised population groups of the fairness of republican ideals. Unless it is 
changed, such an approach will perpetuate the police lack of community 
knowledge and consequent mutual lack of understanding.  
The analytic framework adopted for this thesis was an adapted and 
???????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????hich has 
proved to be both effective and thorough in it coverage of the critical areas. Due 
to their interdependence and overlapping nature, its seven levels of structuration 
ensure that the necessary ground is covered and that nothing is overlooked in 
terms of accounting for both the contextual and interactional causal factors 
involved in generating mass public order incidents. As a part of this comparative 
study of public order policing in France and Britain, it has served well to ensure 
that as much symmetry as possible was achieved and gave the comparison a 
depth, breadth and flow that resulted in credible findings. 
 The main criticism of the model coming from this study is that those 
levels of structuration are unnecessarily unwieldy in use and their 
interdependence needs to be fully understood as being essential ? the whole in 
this case being far greater than the sum of the parts. This could be readily 
achieved by a simplification of the model, banding the first six levels (Structural; 
Political/Ideological; Cultural; Contextual; Situational; Police Traditions/Policies) 
????????????????????????? ? because that is what they are. They are all important 
factors and viable as levels of analysis in their own right, but as different aspects 
of context, together providing a detailed contextual picture. The original 
????????????? ?????? ???? ??? ??????? ??????? simply ??????????????? ???????????? ????
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???????????????? ?????? ??? ????? ??????? ??? ???? ???????? ??? ??? ??? ???????? ??? ????
interactional level that the final flashpoint or trigger of disorder is found. It is the 
context that delivers the tension in the social environment that makes it possible 
for disorder to occur.  
??? ????????????? ??????????? ???? ?F?????????????????????????????????????????
incident analysis tool, a way of debriefing an outbreak of disorder to make sense 
of it and to hopefully use the product data to prevent further problems. The 
?F???????????? ?????? ??? ??????????? ?? ?????????? ???? ??????ing contextual 
intelligence. The model in the adapted format suggested above shows some 
promise as a tool for ongoing, and near real time, community threat assessment; 
always bearing in mind that ??????? ??? ?????????????????? ???????????????? ????? ???
use the ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
would inform the ?????? ???????????? ????????? ??????? ???? ??????? ?? maintaining 
???????? ??????? ????????? ???? ???? ??????????? ??? ?????????? ?????? ????? the National 
Community Tension Teams (NCTT)  ?????????????????????ê??????????????????????????
extremist terrorism,  ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
assessment process in Britain. Forces have developed their own systems that may 
already consider the necessary components, but they would be improved by 
???????????? ????????????? ?????????????? ?????????? ???????????????????? ??????????
preventative function. Utilisation of the framework certainly encourages the user 
to consider the wider political and social contexts that give meaning to how 
people and communities think and feel.    
All of the British police interviewees were emphatic about the importance 
of local knowledge to successful policing and about the need for meaningful 
community engagement in order to achieve this. Independent research findings 
have underlined the need for well received and processed information, ideally 
freely given by reliable sources for the greater good. It ?gives a sense of how to 
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act at some point in the future, under certain conditions, in order to achieve 
particular objectives? (Innes & Roberts 2007 p2). More succinctly, community 
information is key to making informed decisions without which any police 
interventions, no matter how well intentioned will carry significant risks. It is 
from such sources that the ?views, needs and expectations of a community? can 
be gauged (Innes & Roberts 2007 p3). 
????????????????????????? contextual levels of analysis do not have to be 
used after the event. If we accept that social science needs to engage more 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
again, and how they are shaped by the enduring spatial logic of urban life and the 
interconnected social worlds we inha????? ????????????????????? ??????????????????
greater potential. Some alignment with other effective community intelligence 
???????????? ???? ????????? ????????? ????? ??? ??????? ??????? ???????? ??????????????
?????????????? ???????????? ??? ???? ?????????????? ????????? in its adapted form 
would give police commanders a more comprehensive understanding of the 
precursors of disorder within the communities they serve. At the very least it 
would evidence analysis and evaluation of local conditions and an ongoing 
commitment and desire to anticipate and mitigate contingencies. Further 
research and consideration of the potential for creating a flexible and effective 
threat/risk assessment methodology is necessary. It is also worth exploring 
whether such a methodology could resu?????????????????????????????????????????????
regarding the likelihood of disorder. 
The foregoing considerations have present relevance as Lord Stevens, 
former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police is leading The Independent 
Commission on the Future of Policing, that was initiated  by the Labour Party (in 
opposition) because of growing concerns regarding the future of the British police 
(Independent Police Commission 2012). Additionally a review of police leadership 
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and training carried out by Peter Neyroud has made a number of 
recommendations that, whilst not explicitly aimed at public order policing, 
suggest a need for significant political and institutional change to the present 
system. ?????????? ???????????????? ???? ???????? ????????? ????? the present 
government??? ???????????????????????????????????????? ?????????? ??? ???????????????
authorities with elected Police and Crime Commissioners, whilst at the same time 
adopting a more national approach (Neyroud 2010 p8). There is potential for 
public order policing to act as a further catalyst for significant structural and 
institutional change to policing in the round that has been outlined in the Neyroud 
review and this has been reinforced by the findings of this comparative study.  
However, the present government appears to lack any real understanding 
of the realities of policing and there is a clearly discernable tension between 
those foundational Peelian principles and this government?s apparent desire for 
more direct control of the police through commissioners elected along party 
political lines, coupled with debilitating cost cutting. It is reasonable to argue 
that this conflict of interest will impinge upon the operational independence of 
chief officers. Police forces will have to prioritise, focusing more tightly on the 
most harmful problems (Innes 2011a) at the expense of some of their traditional 
but less pressing functions. This is bound to have consequences for public 
satisfaction and confidence in the police. There is a similar tension apparent here 
to the HMIC local/national dichotomy mentioned in the previous chapter. It is 
clear that significant areas of policing in Britain are moving, if not intentionally, 
towards a more national structure that is convergent with the French model.  
Specifically regarding the policing of disorder, there has been an 
incremental convergence of ideas and approaches. It is difficult to pin this 
increased convergence to one particular incident or event but British public order 
policing started to change character during the 1970s and more significantly after 
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??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
began to look more and more like those utilised by other nationalities ? notably 
continental forces. In truth most public order tactics are not new developments, 
being similar to those employed by Roman legionaries, such as shield cordons, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ns or 
options e.g. containment or dispersal of crowds.  
This ongoing convergence of public order practice could be linked to a 
process of Europeanisation, driven by EU initiatives such as the European Police 
College (Cepol), but is just as likely to be a result of the need to develop better 
methods and a willingness amongst practitioners to share learning to that end. 
This was evident between 2003 and 2008 when several nationalities attended the 
series of exercises hosted by the GN at St Astier. Far reaching developments  in the 
international arena, such as terrorism and protest have also necessitated a 
greater shared agency and convergence more generally. 
Whether this convergence is occurring by design or via a process of 
?????????????? ??????, it is high time that British strategic decision makers gave 
fresh consideration to whether foundational Peelian principles need to be 
reconceptualised to better address post-‐modern policing requirements,  
particularly in relation to public order policing. Twenty first century policing 
organisations need to be sure that they are not steeped in nineteenth century 
ideals (Savage, Charman & Cope 2000) that are no longer relevant. The reviews by 
Peter Neyroud and Lord Stevens could provide just such an opportunity.  
 Clearly the need for research into policing generally, as well as into its 
specialist disciplines, is vital and will doubtless continue. However it needs to be 
encouraged more and appropriately funded. Competent research will inform more 
effective operational agency and lead to improved public satisfaction. More 
specifically, this study has shown that much can be learned from a comparative 
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approach and significant further critical analysis through comparison with other 
national models is recommended. Wider research would provide a better 
understanding of where British public order policing can improve through 
absorption and adaptation of better strategies, tactics and equipment that exist 
to be identified elsewhere. It would also highlight how and where undoubted 
???????? ?????????? ???? ??? ???????? ?????????? ????? ????????? ????????es to policing 
improvement.    
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